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 Nationalism is rising in Europe and the world. Much of it responds to massive 
migration, with nationalistic Europeans vocalizing their belief that immigrants do not 
“belong” in their countries. Many states respond to this influx of people and rising anti-
immigrant sentiment by creating laws demanding immigrant “integration.” Yet a clear 
understanding of what defines “integration” remains elusive. So too does an 
understanding of how laws aimed at immigrant integration influence relationships 
between immigrants and local citizens, institutions, and spaces. This research addresses 
both of these points in Belgium, a politically and culturally fractured country that serves 
as a microcosm of Europe’s integration debates. This research investigates “integration” 
laws in Wallonia, Belgium’s francophone region, and understandings of integration and 
belonging as considered by: (1) workers tasked with implementing Wallonia’s integration 
laws, (2) migrants affected by these laws, and (3) locals comprising the “host society” 
into which migrants are to integrate according to the laws. 
 Findings from interviews with integration workers show that “integration” cannot 
conceptually be categorized as an either/or proposition set forth by the state along a 
multicultural versus assimilationist ideological spectrum. Workers simultaneously 
incorporate elements from normative assimilationist and multicultural models to create a 
localized sense of integration. Actors implementing integration laws do so differently—at 
a localized level—based on divergent ideas of belonging and community. Each worker 
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has his or her own notions of how things should be, or how they are on the ground, and 
acts accordingly. Laws may dictate one thing; workers may do another.  
 Findings from interviews with migrants engaging with Wallonia’s legally 
mandated integration programs reveal that migrants’ seemingly instrumental decision to 
acquire legal citizenship is not devoid of emotion. Many maintain an attachment to the 
country’s political culture, meaning safety, personal liberty, and legal institutions, rather 
than the national culture. Others seek legal citizenship to secure a sense of belonging in 
their new state. The migrants’ emotional attachments to the state are thus real, but 
perhaps without the full panoply of emotions desired by nationalists. 
 Findings from interviews with locals considered members of the “host society” 
provides empirical evidence contesting the idea of uniform host societies and congruity 
between society and state (or even substate) boundaries. Host societies are not monolithic 
entities and nationalist ideologies do not necessarily shape immigration, integration, and 
citizenship policies in any singular way; there is a process that significantly varies across 
national space. This variance results from fellow community members’ competing 
imaginaries and emotional attachments to place that may be more local in nature. Each 
person acts according to his or her own notions of who they are and who members of 
their fellow community are. So while certain ideas/societal conceptions may appear one 
way, everyday imaginations may be different. This contributes to an increasing literature 
focused on host society perceptions. And it provides a new framework for considering 
ordinary persons’ perspectives by engaging elements from existing frameworks 
addressing nationalism and identity (everyday nationhood and belonging). 
vii 
In sum, this research expands theoretical frameworks regarding belonging, 
citizenship, and identity while simultaneously providing informed perspectives to those 
working with immigrants and also officials crafting integration laws.  
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“Belgians, I think because of their history and their geographic situation, … 
never had a nationalist feeling like other nations. The French are truly French. 
The Dutch have their distinct colors and manner of dress. A German is German. 
An English is English. By nature Belgians adapt to everything and everyone. That 
is part of our DNA. That’s how we live. A Belgian is never going to confront, he is 
going to go around. So you see, in all, Belgians are not really a nationalistic 
people.” 
– Claude, Braine-le-Château, Belgium, July 4, 2018 
 
 This narrative by Claude, a native Belgian living in the country’s francophone 
region known as Wallonia, summarizes what initially seems to be a common sentiment 
concerning Belgian nationalism, at least in Wallonia. Nationalist parties received less 
than 0.004% of Wallonia’s vote in the 2019 federal elections. But in Belgium overall, 
nationalist parties secured 29% of the federal parliament’s seats (the largest single share) 
after earning over 43% of the Flemish vote in the same federal elections (IBZ n.d.). 
Nationalist parties acknowledge their position criticizing mass immigration as 
contributing to their electoral success (e.g., Cerulus 2019; Crisp 2019). Claude’s 
comment about Belgian adaptation rather than confrontation thus appears disconnected 
from present realities as politicians in Belgium (including Wallonia) and elsewhere 
increasingly confront immigration-related issues—particularly those addressing 
integration. 
 Indeed, massive migration into Europe in the wake of the Syrian civil war 
revitalized long-standing debates about immigrant integration. Nationalistic Europeans 
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increasingly vocalize their belief that migrants do not “belong” in their countries—a 
position amplified by the terror attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016 since all of 
the terrorists had migrant backgrounds (Erlanger 2016). Yet a clear understanding of 
what defines “integration” remains elusive. Many scholars theorize integration as an 
idealized end-state wherein migrants adapt and become absorbed into a clearly 
homogenous host society (Nagel 2009). Politicians largely adhere to the predominant 
scholarly perspective. They actively construct ideas of who the host society is and how 
“others” are supposed to behave to become like them; and they use laws to achieve their 
goals (Calavita 2005). Scholars give significant attention to these national philosophies 
and models of integration (e.g., Favell 2016; Goodman 2014; Joppke 2007a). However, 
despite similar academic and policy approaches to integration, scholars to date have 
largely failed to address how laws aimed at immigrant integration influence migrants’ 
experiences with local institutions and spaces and their relationships with non-migrants. 
The focus instead is on views propagated by the state, prominent political parties, and/or 
by policymakers themselves (e.g., Antonsich & Petrillo 2019; Jensen 2014; Joppke 2010, 
2007a; Spiro 2008). Research is largely top-down and institutional (Knott 2019). 
Consequently, scholarship implicitly reinforces political leaders’ assumptions about 
immigrants as passive objects of law and policy; and these leaders’ beliefs, as legally 
embodied expectations, may be inconsistent across jurisdictions (national, provincial, 
municipal) and unequally applied because of the ways local actors implement integration 
laws (Xhardez 2019; Eggebø 2013). Without adequately analyzing migrant (Pogonyi 
2019) and non-migrant (Antonsich 2012) perspectives on integration, including how they 
may differ from/coincide with those in legislative edicts, scholars undervalue non-
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migrants and migrants’ roles in achieving a peaceful coexistence and instead risk 
bolstering nationalistic claims that immigrants alone must adapt to politically created 
social narratives. 
This study seeks to remedy this gap by examining enacted integration laws and 
using them as a reference point in order to more fully illuminate how migrants and non-
migrants mutually produce “integration.” Its starting point is integration laws in Belgium, 
an immigrant hub with a diverse immigrant population and localized integration laws. 
Studies concerning immigrant integration in Belgium consistently focus on Flanders 
(e.g., Waerniers & Hustinx 2019; Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015) or the Brussels-Capital 
Region (e.g., Xhardez 2016; Swyngedouw 2019) and these regions’ respective 
integration laws. Those that discuss Wallonia’s integration laws usually do so in 
informational terms of comparison with Flanders or the Brussels-Capital Region (e.g., 
Martiniello & Rea, 2018; Xhardez 2015; Adam & Jacobs 2014; Van Avermaet & Gysen 
2009), or they broadly address Wallonia’s integration philosophy (e.g., Martiniello 2013, 
1995; Adam & Martiniello 2013; Martiniello, Rea, & Dassetto 2006). Studies that 
consider Wallonia’s integration laws more in depth are unfortunately outdated due to 
changes in Walloon law starting in 2014 (e.g., Adam 2013, 2011; Torrekens et al 2014). 
Catherine Xhardez (2019) did do an in-depth comparison of Walloon and Flemish laws in 
the early 2000s, but again there is nothing contemporary. Nor is there a study that 
considers Wallonia’s non-migrant perspectives. The focus here is Wallonia. 
Using qualitative methods, including in-depth interviews and participant 
observation, this study addresses dominant and subordinate discourses and practices 
relating to integration, and how these understandings do or do not correspond with what 
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Wallonia’s integration laws dictate. It does so by targeting three key populations with 
differing connections to integration laws. These are: (1) workers tasked with 
implementing integration laws; (2) immigrants affected by these laws; and (3) locals 
comprising the “host society” into which migrants are to integrate according to the laws. 
Considering these varied populations is particularly salient when discussing integration 
laws as such laws’ purpose is presumably to shape migrants and non-migrants alike and 
their relationships with each other. Yet integration studies typically do not simultaneously 
consider migrant and non-migrant viewpoints. They instead focus separately on either 
state (Antonsich & Petrillo 2019;), migrant (Ehrkamp 2005), or local population 
(Strømsø 2019) perspectives. Segmenting studies in such a way makes it difficult to 
understand law’s influence on integration as a whole rather than a component part. But as 
shown in the holistic approach considering migrant and non-migrant perspectives applied 
here, laws may influence integration discourses without necessarily defining those 
discourses.  
Considering the varied populations connected to integration laws reveals three 
broad points elaborated in this dissertation. First, “integration” cannot conceptually be 
categorized as an either/or proposition set forth at the state (or even sub-state) level along 
a multicultural versus assimilationist ideological spectrum. Second, migrants affected by 
integration laws have emotional attachments to their new place of residence and do not 
see formal citizenship simply in instrumental terms. Third, the “host society” that 
integration laws presume exists (and that migrants are to integrate into) cannot be 
categorized as homogenous or “national” based on the locals living there. This moves 
away from a monolithic view of a host society by considering how local interactions, 
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attitudes, and dynamics complicate national approaches and philosophies of integration. 
This study thus contributes to broader integration discourses by showing the connection – 
or lack thereof – between integration laws and the localized, coexistent experiences 
between migrants and non-migrants. 
1.1 Research Questions and Approach 
The primary questions guiding this study are: What legal constructs (state and 
local) are shaping integration? How do local actors interpret and implement these legal 
constructs? How do immigrants and non-immigrants understand and respond to 
integration laws? These questions address integration on a practical, everyday level as 
migrants and non-migrants live together in a shared space. Focusing on the everyday 
exemplifies the approach applied in this study that critically examines “integration.” This 
critical approach considers integration as a set of political processes in which immigrants 
and host groups together “make sameness” by determining differences that do/do not 
matter (Nagel 2009). The parties effectively decide who and what “belongs” in a place. 
This makes the notion of “belonging” a key component in investigating integration 
politics.  
Belonging, as considered by some and as applied here, is a concept that focuses 
on two aspects (Antonsich 2010). The first is an individual’s personal sense of belonging 
to a particular place (a feeling of being “at home”). The second is broader societal 
concepts of inclusion/exclusion considering whether a person or group of persons does or 
does not “belong” to a particular group or identity (Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2011). 
Belonging thus sheds light on the social dynamics between immigrants and native-born 
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citizens. It reveals how communities produce and regulate boundaries in terms of who 
is/is not welcome within them. In short, belonging calls attention to both dominant and 
subordinate groups’ perspectives. It is a bottom-up approach to examining integration, 
including questions of individual identity and emotional attachment. While many 
scholars appeal to belonging, including geographers studying migration (Gilmartin 2008), 
they tend to address one aspect of belonging or the other (not both), and they typically 
focus only on migrants’ perspectives (e.g., Staeheli & Nagel 2006; Ehrkamp 2005). Here, 
however, this study employs the broader understanding of belonging as a conceptual 
framework to consider the social dynamics between migrants and non-migrants living in 
Wallonia.  
Because this study also considers integration as law and policy, it incorporates 
ideas of citizenship as a legal dimension of belonging. “Citizenship” makes “social, 
cultural and political distinctions both within and between political communities. Who 
counts as a citizen depends on relations not only with others outside ‘our’ space but also 
with others within it” (Painter and Philo, 1995: 118). In effect, there is no citizenship, no 
“belonging,” absent common identities that contrast with markers of difference.   
To more fully explore the relationship between integration laws and belonging 
(meaning immigrants and locals’ perspectives), this study targeted three key populations 
with differing connections to integration laws (workers, immigrants, and locals 
comprising the “host society”), as mentioned above. Each population group has different 
perspectives on integration, citizenship, a “Belgian” identity, and what it means to belong 
in Belgium based on their lived experiences. These perspectives at times exist in tension 
with one another. At other moments they are in agreement. Accordingly, the respective 
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perspectives provide a foundation for better understanding integration by revealing issues 
of sameness/difference among migrants and non-migrants that do/do not matter (e.g., 
Nagel, 2009; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). This dissertation presents perspectives from each 
group in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
A final conceptual consideration guiding this research is that of “locality.” There 
is no consensus in geography about locality’s definition (Jones et al 2014). Some see 
locality as “the [physical] setting in which everyday life is most concentrated for a group 
of people” (Agnew 2002; p. 16), the scale defined by people’s day-to-day 
activities (Clarke 2013). Localities under this second approach include neighborhoods, 
churches/mosques, workplaces, schools, and so forth. Geographers studying nations and 
nationalism tend to adopt this approach (e.g., Mills 2007; Jones & Desforges 2003). So 
do many migration scholars, particularly those considering transnationalism and 
migrants’ identifying with more than one space (e.g., Herrmann, R.K., Risse-Kappen, T., 
& Brewer, M.B. 2004). Other scholars define locality simply as a place or region of 
subnational scale (Painter 2009). A locality could thus be a city, commune, or even a 
collection of communes. This understanding is popular among migration scholars who, 
like urban geographers, tend to use locality synonymously with “city” (e.g., Krawatzek & 
Sasse 2020; Glick Schiller & Çağlar 2009) or village (e.g., Anghel 2016). Both of 
locality’s standard definitions are relevant here. First, this study considers integration in 
an everyday manner by its research questions and study populations, as described above. 
Localities of the everyday factor in to this study and analysis as shown in the ensuing 
chapters that consider regional integration centers, citizenship courses, and the Walloon 
region. Second, this study highlights integration occurring on a regional scale in a divided 
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state. Belgium grants competence (legislative authority) over immigrant integration to 
regional parliaments in Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region rather than 
to the central state (Adam and Jacobs, 2014). This division results in integration laws that 
at times conflict and at others coincide (Adam and Martiniello, 2013; Xhardez, 2019). 
The subnational locality focus for this study is Wallonia, Belgium’s francophone region. 
To demonstrate why Wallonia is a compelling area to consider integration laws and 
belonging, I must first contextualize integration politics in Belgium. 
1.2 Integration Politics in the Belgian Context  
1.2.1 Belgium’s contemporary immigrant situation and governing structure 
Belgium provides a unique environment to consider immigrant integration, laws, 
and localities for a number of reasons. First, Belgium’s immigration experience relates to 
broader European security concerns as the country served as the base of operations for 
the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks, though not all of the perpetrators were Belgian 
nationals (Schreur & Bilefsky, 2017). Politicians throughout Europe seized on the attacks 
to call for stricter laws governing immigrants and mandating integration (Erlanger, 2016). 
Belgian legislators were no different; lawmakers at all levels responded by proposing and 
adopting rules ostensibly intended to promote immigrant “integration” (European 
Migration Network (“EMN”) 2016 Annual Report, 2017). One measure requires 
immigrants to sign a pledge promising to accept Belgium’s “local values” (Guardian 
2016). Integration laws effectively gained new urgency and prominence in Belgium (and 
across Europe) following the attacks.  
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Second, Belgium it is an immigrant hub with a diverse immigrant population. 
Eighteen percent of its total population was foreign born in 2010 (Petrovic, 2012). These 
immigrants are mostly European, with roughly 70% of all immigrants who live in 
Belgium coming from other European Union countries (“A statistical overview,” n.d.). 
But the country also receives large numbers of immigrants from non-EU countries. For 
instance, the 2015 immigrant wave into Europe contributed to a greater proportional 
population increase in Belgium than it did in Germany or France (Connor & Krogstad, 
2016), two countries that dominate scholarship regarding immigrants (e.g., Ehrkamp, 
2006; Croucher, 2009). Third, Belgium’s broad experience with both European and non-
European immigrants alike is distinctive and allows for useful comparisons with more 
commonly studied countries like France and Germany. Integration studies in these other 
countries frequently focus on racial and/or religious minorities with non-European origins 
(e.g., Favell, 2016; Ehrkamp, 2005). Belgium, on the other hand, has large numbers of 
immigrants that are neither racial nor religious minorities because of their European 
origins. So integration discourses in Belgium may differ, as might the lived reality for 
immigrants and local citizens alike vis-à-vis societal expectations and immigrant 
integration.  
Belgium’s federal political system provides perhaps the most compelling reason 
to consider law and locality in integration discourses. Belgium began in 1830 as a unitary 
state with French as the sole official language. The country had been part of the 
Netherlands since 1815, but the predominantly Catholic population resented interference 
in their territory by a protestant king (see, e.g., Cook, 2004). Following independence, a 
minority French-speaking elite dominated government and educational institutions, as 
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well as commerce in urban areas throughout the country, including the country’s 
Flemish-speaking northern half known as Flanders. Much of the country spoke only 
Flemish, also known as “Belgian Dutch.” Starting in the mid-19th century, Flemish 
speakers, known as Flemings, began advocating for linguistic equality with French. 
Beginning in the early 20th century, some advocated for complete independence for 
Flanders (see, e.g., Murphy 1988). This advocacy eventually led to six state reforms 
between 1970 and 2014 that resulted in Belgium becoming “a federal state, composed of 
communities and regions” (First Article of Belgian Constitution). The federated entities 
include three regions and three linguistic communities. Each federated entity has its own 
parliament equal in authority as the national parliament within their legally assigned 
competencies (Deschouwer 2012). The regions are: the Flemish Region (Flanders); the 
Walloon Region (Wallonia); and the Brussels-Capital Region (see Figure 1.1).  
“Communities” refers to the three official language groups present in Belgium: 
Dutch, French, and German. Dutch-speakers comprise the Flemish Community and live 
in Flanders and the Brussels-Capital Region. The French Community consists of 
Wallonia’s residents and all Francophones in the Brussels-Capital Region. The German-
speaking Community consists of nine municipalities located in Wallonia near the German 
border (see Figure 1.2). This community represents a tiny fraction of Belgium’s total 
population and does not have a separate region. The Flemish Community and the 
Flanders Region combined to create one federated entity legislating for all Flemings 
throughout the country (Adam and Jacobs, 2014). The combined Flemish parliament 
means that there are five parliaments between the regions and the communities. Laws 
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from these varying parliaments shape residents’ everyday lives depending on where they 
live within the country. 
While the regions maintain “territorial” competencies over socio-economic 
matters such as employment and economic policies, the linguistic communities’ 
competencies concern “personal matters” such as culture, welfare, and education, 
including policies regarding “immigrant integration” (Swyngedouw, 2016). Integration 
policy had rested with the federal government until 1980 and was uniform throughout the 
country (Adam, 2007). Following further devolution of power in 1993, the French 
Community subsequently shifted immigrant integration policy to the Walloon Region and 
the French-Community Commission of the Brussels-Capital Region1 (Adam, 2013). 
While Flemish integration policy remained consistent because of the single parliament 
legislating for all Flemings (Adam and Jacobs, 2014), the competency split between 
Wallonia and Brussels made integration laws for Francophones extremely place-based as 
the different entities created different policies. So Wallonia’s integration laws are 
distinctly Walloon.   
1.2.2 Wallonia’s integration laws and its regional integration centers (CRI) 
implementing them 
Wallonia’s integration laws received their start in 1996. That year, the Walloon 
government adopted a “decree on the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign 
origin” (4 juillet 1996 Décret). The law created six “regional integration centers” (centres 
régionaux d’intégration (CRI)) throughout Wallonia and tasked them with specific 
 
1 Now known as the Federation Brussels-Wallonia 
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integration objectives. These objectives included “promoting participation by foreigners 
and persons of foreign origin in cultural, social and economic life” as well as “promoting 
intercultural exchanges and respect for differences.” Neither assimilationist nor 
multiculturalist in character, the law’s aim was to provide a coherent integration policy 
that would, as the decree’s title suggests, target established migrants who had been in 
Belgium for a long period of time or their Belgian-born children (Torrekens et al. 2013; 
Adam 2013). The CRI would not take a frontline position vis-à-vis immigrants; they 
would instead partner with local associations that assisted immigrants on a day-to-day 
basis. In these partnerships, the CRIs would produce socio-cultural activities for 
immigrants and encourage civil society institutions to engage with immigrants (Adam 
2013). Their actions were similar to the Flemish Community’s creation of integration 
centers across Flanders in the 1980s. A significant difference, however, was that the 
Walloon Region did not establish a coordination structure to harmonize the CRIs’ 
policies (Adam 2013). The CRIs had great autonomy in their undertakings, and with that 
flexibility each had the ability to adapt to the needs of the localities they served. Some 
CRI have more Maghrebian immigrants in their service areas, for example, while other 
CRI encounter more sub-Saharan African immigrants; the “intercultural exchanges” each 
CRI promote could thus vary depending on the localized host and immigrant populations 
they serve. So everyday integration policies in Wallonia became more decentralized and 
determined at the sub-regional level by the CRI workers operating within their respective 
localities.  
Another factor fostering localized applications was that four of the first six CRI 
already existed as non-profit organizations with their own established objectives and 
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missions regarding immigrants (cf. Torrekens et al. 2014). Such was the case in Namur, 
Wallonia’s capital city. There, locals started the non-profit Socio-Cultural Center for 
Immigrants in Namur Province (Centre Socio Culturel Des Immigres de la Province de 
Namur) in 1982 to assist immigrants in the community. The association focused first on 
immigrants with European origins but then expanded its scope based on the changing 
nature of immigration to the area. In 1997, the association became one of the CRI and 
changed its name to the Intercultural Action Center – Namur (Centre d’action 
interculturelle – Namur (CAI – Namur)). But it continues to operate largely in the same 
manner since becoming a CRI. 
In 2009, the Walloon government amended the original decree creating the CRI to 
give the centers additional responsibilities. For the first time these included “frontline” 
responsibilities to provide French language instruction and impart “knowledge of Belgian 
institutions” (i.e., citizenship classes) (30 avril 2009 Décret). But CRIs acting as frontline 
actors would be limited. The CRIs would assume these duties only when other local 
associations or public authorities did not provide them or requested that the CRI offer the 
services. Second, the 2009 law tasked the CRIs with coordinating integration activities 
considered part of “local integration plans,” defined in the same law as plans created by 
individual municipalities (communes) within the CRIs’ localities. The purpose for each 
commune’s plan is to “promote[] the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign 
origin” by “highlighting their specific needs and defining strategies to be developed to 
better meet them.” So the 2009 decree further localized Wallonia’s integration policies as 
each CRI assumed greater contact with local political leaders crafting integration policies 
within that CRI’s locality. Each CRI working with local partner organizations also 
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crafted language and citizenship classes that might differ in a variety of ways, such as 
content emphasized, target audience (new arrivals versus persons of foreign origin 
already present in Belgium), participant composition (i.e., catering to specific ethnic 
groups), and so forth. The CRIs maintained a supporting role in this effort as second-line 
actors; the frontline actors actually working with migrants were the local organizations 
partnering with the CRIs or the local communes.  
 In 2014, the Walloon government issued another decree reshaping the CRIs’ 
missions yet again. This decree was the most expansive regarding the CRIs’ roles in 
integration. It assigned the centers primary responsibility for a newly mandatory 
“welcome course” (parcours d’acceuil) intended to “integrate newly arrived immigrants” 
within the CRIs’ territory and that immigrants had to follow (27 Mars 2014 Décret, 
Article 10). The CRIs became designated frontline actors for welcoming new arrivals. 
This role includes two parts. The first involves interviewing immigrants individually to 
better understand their needs and abilities. Second, the CRIs use information from those 
interviews to then guide migrants to the various local organizations providing French 
language lessons, citizenship classes (known as “Citizen Integration Training”), and other 
instructional/training components that comprise the welcome course. So the CRIs’ 
frontline contact with migrants is largely administrative in nature.  
The 2014 decree maintained the CRIs’ principal role as second-line actors 
ensuring coordination between all of the various local public and private actors 
implementing Wallonia’s welcome courses operating within their respective territories. 
The 2014 decree also ordered each center to “consult with the other centers in order to 
carry out coherent policies” throughout Wallonia (27 mars 2014 Décret, Art. 28). The 
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directive to consult with one another did not mean that each CRI lost its independence; 
the CRIs retain significant autonomy in developing projects and partnering with local 
associations who assist immigrants on a day-to-day basis. Rather, the directive provided 
the government with greater justification to fund a non-profit known as DisCRI 
(Dispositif de concertation et d’appui aux Centres Régionaux d’Intégration) that provides 
technical, logistical, and education support to Wallonia’s CRIs and that had been in 
existence since 2009. Some nevertheless argue that the enhanced legal requirements in 
this decree and the one from 2009 made Wallonia’s laws increasingly assimilationist 
(e.g., Gsir, Mandin & Mescoli, 2015) and more similar to Flemish integration laws (e.g., 
Xhardez, 2019). Yet the 2014 law stated that the region sought an “intercultural society” 
(27 mars 2014 Décret, Art. 6). The flexibility afforded the CRI in their frontline and 
second-line responsibilities means that the laws’ implementation nonetheless remains 
highly localized through the CRIs and their workers. 
One other decree bears briefly mentioning here. It passed in April 2016, just over 
one month after the Brussels terror attacks (27 avril 2016 Décret). The decree changed 
the name of the CRIs’ “welcome course” to “integration course” (parcours 
d’intégration). Since the terrorists came from Belgium but had foreign backgrounds 
(Schreur and Bilefsky, 2017), perhaps the name change resulted from political leaders 
seeking to appease an aggrieved public as the course’s requirements did not substantively 
change. The name change could have also been a way to appease Flemish politicians at 
the federal level, and specifically N-VA members. Regardless of the reason, the law was 
a name change, nothing more. 
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Today, there are eight CRI throughout Wallonia. Each center’s locality contains a 
varied population of immigrants, host society members, and frontline integration actors 
(the assorted nongovernmental organizations implementing components of Wallonia’s 
integration course). For example, CRILUX, the CRI whose locality includes 44 
communes throughout the Luxembourg province, has a much more rural-based 
population and coordinates with relatively few frontline actors compared to CRIPEL, the 
CRI centered in Liège, Wallonia’s largest city. CRIPEL works with 55 urban communes. 
Brabant-Wallon, CRIBW’s locality, includes thousands of European immigrants drawn 
to Belgium because of EU institutions headquartered nearby and who are not subject to 
Wallonia’s integration laws. The localities thus create different everyday engagements 
and negotiations for CRI workers implementing integration laws and the immigrants and 
host groups they work with.  
The increasing obligations for immigrant integration in Wallonia has not 
corresponded with an increase in nationalism. Nationalist parties received less than 
0.004% of Wallonia’s vote in the 2019 federal elections, for example (IBZ, n.d.). But it 
does not mean that nationalism is not affecting the Walloon government’s actions. In 
2012, nationalist and other parties at the federal level pushed for including integration as 
a condition for legal citizenship (Adam, Martiniello, and Rea, 2018). The national 
parliament retains competence over legal citizenship while integration remains at the 
regional level. The result was a revised national citizenship law demanding proof of one’s 
“social integration” as a condition of citizenship (see Loi du 4 décembre 2012). So 
Wallonia’s actions towards immigrants in mandating certain actions could be efforts to 
placate nationalists at the federal level. Or it could be that nationalism is growing in 
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Wallonia but remains unspoken politically while receiving tacit approval legislatively. 
Indeed, Wallonia’s demographics and socio-economic situation largely mirror those just 
across the border in northern France where National Rally,2 France’s most prominent 
nationalist party, enjoys a significant base of support (see e.g., Aisch et al, 2017). I do not 
make a determination on the issue on way or another here as the legislators’ purposes 
behind the laws in not the point of inquiry. I instead maintain focus on examining how 
integration laws shape interactions among migrants and non-migrants in localized 
contexts. 
Finally, integration in Wallonia remains relatively unexplored despite its distinct 
legal status. Studies consistently focus on integration policies in Flanders (e.g., Pulinx 
and Van Avermaet, 2015) or the Brussels-Capital Region (e.g., Xhardez, 2016). Those 
that do discuss Wallonia usually do so in informational terms of comparison with these 
other regions that are the primary focus of analysis (e.g., Adam and Jacobs 2014; Van 
Avermaet and Gysen 2009). I detail this prior work in Chapter Two. 
1.3 The Arguments 
This study’s focus on laws and the localized, coexistent experiences between 
migrants and non-migrants reveals three key points. First, “integration” cannot 
conceptually be categorized as an either/or proposition set forth at the state (or even sub-
state) level along a multicultural versus assimilationist ideological spectrum. Actors 
implementing integration laws do so differently—at a localized level—based on 
divergent ideas of belonging and community. Workers have their own notions of how 
 
2 The party previously was known as the “National Front.” 
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things should be, or how they are on the ground, and act accordingly. Integration laws 
may dictate one thing; workers may do another. This moves away from the idea that 
migrants can by objectively successful or unsuccessful in integrating.  
Second, immigrants affected by integration laws have emotional attachments to 
their new place of residence. But their attachments are not necessarily to the national 
culture. Migrants interviewed here focused their emotional attachments on Belgium’s 
political culture, meaning its legal system and rights related to formal citizenship that 
they previously lacked. While seemingly suggesting that migrants see citizenship in 
purely instrumental terms, the overall picture is more complex. Indeed, some 
interviewees see formal citizenship as a means of securing social acceptance—
belonging—in Belgian society (e.g., Eliassi 2016). These findings may be at odds with 
what nationalists expect, but consistent with Wallonia’s seemingly relaxed attitude 
towards migrants (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015; Adam 2011; Martiniello 1995). This 
complicates current understandings of citizenship as state-centered and with migrants 
making citizenship decisions devoid of attachments to the host country. 
Third, the “host society” that integration laws presume exists (and that migrants 
are to integrate into) cannot be categorized as homogenous or “national” based on the 
locals living there. These persons, as fellow community members, have competing 
imaginaries and emotional attachments to place that might be more local in nature. Each 
person acts according to his or her own notions of who they are and who members of 
their fellow community are. So while certain ideas/societal conceptions may appear one 
way, everyday imaginations may be different. This suggests that that scholars should 
rethink their assumptions about host societies and that nationalist ideologies do not 
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necessarily shape immigration, integration, and citizenship policies in any singular way; 
there is a process that significantly varies across national space. 
1.4 Organization of This Dissertation 
 Chapter Two of this dissertation reviews theoretical approaches to the state, 
nationalism, place (locality), and emotion. This review includes considering related 
concepts of integration, belonging, and citizenship. The chapter also provides an 
overview of literature addressing Belgium and past work addressing integration in the 
state. This literature review creates the theoretical framework guiding the empirical 
analysis. 
 Chapter Three outlines this study’s methods. It describes the qualitative methods 
used to gather data and my experience in the field, including researcher positionality. The 
chapter also details the study participants and methods used to recruit them. It explains 
the rationale for focusing on certain participants over others when authoring this study’s 
three manuscripts.  
Chapters Four, Five, and Six examine the key study populations bound together 
by integration laws. Chapter Four examines those tasked with implementing Wallonia’s 
integration laws. It focuses on key workers at all eight of Wallonia’s CRIs, including the 
CRIs’ directors. Focusing on CRI workers comes because the CRIs serve as the port of 
entry in implementing Wallonia’s legally mandated (yet definitionally vague) 
“intercultural” vision regarding integration, and because the CRI ultimately oversee all 
integration efforts in Wallonia. The chapter focuses on 13 key workers and their 
perspectives on citizenship, belonging, and integration as learned through semi-structured 
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interviews. The chapter also addresses localized variances in integration discourses as 
reflected in each CRI’s stated objectives and missions.  
Chapter Five considers the perspectives of immigrants affected by Wallonia’s 
integration laws. It addresses the different ways that migrants engaging with a legally 
mandated integration course to secure formal citizenship actually envision citizenship. 
Legal citizenship is a focus because it is often a central feature in integration debates. The 
mandatory integration program at issue in Chapter Five is the civic integration course 
known as “Citizen Integration Training” (Formation à l’Intégration Citoyenne (“FIC”)). 
This chapter examines FIC and the class participants’ diverse perspectives learned 
through semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, and approximately 55 hours 
of participant observation in two FIC courses. 
Chapter Six focuses on locals comprising the “host society” into which migrants 
are to integrate according to the laws. Drawing on in-depth interviews with sixty-seven 
locals, this chapter addresses perspectives on the “Belgian society” at issue in integration 
discourses as well as what it means to be “Belgian.” These perspectives derive from 
locals who may be considered cultural “insiders” through their connections to the broader 
community by ancestry, kinship, and/or legal status.  
Taken together, Chapters Four through Six provide new ways of seeing 
integration in both legal and spatial terms. The first two cases explored in Chapters Four 
and Five originate directly from legislation as the CRIs and FIC’s entire existence rest on 
legal mandates. The third case, consistent with Wallonia’s legal perspective considering 
integration on a subnational, localized scale, provides for a useful cross check on the 
21 
assumptions CRI workers and FIC participants may make about the national community 
and those outside of it. 
Finally, Chapter Seven synthesizes the arguments made in this dissertation and 
explains the findings’ contributions to broader discourses in political and cultural 
geography as well as migration studies. The chapter also addresses areas of further 

















































Figure 1.2: Belgium’s Communities 
24 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CRITICALLY CONSIDERING INTEGRATION 
This dissertation explores “integration” amid rising nationalism and increasingly 
stringent integration laws in Europe. It does so by considering the case of Belgium, a 
politically and culturally fractured country that is a microcosm of Europe’s integration 
debates due to its differing, region-based integration laws. I provide a critical perspective 
on integration by considering dominant and subordinate discourses and practices relating 
to integration, and how these understandings do or do not correspond with what the 
Walloon region’s integration laws dictate. Broadly speaking, I thus address how migrants 
and non-migrants mutually produce integration and membership in “society”. To frame 
this discussion, I draw from literature regarding the nation-state, national identity, 
citizenship, assimilation/integration, and place. These themes successively build upon 
each other as set forth in the sections below. I then use the theoretical concept of 
belonging as an analytical tool to integrate these themes and to inform the overall critical 
perspective applied in this dissertation looking at key populations with differing 
connections to integration laws (workers, immigrants, and locals comprising the “host 
society”). Next, I contextualize these themes in this research by discussing Belgium’s 




2.1 The Nation-State and National Identity  
The “state” or “nation-state” is a central conception in modern politics. The term 
refers to a form of political organization over a sovereign territory that encompasses a 
relatively homogeneous population claiming common history, ancestry, and/or 
language (Heffernan 2012; Murphy 1996). The nation-state is a primary unit of analysis 
in social science research (Murphy 1996). In fact, the nation-state holds such conceptual 
sway that it is a sort of conceptual hegemon (Murphy 2010, 2008). The idea is that states 
are societal containers to be studied individually or in relation to others, causing some to 
consider nation-state analysis to be a sort of “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994). Because of 
its historical presence and significance, however, the nation-state conception greatly 
informs the current political landscape and so must be considered when seeking to 
understand contemporary issues (Agnew 2015). It is particularly salient when exploring 
immigration; indeed, the idea of immigration and integration depend on a nation-state 
system where people move from one state (and national society) to another.  
The nation-state did not always exist in Europe (Heffernan 2012). Prior to the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, for example, territorial control primarily came in the form 
of feudal organization, free cities, and proto-absolutist states (Murphy 1996), although 
some republics existed in a pre-Westphalian world including the Old Swiss Confederacy, 
Venice, and the Dutch Republic. The complementary concepts of territoriality and 
nationalism fostered the nation-state’s rise in Europe. Territoriality is a “spatial strategy 
to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area.” (Murphy 2008). 
Applied, the strategy simplifies the task of enforcing control and reifies power in the 
governing authority (Murphy 1996). In Europe, the inhabitants considered territory in 
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alternative views. At times, they saw the entire area being unified in singular 
characteristics, such as being home to “Christendom” (Heffernan 2012). Or the people’s 
sense of territory was geared towards a combination of local communes, ruling elites, and 
broader ecclesiastical ideals (Murphy 1996). Following the Peace of Westphalia, 
however, leaders began to sweep away attachment to community in favor of state-defined 
national identities (Murphy 2018). Reasons for this include leaders’ exerting control over 
larger portions of territory, the emerging international regime resulting from the varying 
Westphalia treaties, and the growth of the idea that government should be an instrument 
of the people (Murphy 1996).  
As territoriality expanded and intensified, so did nationalism. “Nationalism as an 
ideology was premised on the link between people and territory” (J. Anderson 1986; p. 
97; see also Williams & Smith 1983). The people linked to the territory constituted the 
“nation” (Jones & Fowler 2007). Indeed, the word “nation” comes from the French term 
“naissance,” meaning “birth” or “place of origin.” The concept of a territory “belonging” 
to a people furthered internal unification of culturally and economically diverse regions 
into a more homogeneous state territory (J. Anderson 1986). It also created grander ideas 
of “us” and “them” with some states pitted against others (Murphy 1996). Nationalism 
served to divide one political community or “nation” from another, thus determining the 
geographical boundaries of the state in many instances (J. Anderson 1986). The creation 
of education and social systems then perpetuated the cultural and historical norms 
associated with the dominant “nation” (Murphy 2008). In effect, the nation-state was the 
“territorial order that could reflect and accommodate nationalist ambitions” (Murphy 
1996; p. 100).  
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The “nation” in nationalist discourse is territorially limited and mutually 
exclusive. Broad literature exists concerning the idea of the nation, its relationship to the 
state, and relationships between religious, ethnic, and national identities (see, e.g., B. 
Anderson 2006; Breuilly 1993; Gellner 2008; Renan 2002; Smith 1983, 1986). Even 
though considered limited and exclusive, the nation is not static or unitary (Mills 2010). 
Benedict Anderson (2006) describes it as an “imagined community.” Members create a 
mental affinity for their imagined “fellow community members,” most of whom they will 
never know or meet face to face. And membership is open only to a certain group of 
people (described as sharing a common origin and/or destiny) living in a certain place. A 
closure exists vis-à-vis those outside of that place (Brubaker 1992), with those inside 
maintaining a sense of “one nation” based on ideals of common origins, ancestry, and 
consanguinity, as well as a common destiny (Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendoorn 2003). 
Persons not fitting within this mold or living in the territory do not belong (Soysal 2001; 
Gustafson 2005). National identity thus changes as persons create new imaginations, 
making nations fluid and continually re-created (Mills 2010).  
Starting in the mid-1990s, scholars started considering nations in new ways; a 
nation was not only a territory-based ideology, but also as a set of social practices 
reproduced in everyday life. Perhaps the most famous of these new approaches, and one 
that has significantly influenced political geographers (Koch & Paasi 2016), is social 
psychologist Michael Billig’s (1995) Banal Nationalism. This concept considers 
everyday representations and practices that create a shared sense of national identity, and 
it sees the nation reproduced in everyday circumstances. The focus is on national symbols 
such as flags hanging in public buildings, national songs, and daily rituals that 
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presumably create a shared sense of identity in everyday life. Banal nationalism is a top-
down approach because it emphasizes the role of the state and its elite members in 
dictating the nation’s identity through these everyday images and practices that people 
passively consume and repeat (Antonsich 2016, 2020).  
Sociologists similarly began studying nations and nationalism through everyday 
life (e.g., Brubaker 1996; Thompson & Day 1999; Thompson 2001). Their approach sees 
nations as social creations: persons seeking to situate themselves in relation to others 
create the nation in everyday contexts (Thompson & Fevre 2001; Brubaker et al 2018). 
The “nation” simultaneously results from state-level forces and “ordinary people 
engaging in routine activities” (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008, p. 554). It is a bottom-up 
approach because, while nationalism is a mass phenomenon, this everyday approach 
seeks to understand the individuals constituting the “masses.” (Strømsø 2019; Smith 
2008). Sometimes referred to as “sociology of nationalism” because of sociologists’ lead 
in advocating its use, this perspective is often labeled “everyday nationalism” in 
geographic literature (see Jones & Merriman 2009). 
The insistence on, and assumption of, national homogeneity in the modern nation-
state gives rise to the idea of “minorities” and creates the “problem” of minority rights. 
Minorities are those deemed to differ from the nation due to traits such as “race,” 
religion, or language; they do not always have equal rights and obligations in a state. 
Since the nation-state’s rise, state governments have “sought to maintain the national 
character by making full access to rights contingent on one’s conformity to national 
values and moralities” (Nicholls 2012). So those who do not conform to the notion of the 
“national” identity do not achieve equal status, with this “national” identity now 
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presumed to be that of the state (Murphy 1996). The minorities who do not fit this 
identity—including migrants or those with migrant origins—then become ethnic 
underclasses in the state (Kofman 1995). The experience of Europe’s Jewish population 
over the centuries exemplifies this situation. A more contemporary example is London’s 
Muslim community, which built its first mosque in London’s suburbs in the 1920s.  The 
local majority community initially welcomed the mosque as an instance of Britain’s 
imperial reach (Naylor & Ryan 2002). Following decolonization, however, residents 
increasingly protested the mosque’s presence as “foreign” and out of place within 
national space. So when the local Muslim community (many of whom were British 
citizens) sought to expand the mosque in the late 1990s, local officials denied their 
request. The minority population did not fit within the national ideal and so did not 
receive the same rights. 
 Nationalist ideologies’ pursuit of a uniform nation often shapes integration 
demands that are imposed on migrants and other minorities. Migrants are an apparent 
minority in the state, and the integration demands can come from the state (Mitchell 
2003), members of the national community (Antonsich 2012), or both.  Such demands 
center on the nation, or what integration discourses and many scholars label the “host 
society” (Antonsich & Matejskova 2015). While cultural geographers and others often 
consider the nation as variegated and contextual (e.g., Mills 2010), many nationalism 
scholars do not. Banal nationalism, for example, “operates with an unrealistic notion of a 
uniform, homogenous national audience” (Antonsich 2016, p. 33). Everyday nationalism 
likewise presumes “an undifferentiated ‘ordinary people’” within a state (Smith 2008; p. 
565). Nationalists demanding migrant integration also presume host society homogeneity; 
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they expect uniformity (and conformity) from migrants despite many nationalists 
continually marking migrants as foreign to the nation. 
Notably, mainstream migration scholarship similarly tends to treat the national 
“host society” as a monolithic given. It generally imagines “integration” as a process 
wherein immigrants incorporate into a uniform and immediately apparent nation/host 
society (Antonsich & Matejskova 2015; Nagel & Staeheli 2008). This perspective views 
the fading of differences between the immigrant minority and the resident majority as 
both measurable and desired, and the adaptation to a seemingly monolithic “host society” 
to be migrants’ responsibility (Nagel 2002). I return to this point below in section 2.3 
when describing the “assimilation canon” in integration literature. First, however, I 
address notions of rights and obligations that nations have. These rights and obligations 
come by way of state “citizenship” in the nation. And in the nation-state context, the 
nation-state concept’s primary role in the political order is its promoting citizenship 
attached to notions of territory and the nation living there (see Kofman 1995). So the idea 
of state citizenship plays a large part in understanding migrants’ situations in Europe 
today. I thus review citizenship in the next section.  
2.2 Citizenship and the Nation-State 
“Citizenship” is a mode of membership conventionally associated with the 
modern state. Historical understanding of citizenship dates to the Greek city-state, when 
citizenship was a mark of belonging and commitment to a particular place (Painter & 
Philo 1995; Desforges et al. 2005).  The rise of the nation-state and ideas of national 
citizenship in the late eighteenth century, however, weakened citizenship’s local, city-
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based focus and changed it to more of a national ideal (Desforges et al. 2005). The scale 
change from the local to the national did not necessarily remove the idea of rights and 
obligations. Indeed, long-established citizenship conceptions, and the study of them, did 
not begin changing for an additional two centuries after the nation-state’s rise (Ho 2008). 
Territory was considered the dominant citizenship factor throughout this time (Waite 
2012; Murphy 2013). Citizenship thus focused on the formulation of political 
relationships within the nation-state territory. 
Citizenship is at once a legal category, referring to formal relations between 
insiders, outsiders, and the state (Steil & Ridgley 2012). It is also a social and cultural 
construct (Staeheli et al. 2012). As a legal category, citizenship highlights notions of 
rights and obligations that are encoded in laws and constitutions. As a social and cultural 
construct, citizenship suggests values and virtues associated with participation in a 
national community—values and virtues that are imparted in the spaces of everyday life 
by various actors including parents, neighbors, clergy, and educators (Nagel & Ehrkamp 
2016). These societal and cultural conceptions may coincide with citizenship’s legal 
conceptions, meaning that local actors act in concert with defined laws, or they may 
conflict with the legal understanding such that local actors’ membership and participation 
remains partial, localized, and/or informal in nature. This is evident in cases where 
undocumented immigrants claim citizenship despite the lack of legal membership in the 
polity (Nicholls 2013).  
Citizenship’s social and cultural construct connects with nationalism conceptions 
in various ways. For example, many social scientists (including sociologists and political 
scientists) categorize nationalism as “ethnic” or “civic” in nature (e.g., Leong et al 2020; 
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Tamir 2019; Sharma 2016; Smith & Hutchinson 1994). Ethnic nationalism presumes a 
community based on ideas of common origins, ancestry, consanguinity, and so forth 
(Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendoorn 2003). This is similar to what Painter and Philo (1995) 
observed regarding citizenship, specifically that “who gets defined as a ‘true’ citizen 
within the city-state or the state-area depends in part on who carries with them what is 
deemed to be the correct baggage of history, culture, ethnicity, language and religion” (p. 
113). Civic nationalism, on the other hand, similarly coincides with civic models of 
citizenship in that it focuses on sharing common political norms and values. Civic 
nationalism and citizenship both suggest a distinction between majority “culture” 
applying to only some persons and the political-constitutional system shared by all 
citizens (Antonsich & Petrillo 2019).   
Political geographers make similar ethnic/civic distinctions but use different 
terminology based on two scalar expressions (Koch 2016). The first is at the state level; 
the second is sub-state in nature. State-centered notions equate “the nation” with the 
residents of the state (similar to civic nationalism/citizenship) while sub-state expressions 
point to the existence of ethnic or regional groups who might make claims of sovereignty 
within or beyond the territorial state’s borders (akin to ethnic nationalism/citizenship) 
(see Herb & Kaplan 1999).  In Belgium, there may be a mixture of both. Nationalist 
parties in Flanders currently promote a “Flemish” nation (ethnic nationalism) (see e.g., 
Cerulus 2019; Crisp 2019), for example, while Wallonia historically favors civic 
nationalism (Martiniello 1995). Notions of nationalism (and thus citizenship) are not 
necessarily either civic or ethnic; they may be a mixture of both (see, e.g., Brubaker 
1999; Medved 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe 2010).  
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Rapid globalization and large-scale global migration in the late twentieth century 
prompted some scholars to rethink nation-state citizenship in various ways. Globalization 
rescaled notions of citizenship to also include those above the nation-state such as group 
identities based on religion, ethnicity, and culture (Waite 2012; Desforges et al. 2005). 
Migration similarly changed ideas of citizenship because, while not formal citizens, 
migrants in many contexts maintain certain rights and are subject to similar obligations 
attendant to citizenship within those areas where the migrants live (Ehrkamp 2010). So 
citizenship is now understood to play out at different scales (local, national, global, etc.) 
and across many social identities (Waite 2012). In other words, citizenship is 
multilayered and context-dependent, hinging on concepts of nation, religion, ethnicity, 
and the like (Desforges et al. 2005). 
        Regardless of the applicable scale and the conceptual changes over time, 
distinctions among people remain central to citizenship conceptions (Ehrkamp 2010). 
Citizenship necessarily makes “social, cultural and political distinctions both within and 
between political communities. “Who counts as a citizen depends on relations not only 
with others outside ‘our’ space but also with others within it” (Painter & Philo, 1995: 
118). In effect, there is no citizenship, no “belonging,” absent common identities that 
contrast with markers of difference. This production of identity categories and the 
formulation of the terms of membership in these categories unfolds both on the 
“national” level (in national policy and constitutional law, for instance), as well as 
everyday spaces (churches, neighborhoods, schools, etc.) where migrants and locals 
negotiate membership and what it means to belong in the community of citizens (Nagel 
& Ehrkamp 2016). Identity and membership can thus be uneven within a national 
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territory. And because making sameness and difference are bound up in a legal process of 
distributing rights, citizenship becomes central to integration discussions. 
2.3 Identity and Integration 
While nationalism assumes a uniform and undifferentiated nation (Billig 1995; 
Smith 2008), and citizenship considers the distinctions between those inside and outside 
of that national community (Steil & Ridgley 2012), integration investigates how outsiders 
can become members of that homogeneous host nation (Nagel 2009). Much of the 
literature over the past century thus addresses integration in assimilationist terms. Indeed, 
key literature frequently uses integration and assimilation synonymously (Modood 2005). 
I use the terms “integration” and “assimilation” somewhat interchangeably in reviewing 
relevant literature as much of the integration research stems from what is commonly 
referred to as the “assimilation canon.” But in discussing Belgium’s specific context in 
subsequent chapters, I use only “integration” as that is the term European politicians use 
in legislating immigrant behavior (Joppke 2007).  To better understand contemporary 
integration perspectives assuming this host-society homogeneity, I outline below 
literature known as the “assimilation canon.” I then set forth some critical perspectives in 
integration literature that inform the perspective applied here.  
2.3.1 The “assimilation canon” 
Integration’s formal theorization in the assimilation canon dates to early twentieth 
century America, with the Chicago School of Sociology’s myriad treatises on immigrant 
identities, settlement patterns, and behaviors. Chicago School scholars articulated 
assimilation theory at a time of increased emphasis on “Americanization” in response to 
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European immigrants who allegedly created “ethnic colonies” in American urban areas 
(Draschler 1920). Amid political and popular debate about mass immigration’s 
implications on the nation’s cultural integrity and racial purity, scholars began exploring 
the idea of assimilation as the gradual disappearance of differences between immigrants 
and the host society. “Assimilation” meant the process of an immigrant abandoning “old 
ways” seemingly incompatible with, or perceived as inferior to, the modern, 
industrialized, urbanized host society (Wirth 1927; Draschler 1920). The immigrant 
changes his or her perspective to that of the host society’s, at least in the public realm, 
without any sort of explicit reciprocal adjustment (Young 1928). And the assumption is 
that the host society has a highly cohesive, national identity (see Alba & Nee 1997). 
Two early works elaborating on these ideas of the absence or disappearance of 
difference focused on Jewish communities. Louis Wirth’s The Ghetto (1927) examined 
Jewish immigrants in the United States and the attempts by some to move away from 
Jewish neighborhoods. Wirth observed that Jewish immigrants became more “American” 
in the public realm when they lived apart from other Jews and Jewish ghettos. And the 
more they experienced life away from other Jews, the more these immigrants changed 
over time to no longer seek association with Jews. Wirth stated, “Scarcely does the Jew 
get a glimpse of the freer world that looms beyond the ghetto when he becomes irritated 
by the presence of his fellow-Jews, more Jewish than himself; he is bored, disgusted, and 
resumes his flight” (p. 70). Pauline Young (1928) observed the assimilation tensions 
within Jewish families as second-generation children increasingly abandoned Jewish 
cultural traits in public while adhering to them at home. These second-generation 
members lived in two different worlds, with home, religious and communal life being 
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one culture while public school and the larger community was another. The host society, 
Young observed, tolerated the Jewish immigrant children so long as they made these 
adjustments in public life. And a Jewish child “may appear assimilated in his public life, 
but he remains hyphenated in his private life.” (Young 1928; p. 244). 
These and other conceptualizations adopted by many early assimilation theorists 
suggested that assimilation was an “either/or” proposition. That is, persons were either 
part of the host culture, or they were part of a foreign culture. This can be seen in Julius 
Draschler’s comment that those within the first generation (i.e., foreign-born immigrants) 
“are really unassimilable. Transplanted though they are in body, they live in spirit in a 
traditional world of their own. They must die out to make room for their native-born 
children, who will need no ‘Americanization’” (1920; p. 192-193). The children were 
assumed to be in a different culture, shaped by mainstream American society (Young 
1928). As such, there was presumed to be “a death-struggle between two worlds, two 
cultures, two civilizations” within every immigrant home (Draschler 1920; p. 79). 
Draschler’s language suggests that he viewed the elimination of past cultures as vital for 
assimilation. Park and Burgess, while not maintaining as rigid of a distinction regarding 
immigrant assimilability as Draschler, held similarly minimal expectations for foreign-
born immigrants and believed that a much greater degree of sameness was inevitable for 
the immigrants’ children. They said, “The second generation of the immigrant may share 
fully in our memories, but practically all that we can ask of the foreign-born is 
participation in our ideals, our wishes, and our common enterprises” (quoted in Rumbaut, 
1997, p. 484).  
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Early theorists, in short, all assumed changes over time and through the 
generations. The second and subsequent generations would gradually become completely 
part of the host society as they cast off certain cultural elements and adopted others. 
Young assumed this to be the case for children of Jewish immigrants who she said would 
lose their Jewish identity over the generations (1928; p. 243). Robert Park assumed the 
same regarding the second and subsequent generations. He viewed the second generation 
members as those who had become “emancipated” by adopting the new culture. He 
claimed that the second-generation individual, “learns to look upon the world in which he 
was born and bred with something of the detachment of a stranger” (1928; p. 888). 
Statements like these give credence to criticism that assimilation was thought to be a 
“homogenizing” process completed by the third generation (e.g., Rumbaut 1997; p. 483). 
Despite what it might seem based on the above statements and viewpoints, 
however, early assimilation theorists did not necessarily expect a complete abandoning of 
one’s immigrant heritage. Rather, theorists expected abandonment of only “inferior” 
cultural elements. Julius Draschler, for instance, commented that if a culture “lacks 
vitality and melts away in contact with other superior cultures, then it has surely merited 
its fate” (1920; p. 165). Such statements support critics’ contentions that assimilation 
theory rests on “arrogant presumptions of ethnic superiority and inferiority” (Rumbaut 
1997; 484). Yet, Draschler and other theorists did not necessarily contend that the host 
society’s culture was superior over the immigrants’ culture. Rather, they maintained that 
the superior culture was one created by the immigrant and host society together. As 
Draschler stated, the created culture was to be one: 
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broad enough to embrace full political equality human enough to make 
room for industrial self realization generous enough to welcome all culture 
groups dwelling in the midst of America to join as perpetually creative 
forces in the building of a synthetic civilization that shall bear the lasting 
imprints of the genius of many peoples. (1920; p. 238) 
Draschler was not the only early theorist to expect that some cultural elements 
from immigrants would become part of the host culture. Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, 
for instance, defined assimilation as “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which 
persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and 
groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a 
common cultural life.” (quoted in Alba & Nee, 1997; p. 828). In other words, immigrants 
made contributions to their new homeland; assimilation was not one-sided (Kivisto 
2004). Those adopting the “Chicago School” conception, as Park and Burgess’s ideas 
came to be known, understood assimilation as a process that did not require social or 
cultural homogeneity (Nagel 2009). Rather, assimilation served to create a shared 
national identity, including shared language and core cultural values, while sub-cultural 
affiliations persisted (Kivisto 2004). Achieving this goal of a new, shared culture was to 
be “a cooperative undertaking in the highest sense of the word” (Draschler 1920; p. 237). 
Notions of a new, shared culture amid persistence of ethnic identities and 
affiliations fell from focus for a time following publication of Milton Gordon’s 
Assimilation in American Life in 1964. Gordon’s piece outlined what scholars later 
termed the ‘canonical account of assimilation’ (Alba & Nee 1997). He claimed that a 
one-way process of conformity existed between migrants and America’s dominant 
Anglo-Saxon society. Migrant communities, Gordon argued, would gradually 
adopt/conform to the dominant culture in nearly all ways, with migrants adopting some 
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traits sooner than others. The dominant culture remained unchanged by this absorption 
other than insignificant variations “in cuisine, recreational patterns, place names, speech” 
and so forth to merely “add flavor and piquancy” to the dominant culture’s totality (p. 
110). Yet Gordon also emphasized that total societal homogenization would not occur. 
Racial differences would persist. So too would religious distinctions; immigrants tended 
to maintain their pre-migration religious beliefs. Gordon considered that since Americans 
lived and worked within broadly categorized religious communities (Catholic, Jew, and 
Protestant) from cradle to grave, immigrants would operate within one of these 
communities according to their faith and consequently not have full entrée into the 
dominant group’s spaces. Some measure of assimilation was inevitable as migrant groups 
at least “acculturated” to the dominant culture. 
Gordon’s portraying assimilation as a one-way process with the immigrants 
adapting to the dominant “core culture” departed from earlier researchers’ ideas even as 
he adhered to these researchers’ concepts of considering assimilation to be the absence of 
difference between groups. Gordon noted that some could “acculturate” to the host 
society without ever assimilating based on their public and private behavior. This 
effectively reiterated Young’s (1928) position about the public/private distinction 
between behaviors. Different from Luis Wirth’s perspective on Jews in the United States 
(1927), however, was Gordon’s conclusion that some immigrants and their generations 
will never become full members of society. These persons were “acculturated” rather 
than “assimilated.” This coincided with Robert Park’s earlier claim that some groups face 
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greater difficulty in assimilating (1928).3  Following Gordon’s work, “classic assimilation 
theory” came to signify the idea of assimilation as a “straight line,” teleological process 
bringing minorities into mainstream society. Building on the simple teleology 
purportedly laid out by Gordon and the Chicago School theorists, scholars subsequently 
developed derivative assimilation theories, including the “racial/ethnic disadvantage” 
model,4 “bumpy-line” integration, and “segmented” integration (see Alba & Nee 1997; 
Brown & Bean 2006; Gans 1992). While disputing the degree to which immigrants and 
their descendants retain ethnic differences, the theories generally presume the existence 
of “successful” and “unsuccessful” measures of assimilation based on factors like 
language acquisition, socio-economic activities, and marriage (Nagel 2009). Ironically, 
by maintaining the question as to whether an immigrant has “integrated” into the host 
culture, these efforts to complicate teleological assimilation theories actually perpetuate 
essentialized and homogenized understandings of migrant groups and host society groups 
(Ehrkamp 2006).  In other words, scholars reinforced societal assumptions that migrants 
are “other” by maintaining the focus on the migrant group as the one “integrating” and 
adapting while leaving relatively unexamined both the host society and everyday social 
dynamics that create understandings of difference and sameness.  
Later researchers pushed back against Gordon’s work and its derivatives within 
the broader assimilation canon. Considering assimilation’s presumption (and even 
 
3 Park considered race to be the factor causing difficulty in assimilation based on the host 
society’s prejudice towards certain racial groups. Even so, Park believed that such 
difficulties would eventually subside due to “interbreeding,” thus making his perspective 
more like Luis Wirth’s and other, earlier theorists who saw assimilation as inevitable. 
4 Ethnicity and race are often considered deviations from the national norm, with 
ethnicity including all things that fail to be subsumed and assimilated into national life 
such as social practices, religious beliefs, and so forth.  
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objective) to be one of wiping out previous ethnic characteristics and ties, these 
researchers adopted an “ethnic retention” model instead, one also labeled 
“multiculturalist,” “postacculturationist,” and “pluralist” (Gans 1997; 876). The ethnic 
retention model focuses on immigrants’ ethnic identities, the barriers they face in 
assimilating into the broader culture, and also the adaptations ethnic groups make within 
the host society. Researchers following this model consider how persons and groups 
constantly reconstruct, or even invent, ethnic culture (e.g., Yancey et al. 1976). 
Considerations of how groups are able to become part of the broader mainstream culture, 
they argued, depended more on one’s experience in an “urban American-ethnic 
community” rather than one’s original point of departure (p. 397). So multicultural 
literature came to examine how immigrants adapted ethnic practices – themselves 
presumably a mix of handed-down family, community, and regional practices – to 
America. Examples include Italian immigrants holding Thanksgiving dinner with turkey 
and Italian pasta dishes (thus adapting an American tradition to their native cuisine), as 
well as the practice of a bas mitzvah (a religious ceremony for girls similar to the bar 
mitzvah for boys prevalent among Jews worldwide) that American Jews created based on 
their experience in American culture where women assumed a greater role in than they 
did in traditional Jewish communities (Gans 1997). A dichotomy thus resulted between 
multiculturalists, who emphasized groups retaining ties to ethnic heritage, and classical 
assimilationists, with those among the latter group who adhered to the straight-line theory 
“becoming the villains” as multicultural models gained prominence (p. 876). This all 
occurred despite classical assimilation literature primarily focusing on discussions of 
becoming American culturally but not socially (what Gordon termed “acculturation”) 
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(Ibid). Indeed, early classical assimilation theorists recognized certain ethnic retention 
and so anticipated “ethnic stocks” rather than racial homogenization within the broader 
culture (e.g., Draschler 1920; p. 222). In the end, there may be more similarities between 
multiculturalists and classical assimilationists than the latter’s critics might concede. Just 
as classical assimilationists like Draschler and Park and Burgess saw host societies as 
changing based on immigrants’ arrival, so too do multiculturalists. This is evident in the 
following observation by Ruben Rumbaut (1997): 
Neither assimilator nor assimilatee are fixed, static things, in any case, but 
permanently unfinished creations with vexing degrees of autonomy. The 
ultimate paradox of assimilation American-style may well be that in the 
process, what is being assimilated metamorphoses into something quite 
dissimilar from what any of the protagonists ever imagined or intended, 
and the core itself is ineluctably transmuted, even as it keeps its 
continental name: America (named for an Italian geographer, at that). (p. 
505-506.) 
Such similarities mean that modern migration studies may benefit from classical 
assimilation theorists and the broader assimilation canon. This is particularly true in 
Europe, where nationalistic fervor among an immigrant influx results in calls for greater 
assimilation, much as what occurred in America 100 years ago when classical 
assimilation theory began. 
2.3.2 Rethinking the “assimilation canon” 
Debates regarding assimilation theory abounded from the 1960s through the 
1990s with the disputes primarily centered on how much immigrants retained distinctive 
identities. Starting in the early 2000s, however, scholars began to rethink 
assimilation/integration theory in creating an alternative, critical approach. Intersecting 
with critical approaches to nationhood and citizenship that see these categories as social 
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creations and sensitive to power dynamics (e.g., Brubaker et al 2018; Staeheli et al 2012), 
this critical approach to integration deconstructs taken-for-granted categories like 
“ethnicity” and “race” to focus instead on how social actors continuously produce, 
reproduce, and police group boundaries. In this way, “integration” is more of a political 
process of determining who belongs and how they belong. It is a process of “making 
sameness” by creating, reproducing, and enforcing collective understandings of 
who/what is different or the same and by identifying criteria of difference/sameness that 
matter (Nagel 2009; Erdal & Oeppen 2013). In practical terms, this critical approach 
examines issues such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, language, and even music 
preferences to assess areas of making sameness between the migrants and what may be 
perceived as the dominant culture (e.g., Leitner 2012; Yeh & Lama 2006; Nagel & 
Staeheli 2005). This alternative approach considers both the host-society’s and 
immigrants’ imaginations of what immigrants must do/be on each of these issues to 
become members of society, i.e., to “belong.” 
Yet by privileging the politics of assimilation, the assimilation canon and critical 
perspectives alike tend to assume a uniform host society as tied to a place, and more 
specifically the boundaries of a nation-state (Wimmer & Schiller 2003; Antonsich 2012). 
In other words, researchers recognize the perceived/imagined dominant societal group 
and assume it as reflective of the whole of a national territory in their integration 
assessment (e.g., Leitner 2012) rather than acknowledging and addressing localized 
variances in national space. This is not to say that the researchers themselves believe in a 
containerized, undifferentiated view of the host society. Rather, it is to note that the 
researchers’ assessments on host societies simply treat them as such, likely due to the 
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researchers’ focus on immigrants’ perspectives as a counterpoint to the broader nation. 
For example, studies regarding immigrant integration in Germany discuss “German” 
society as national and undifferentiated within Germany (e.g., Ehrkamp 2006), those 
examining immigrants in France envision “French” society coterminous with the state’s 
borders (Brubaker 1992), and so forth across numerous states (Antonsich 2012). In many 
respects, the persistence of a fixed host society within integration literature (regardless of 
approach employed) is indistinguishable from the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) 
confounding political geographers wherein states are “containers” of societies with 
analysis centering on the nation-state.  
Efforts to move beyond methodological nationalism in integration scholarship can 
conceptually benefit from political geographers’ efforts to escape the territorial trap. 
These scholars broke free from nation-state-based analyses by problematizing territory 
and prioritizing place (Murphy 2010; Agnew 1994, 2015). Indeed, focusing on territory 
and place rather than the nation-state reflects a trend in political geography over the past 
few decades (e.g., Agnew 1994; Herb & Kaplan 1999; Elden 2005). A primary point in 
this is to not treat place as a given (Murphy 2010; Elden 2010). I address place in the next 
section. 
2.4 Place and Integration: Locality 
Place is a geographic location with human attachment and meaning (Cresswell 
2014; Tuan 1990). Place as a combination of location and meaning is a key concept in 
geographic thought since the 1970s (Tuan 1977; Agnew 2015; Cresswell 2014). Place 
“refers to how everyday life is inscribed in space and takes on meaning for specified 
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groups of people and organizations” (Agnew 2002; p. 16). These are everyday spaces 
where people conduct their lives and socially engage with one another (Agnew 2015). 
Accordingly, “[p]lace can be considered ‘bottom up,’ representing the outlooks and 
actions of ordinary people.” (Agnew 2002; p. 16). It differs from space, which “can be 
considered as ‘top down,’ defined by powerful actors imposing their control and stories 
on others” (Id.) Place is a meeting point that considers networks of associations stretched 
across different scales (Massey 1994). The scale of focus in this dissertation is locality. 
There is no consensus in geography about locality’s definition (Jones et al 2014). 
Some see locality only as “the [physical] setting in which everyday life is most 
concentrated for a group of people” (Agnew 2002, p. 16), the scale defined by people’s 
day-to-day activities (Clarke 2013). Localities under this first approach include 
neighborhoods, churches/mosques, workplaces, and schools, among other sites. 
Geographers studying nations and nationalism from a critical perspective tend to adopt 
this approach (e.g., Mills 2008; Jones & Desforges 2003). So do many migration 
scholars, particularly those considering transnationalism/translocalism and migrants’ 
identification with more than one space (e.g., Herrmann, Risse-Kappen, & Brewer 2004). 
Other scholars define locality simply as a place or region of subnational scale (Painter 
2009). A locality could thus be a city, commune, or even a collection of communes. This 
understanding is popular among migration scholars who, like urban geographers, tend to 
use locality synonymously with “city” (e.g., Krawatzek & Sasse 2020; Glick Schiller & 
Çağlar 2009) or village (e.g., Anghel 2016). Cultural geographers often contend that 
localities are relational and “not simply spatial areas you can easily draw a line 
around” (Massey 1991, p. 277). In other words, locality considers social interactions 
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connected to varying spatial areas (cities, schools, etc.) regardless of the scale. This 
contention is not necessarily a separate definition but instead a perspective that can 
connect with either of the former definitions (the everyday or a subnational space). 
Both the everyday and subnational aspects of locality are relevant here. Locality 
varies for each of the three populations examined in this dissertation. For the CRI and 
their workers implementing Wallonia’s integration laws, locality is a collection of 
communes designated as working with each CRI for local integration plans and other 
frontline actors implementing the mandatory integration course. For immigrants in 
legally mandated civic integration courses (FIC), locality is the participants’ everyday 
spaces. This includes FIC classrooms as well as their neighborhoods, churches/mosques, 
workplaces, schools, places of employment, and other everyday spaces. And for the 
locals comprising the “host society” into which integration is supposed to occur 
according to the laws, locality is similarly everyday socio-spatial contexts and spaces. 
Locality in this dissertation is both spatial and scalar according to the situation.  
Locality plays a role in creating an identity. To be sure, territory comes with 
identity (Murphy 2010), and individuals interacting in everyday spaces create notions of 
national identity (Mills 2010). Locality shapes identity through the feelings of belonging 
to a place, and so to the nation as an imagined community (Mills 2008; see also Tuan 
1990). Megoran’s (2006) study of the Ferghana Valley straddling the border between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provides an example. There, ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
persons have lived alongside each other within the valley for centuries with no perceived 
divisions among them. Intermarriage is common, and residential segregation by ethnicity 
is nonexistent. The primary distinction between the two groups is the maternal language 
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spoken. The everyday for persons living in this valley was thus a localized, peaceful 
coexistence. Yet the Uzbek government erected a border in the valley nearly 10 years 
after the countries became independent from the Soviet Union. It did so based on a more 
elite notion of the nation-state ideal. In other words, the everyday for persons living 
outside of the Ferghana Valley mandated separation by language. Valley residents, on the 
other hand, considered the division nonsensical and separate from who they are. Their 
everyday remains one that differs from the Uzbek elites and possibly even from other 
ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz peoples living elsewhere. It is localized in nature. Locality thus 
plays a part in nationalism as the nation becomes real and material in localized contexts. 
The identities migrants might aspire to in becoming part of the nation may vary based on 
locality.  
Place’s connection to the nation and national identity requires that it play a 
prominent role in how migration scholars conceptualize host societies and so study 
integration. Integration scholars should also critically consider the population living in 
places where integration is an issue. They should recognize that people may have 
localized understandings of community and belonging that are different from the broad, 
nationalist narratives set forth in laws or policies as to what constitutes the “host society.” 
And some of these people may have personal attachments to place that shape everyday 
interactions and thus integration (Huot, Dodson, & Rudman 2014). So using a framework 
addressing place helps move beyond methodological nationalism in integration studies. 
Belonging is that framework. 
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2.5 Belonging as an Analytical Framework 
 Belonging brings together nationhood, citizenship, and place—elements shaping 
integration as discussed above—in a single theoretical concept separate from assumptions 
about the national state and a homogeneous host society. Marco Antonsich (2010) created 
an influential framework for examining belonging. His framework considers both “place-
belongingness” and the “politics of belonging.” As discussed in this chapter’s 
introduction, the former refers to feelings of being “at home” in a place, while the latter is 
seen as “discursive resources that constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-
spatial inclusion/exclusion” (Antonsich 2010, p. 645). Antonsich notes five factors 
relating to place-belongingness. The first is autobiographical matters such as past history, 
personal experiences, or relations. By way of example, Antonsich refers to author bell 
hooks’ descriptions of the Kentucky hills (her girlhood home) where she feels at home. 
The second factor is relational and refers to matters such as personal and social ties. But 
Antonsich does not include everyday encounters with this relational construct. The third 
factor is cultural; it considers things such as language, religion, and food 
production/consumption. The fourth factor is economic and considers one’s integration 
into the economy. Antonsich’s final factor for “place-belongingness” is legal, such as 
citizenship and residency permits because of their connection to security, which 
Antonsich sees as vital for belonging. 
 Antonsich’s (2010) politics of belonging centers on boundary discourses 
separating “us” and “them”, which he says are “the very essence of any politics of 
belonging.” (p. 649). So membership (in a group) and ownership (of a place) become key 
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factors in politics of belonging. Yet achieving a politics of belonging is not enough for 
one to also have place-belongingness (2010, p. 650). 
 Antonsich’s framework Antonsich bears similarity to one proposed by Nira 
Yuval-Davis, who also sees belonging on both an individual level and in connection with 
a larger population separated into “us” and “them” (Yuval-Davis 2006; p. 204). Like 
Antonsich, Yuval-Davis refers to the collective belonging as the “politics of belonging.” 
Yuval-Davis considers place-belongingness (what she simply labels “belonging”) to be 
made up of three parts: (1) social locations, (2) identifications and emotional attachments, 
(3) and ethical and political values. Social location refers to membership in a specific 
group like age, profession, race, gender, and class. These may occur on multiple axes, as 
a black woman will have a different locational axis than a white woman (2006, p. 199). 
Identifications and emotional attachments, Yuval-Davis’s second aspect of belonging, 
centers on who people are/are not, what it means to be a member of particular groups, an 
individual’s construction of identity, and so forth. (2006, p. 202). The third aspect, ethical 
and political values, concerns an individual’s personal considerations (2006, p. 203).  
 Antonsich (2010) acknowledges his framework’s similarity to Yuval-Davis’s 
model. Indeed, the fundamentals of both models (individual considerations and 
connections with a larger population) are the same (compare Antonsich 2010 with Yuval-
Davis 2006). One difference is that Antonsich’s model considers citizenship within the 
individual sphere (“place-belongingness”) while Yuval-Davis categorizes it with the 
politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). Other than this observed difference, Antonsich 
attempts to distinguish his framework by stating Yuval-Davis’s model overlooks notions 
of place (Antonsich 2010). But the claim is an oversimplification. Yuval-Davis does 
50 
consider space; she notes that citizenship comes in forms of political rights, civil rights, 
and social rights (i.e., access to welfare), and to that she adds “spatial rights,” meaning 
“the right to enter a state or any other territory of a political community and, once inside,” 
stay there (Yuval-Davis 2006; p. 208). Her observations regarding citizenship and spatial 
rights, however, effectively remained bound by the “territorial trap” of the nation-
state (see Agnew 1994).  
 Other studies ask similar questions as those put forth in the Antonsich/Yuval-
Davis framework even if guised in different terms. A study of immigrants in Italy, for 
example, considered belonging to be “made up of different layers: (1) admittance, (2) 
involvement, and (3) identification” (Colombo et al. 2011; p. 342). The approach at first 
seemed to be parallel to Antonsich’s ideals. Yet the study’s ultimate conclusions 
maintained the notion of its conceptual “belonging” (meaning “admittance, identification 
and involvement”) as emphasizing “different aspects of the meaning attributed to 
citizenship.” (p. 344). Several others adopt similar, if not parallel, approaches in 
considering belonging; Nelson and Hiemstra (2008) do so in discussing migrants in 
Colorado and Oregon, while Van Riemsdijk (2014) does the same in studying highly-
skilled migrants in Oslo. Huot et al (2014) adheres to a similar approach in discussing 
francophone residents in Toronto, although they bring in notions of place’s interaction in 
shaping migrants’ integration. Leitner (2012) similarly stresses place (specifically places 
of encounter) in discussing belonging in Minnesota. And Trudeau (2006) emphasizes the 
politics of belonging in considering the case of a slaughterhouse in rural Minnesota while 
largely overlooking elements associated with Antonsich’s place-belongingness. 
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Gilmartin  (2008) points out the need to consider place in the context of migrant 
belonging. 
Elements of Antonsich’s framework can thus be seen in many studies regarding 
belonging. And while his framework patterns Yuval-Davis’s, it goes beyond her work in 
moving towards a smaller, more localized understanding of belonging. Antonsich’s 
considering citizenship with “place-belongingness” and otherwise bringing in more 
concrete discussions regarding space creates a solid foundation to further emphasize 
space and place’s importance in belonging. That is where this proposed framework builds 
on Antonsich’s work and so provides greater understanding regarding migrant belonging.  
 The approach I consider in this dissertation examines integration through 
belonging and localities rather than simply relying on Antonsich’s two-pronged approach 
involving place-belongingness and the politics of belonging. The reason is that localities 
bring together both of Antonsich’s elements in definite spaces and in connection with 
other places. And just as belonging is a process in becoming (Antonsich 2010) that is 
continually being remade (Wright 2011), so too are localities, as spaces and 
places (Massey 2005), such that localities and belonging may remake each other.  
Specific “localities” in this context refers to definite spaces and places involving 
people, including cities (Nelson & Hiemstra 2008), workplaces (Van Riemsdijk 2014), 
homes (Delaney 2015), churches (Cresswell 1996), community centers (Matejskova & 
Leitner 2011), and so forth. Localities may change by the moment. One might feel 
belonging (both place-belongingness and political belonging) while worshiping with 
fellow believers in a church (one locality), for instance, but not feel belonging in a store 
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immediately adjacent to the church (a different locality). The same individual may 
similarly experience belonging at localities including their workplace, their home, and 
their neighborhood, but exclusion in localities within the same city such as a park, the 
town hall, and commercial office buildings. So where does the individual belong? Would 
the exclusion from some localities within a city be such that the individual no longer 
claims “belonging” there? Likely not. So the agglomeration of localities, and their 
proximity to one another, contributes to a greater sense of belonging. In other words, the 
greater number of localities where one feels belonging, and their proximity to one 
another, the greater overall sense of belonging in a place. Belonging is not evenly 
experienced spatially. Nor is it necessarily evenly experienced temporally as one might 
have feelings of belonging and non-belonging, or being in/out of place (Cresswell 1996), 
as they move throughout their day.  
Antonsich left open this possibility of belonging by localities when he 
acknowledged the possibility of seeing “belonging as a mode of affective community-
making based on physical proximity rather than a common identity.” (Antonsich 2010; p. 
652 (emphasis added)). Examining belonging based on physical proximity is what the 
proposed model does. The closer in proximity of the various localities making one’s 
community, the greater one’s sense of belonging. Consider the following example 
regarding migrants in Leadville, Colorado (Nelson & Hiemstra 2008). Latino immigrants 
in that city lived clustered in a trailer park 10 minutes outside of the city, worked dozens 
of miles away in a neighboring resort community in the opposite direction from the city, 
and entered Leadville only to attend a church in the city center or to purchase groceries. 
The Latino immigrants, even those with American citizenship, did not feel belonging in 
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the city of Leadville. Some did not feel belonging outside of the trailer park or even their 
own homes (among other Latinos). The low number of localities where the immigrants 
felt belonging, combined with the tight proximity of those localities where they did feel 
at home (primarily in a single trailer park away from the city), explain why the 
immigrants did not have a greater sense of belonging to the city.  
Examining belonging through localities requires consideration of boundaries. 
Boundaries—both metaphorical and material—are a critical component of the politics of 
belonging (Antonsich 2010). The boundaries focused on using the localities analysis are 
those that the people individually set for themselves on a day-to-day basis. Their 
boundaries create their localities, and their localities together create belonging. The 
Latino immigrants Nelson and Hiemnstra (2008) examined in Leadville, for instance, 
drew boundaries around specific localities where they had both a sense of feeling at home 
(place-belongingness) and inclusion by those within those same spaces and places (the 
politics of belonging). Another example of creating and changing localities by drawing 
boundaries can be found in Amanda Wise’s (2005) study of Ashfield, a suburb of 
Sydney, Australia. There, long-term, Anglo-Celtic residents no longer went to certain 
shops or other areas of the city. The long-term residents withdrew from these localities 
(adjusted their personal boundaries) because they did not want confrontations with those 
who they saw as different (Asian immigrants who represented an increasingly significant 
share of the local population). The residents voluntarily reduced their boundaries. Both 
the Leadville and Ashfield examples demonstrate that boundaries create a shifting social 
space that polices and creates distinctions (Crowley 1999). Both those who claim 
belonging and those who seek it have power to grant belonging through these boundaries 
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(Antonsich 2010). The politics of belonging is essentially the “dirty work of boundary 
maintenance” (Crowley 1999) tied to localities. 
Focusing on localities is integral to examining belonging because localities do not 
provide for broad-scale generalizations. Doreen Massey (1995) recognized this in her 
seminal essay “A Global Sense of Place” when she observed that her neighborhood did 
not have single, coherent identity that everyone shared. Rather, multiple identities 
existed.  
Another reason to examine belonging through localities is because one’s sense of 
belonging to a place, the place-belongingness referred to by Antonsich, can change. Yet 
Antonsich’s framework does not seem to consider this. He used as an example bell 
hooks’ writings of her feelings of being “at home” in the Kentucky Hills. The localities 
these hills occupy presumably had not changed over time. More often than not, however, 
places change. As an example, a co-worker attended Hollywood High School in 
Hollywood, California, over fifty years ago. While the high school building stands, the 
co-worker has no connection whatsoever to the school at present. He does not feel at 
home there or otherwise have an attachment. Current students would similarly not see 
him as being part of their community. 
Finally, localities are important because they recognize that laws, which shape the 
politics of belonging, do not always achieve their intended effect. For example, despite 
the Multiculturalism Act in Canada permitting the use of French, many Francophones 
living in Ontario must learn English to advance in their society (Huot et al. 2014). And 
sometimes laws can achieve their intended effect for the public broadly, such as 
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antidiscrimination laws in the United Kingdom, but not achieve the accompanying 
change in mentality for those within the area (Valentine & Harris 2016). Examining 
localities will inform what a law’s effect is because of the visible presence on the 
landscape. Landscapes reflect the law (Delaney 2015).  
In sum, belonging is a powerful analytical tool for examining integration. Its 
focus on both personal belonging and place-belongingness allow researchers to consider 
nationhood, citizenship, and place together in a single framework separate from the 
confines of the nation-state. And by considering belonging along with localities, 
researchers can address integration in a localized manner to better understand integration 
laws and the perspectives of migrants and non-migrants concerning integration.  
2.6 Contemporary Cleavages in Belgium and Literature Regarding Immigrant 
Integration 
This section contextualizes the critical perspective applied in this study by 
considering the themes discussed above (the state, national identity, citizenship, 
integration, and place) in Belgium. To do so, it briefly addresses Belgium’s fractured 
status as a multi-national state with localized political and economic cleavages. These 
cleavages primarily derive from the linguistic divide present in the country. This section 
also addresses immigration into the state. It then concludes by reviewing literature 
concerning immigrant integration in the country. 
2.6.1 Language, politics, and a fractured state 
Language is an important factor in modern nationalism and providing unity in a 
nation-state (see B. Anderson 2006). But language is complicated in Belgium. The 
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country has three official languages: Flemish (Dutch), French, and German. Flemish is 
primarily spoken in the northern half of the country, an area known as Flanders. French 
dominates the south, known locally as Wallonia. And German is the primary language in 
Eupen-Malmedy, an area in the country’s east bordering Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. With only around 75,000 German speakers in Belgium, however, the 
German community does not prominently factor into the country’s linguistic battles. 
Rather, the division is between Flemish and French speakers. Strained relations between 
Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia complicate notions of national 
identity (Adam & Martiniello 2013; Murphy 1988). 
 The country’s linguistic division is apparent in the Belgian landscape. Street signs 
and other posted literature in the Brussels capital region, for example, are bilingual in 
French and Dutch as the capital region is officially bilingual. Yet in Flanders street signs, 
billboards, and other public signage are only in Flemish, just as in Wallonia the signage is 
only in French. Belgian law mandates this unilingualism. Strict linguistic separation 
between the regions is such an issue that in the late 1960s Flemish authorities forced 
French speakers at the Catholic University of Leuven in Flanders (faculty, administrators, 
and students) to relocate to Wallonia despite French speakers having been present at the 
university for well over a century (Murphy 1988).  
Flanders and Wallonia’s unilingual structure, as well as the Brussels capital 
region’s bilingual nature, are also evident in government services. In the Brussels capital 
region, for example, government occurs in both languages. The capital region’s 
governing structure guarantees representation by French and Flemish speakers alike 
based on their respective presence in the area. As 80% of the capital region speaks 
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French, roughly 80% of the region’s representatives are French speakers, with the 
remaining 20% of representatives reserved for Flemish speakers (Deschouwer 2012). 
And as one can expect, government services in Flanders and Wallonia are unilingual. The 
issue is non-negotiable. By way of example, it is so extreme that in the city of 
Linkenbeek, located within Flanders, the Flemish interior minister barred an elected 
mayor from serving because he sent out election literature in French, not Flemish as 
required. In the same city, if the town council’s proceedings occur in French (13 of the 15 
council members are French speakers), then the session is deemed invalid (Traynor 
2010). 
 The national government is officially bilingual. The constitution requires equal 
numbers of French-speaking and Flemish-speaking ministers to serve in the government 
in hopes of helping to bridge divides. Elected representatives, however, are placed 
together according to their language. Most elected members of the national government 
are Flemish by virtue of Flemish speakers accounting for the majority of Belgium’s 
population (Deschouwer 2012).  
As this example indicates, Belgium’s linguistic division shapes its current 
political cleavages. There are no national political parties, for example. Whereas 
historically three political parties dominated Belgian politics (the Catholic (now 
Christian-Democratic) party, the socialists, and the liberals), since the 1960s these parties 
have split along language lines (David & Van Hamme 2011). So it is that there is both a 
Walloon socialist party and a Flemish socialist party, but there is little to no consistency 
between their platforms. The same is true for the other parties. Socialists remain the 
strongest party in Wallonia, while the Christian-Democratic party has remained one of 
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the strongest in Flanders. The large number of political parties, combined with the lack of 
consistency between the Flemish and Walloon parties, often results in difficulties forming 
national governments. In 2010, for instance, Belgium went without a government for an 
unprecedented 18 months largely because of ongoing divisions between Flanders and 
Wallonia (Deutsche Welle 2010). The political crisis ended in part because of an 
agreement to devolve more power to the regions.  
Granting increased power to the regions is something that has occurred on a 
growing scale since the 1970s. Since that time, Belgium modified its constitution to 
become a federal state and began granting certain competencies to the regions. Unlike the 
United States where a federal government received limited powers and the others 
remained with the states, in Belgium all powers resided with the national government (it 
was a unitary state like France) and only some were adjusted down to the regional level. 
This has been increasing as a way of dealing with the divides between the regions. The 
exclusive competencies explains why, in the example above regarding the city of 
Linkenbeek, there was a “Flemish interior minister” dictating what occurred rather than a 
“Belgian interior minister.” As it is today, Flanders and Wallonia have differing 
competencies that permit them to act unilaterally regarding certain functions, including 
entering international agreements with other states. This can be summed up by the 
principle “in foro interno, in foro externo” (if the Belgian region has the competence 
internally, it has it externally too).  
In 2014, Belgium again did not have a functioning cabinet. This time the lack of a 
government occurred for five months. The inability to form a government in 2014 came 
in part because of differences becoming more political than linguistic (Deutsche Welle 
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2014). This is because Flanders increasingly leans right politically while Wallonia leans 
left, as mentioned above with the most popular political parties in the regions. The 2014 
national election resulted in the New Flemish Alliance (Flemish: Nieuw-Vlaamse 
Alliantie or “N-VA”) winning the most votes and holding 22% of the federal 
parliament’s seats. N-VA is a regionalist and separatist party seeking greater autonomy 
for Flanders and a hoped-for secession from Belgium (see Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-
VA). (n.d.)). N-VA entered a coalition government that same year that excluded socialists 
from the governing coalition for first time since the 1980s (Deutsche Welle 2014). 
The primary economic division in Belgium map onto these linguistic and regional 
political divisions. Flanders is a wealthier area. It contributes 60% of Belgium’s GDP 
despite having only 55% of the country’s population. Unemployment is also much lower 
in Flanders at around 5% than in Brussels or Wallonia, where unemployment stands near 
17% and 11%, respectively (Financial Times, n.d.). Flanders may have more contact with 
United States economically, in part because AB InBev, the owner of Budweiser, is based 
in the Flemish city of Leuven. Finally, educational attainment also differs between the 
areas. Flanders maintains higher educational attainment, and it has two of the world’s top 
universities in Leuven and Ghent. Part of the difference may result from the different 
curricula adopted by the Flanders and Wallonia regional parliaments, as education is one 
of the competencies left to the regions. The socio-economic divisions inflame political 
tensions as Flemish nationalist parties seek to keep more of the wealth generated in 
Flanders within the region as opposed to sharing it with Wallonia. 
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2.6.2 Immigration, nationalism, and linguistic/regional cleavages in 
Belgium 
 Nationalist parties like N-VA reflect another cleavage facing Belgium, that of 
immigrants. Belgium is host to tens of thousands of immigrants. Nearly 70% of these 
come from other countries within the European Union under the Schengen Agreement. 
France and the Netherlands contribute the largest share, largely due to the linguistic 
similarities between the countries. Scores of wealthy Dutch residents live in affluent 
suburbs north of Antwerp in their efforts to secure lower costs of living (Kesteloot et al., 
1999). But their presence causes some resentment by native Belgians.  
 There are also large numbers people with Turkish and Moroccan origin. Turks 
and Moroccans originally came to Belgium as guest workers following World War II. 
Many remained in the country, developed social networks, and raised families in 
Belgium. Liberal citizenship laws permitted most of the third generation to claim Belgian 
citizenship. Many did so. However, their presence has not always been welcomed. 
Unemployment among persons with Turkish backgrounds exceeds the national average in 
Wallonia, for example, while in Flanders Turkish unemployment is lower than for 
Belgian citizens although some studies suggest that Turks face far more discrimination in 
Flanders than in Wallonia in terms of education, housing, and employment (Wets 2006; 
Phalet & Swyngedouw 2003; Heylen & Van den Broeck 2016). 
 Immigration, especially from the non-European periphery, has become an 
especially contentious issue in Belgium because of terror attacks that have occurred over 
the past few years. The 2015 Paris attackers and the 2016 Brussels terrorists had used 
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Belgium as their base of operations (Schreur & Bilefsky 2017). And certain areas of 
Belgium, such as the Molonbeek area in Brussels, are often seen as jihadist training 
grounds, causing scores of Belgian citizens to oppose immigration even though many of 
the Molonbeek residents have Belgian citizenship themselves due to Belgium’s 
previously liberal citizenship laws. Indeed, Belgium provides the largest number of 
foreign fighters to ISIS (U.N. News 2015). These dynamics resulted in Belgian 
legislators at all levels proposing and adopting rules ostensibly intended to promote 
immigrant “integration” (European Migration Network (“EMN”) 2016 Annual Report, 
2017). One measure requires immigrants to sign a pledge promising to accept Belgium’s 
“local values” (Guardian 2016). Integration laws effectively gained new urgency and 
prominence in Belgium due to terror concerns. 
Research on Belgian immigration politics notes the differences in integration 
philosophies between Flanders and Wallonia (e.g., Adam 2013; Martiniello 1995). For 
years, Flanders has had clearly defined integration legislation and policies known as 
inburgering (Flemish term approximately meaning ‘citizenization’) (Martiniello 2013). 
Scholars and policymakers alike see inburgering as assimilationist (Adam 2011; 
Swyngedeouw 2016). Wallonia also has well-defined integration legislation that some 
describe as striking a balance between assimilation and multiculturalism (Torrekens et al 
2014). But some consider Wallonia’s attitude towards migrants to be more 
relaxed (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015; Adam 2011; Martiniello 1995). 
Beyond broad philosophies, studies concerning immigration and integration 
policies in Belgium consistently focus on Flanders (e.g., Waerniers & Hustinx 2019; 
Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015) or the Brussels-Capital Region (e.g., Xhardez 2016; 
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Swyngedouw 2019). Those that do discuss Wallonia usually do so in informational terms 
of comparison with these other regions that are the primary focus of analysis (e.g., Adam 
& Jacobs 2014; Van Avermaet & Gysen 2009). 
Concerning Wallonia’s integration laws generally, Ilke Adams (2011, 2013) 
provides perhaps the most comprehensive account in describing the laws’ historical 
background as part of her work comparing and contrasting integration models present in 
Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital region. Yet her work predates and thus fails 
to include significant legislative changes in 2014 and 2016 that have dramatically 
reshaped Wallonia’s integration policies, including CRIs’ role in the integration process. 
Other accounts regarding Wallonia’s laws tend to examine them in the context of general 
integration philosophies (e.g., Martiniello 1995; Martiniello 2013; Adam & Martiniello 
2013; Martiniello, Rea, & Dassetto 2006), in informational terms of comparison (e.g., 
Adam, Martiniello, & Rea 2018; Adam & Jacobs 2014; Van Avermaet & Gysen 2009), 
or only superficially when contrasted to Flemish policies that are the primary focus of a 
study (e.g., Xhardez 2015; Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015). Catherine Xhardez (2019) did 
nevertheless do an in-depth comparison of Walloon and Flemish laws in the early 2000s. 
In-depth research concerning Wallonia’s current integration laws is limited.  
There is some research regarding Wallonia’s CRIs. Corrine Torrekens et 
al. (2014) studied the CRIs, primarily focusing on assessing ‘Europeanization’ within 
Wallonia and its CRIs, meaning the extent of the European Union’s effort to ‘harmonize’ 
member states’ integration policies. In terms of the CRI directly, the account also briefly 
considered each CRI director’s philosophy on a continuum ranging from a willingness to 
work with religious groups to one eschewing any relationship with religious 
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organizations. The article derived from previous work considering the same issue, and 
one that provided greater information and background to CRIs generally (Torrekens et al. 
2014). But both articles examined CRIs prior to the Walloon government’s 2014 decree 
revamping the CRIs and their missions, and which placed CRIs in more active roles in 
integration. These significant legal changes require renewed analysis of CRI and their 
legally mandated role in Wallonia’s integration politics. 
This dissertation addresses the limitations in the literature concerning Wallonia’s 
current integration laws and its CRIs.  
2.7 Conclusion 
To recap, this dissertation critically examines immigrant integration in national 
“host societies.” This approach considers integration as a set of political processes in 
which immigrants and host groups together “make sameness” by determining differences 
that do/do not matter (Nagel 2009). The parties effectively decide who and what 
“belongs” in a place. This makes the theoretical concept of “belonging” a key component 
in investigating integration politics, and more broadly, nationhood, citizenship, and place.  
Belonging rests on differing academic traditions. Elements of “place-
belongingness” draw upon humanistic traditions, while those relating to the “politics of 
belonging” are more conventionally located within political/legal traditions. This 
dissertation weaves these different traditions by considering them together in localities 
marked by immigration. Doing so departs from traditional approaches to integration that 
emphasize the nation-state or use the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis even 
when critically appraising integration policies and politics. But it does not dismiss the 
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nation-state. Rather, it shows how national space consists of countless places—
localities—in which migrants and non-migrants encounter one another and negotiate 
membership and belonging, and how these actors construe membership in ways that 
complement, bypass, or undermine national narratives.  
Locality is the scale defined by people’s day-to-day activities (Clarke 2013), “the 
[physical] setting in which everyday life is most concentrated for a group of 
people” (Agnew 2002; p. 16). Locality is also a place or region of subnational scale 
(Painter 2009). Both aspects are relevant here. This study highlights how belonging and 
experiences of integration—of becoming a member of a spatially defined community or 
society—occurs in specific contexts within the nation-state. It does so by asking the 
following questions: 
 What legal constructs (state and local) are shaping integration? How do 
integration laws shape immigrants’ and non-immigrants interactions; what 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are embedded in integration laws; 
what do these embedded assumptions have about the national community 
and those outside the community (i.e. immigrants); and (d) how 
local/municipal actions differ from national ideals and policies? 
 How do these legal constructs manifest in localized spaces? How do 
migrants and non-migrants brought together by these laws at specific 
spaces understand and interpret the stated legal requirements, including 
how local actors communicate these requirements to immigrants; how do 
local actors enforce or subvert dominant integration discourses; and how 
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do migrants manifest their own views about society in interacting with 
non-migrants? 
 How do immigrants and non-immigrants respond to integration laws? 
How immigrants and non-immigrants interpret “integration”; what do 
people think about integration and what the laws state; and how do people 
(migrants and non-migrants) see themselves “practicing” integration in 
their everyday lives and in everyday spaces of interaction? 
I consider these questions in Chapters Four through Six. But I will first outline my 





 This research explores socially constructed identities and ideas about belonging 
along with everyday social practices related to belonging. Accordingly, it adopts 
qualitative research methods including interviews and participant observation. Such 
methods are pragmatic; they help explain phenomena that researchers cannot readily 
quantify such as the ways people explain what they think, know, or feel, and how these 
ways relate to how people behave (e.g., Secor 2010; Laurier 2010). They effectively 
allow for researchers to examine how people interpret their own and others’ actions in a 
relatively open-ended manner. This maintains the link between people’s experiences and 
the meanings they attach to them, unlike quantitative methods, which tend to ignore 
everyday settings (Staller 2010; Matejskova & Leitner 2011). Qualitative methods also 
help avoid imposing a priori identities/categories on the study subjects. Migration 
researchers in geography frequently employ in-depth qualitative research methods for 
these very reasons (see, e.g., Matejskova & Leitner 2011; Nagel & Staeheli 2008; 
Ehrkamp 2006). Applying them here helps better understand migrants and non-migrants’ 
points of view regarding integration (i.e., making sameness).  
 This chapter explains the methodology used in this dissertation. I begin by 
providing greater context regarding my selecting Belgium—and more specifically 
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Wallonia—as my study site (section 3.2). Next, I outline my research design (section 
3.3).  I then detail my data collection (section 3.4). An outline of my data analysis follows 
(section 3.5). Finally, I conclude by considering my researcher reflexivity (section 3.6).  
3.2 Situated Knowledge and Selecting Belgium for Study 
 My drive to research immigrant integration primarily results from lived 
experience in interacting with both local populations and migrants in southern Belgium 
(Wallonia) and northern France while serving as a volunteer with an international NGO 
in my early 20s. I lived in Belgium and France for approximately one year each between 
2002 and 2004. While there, I met and befriended several migrants (including refugees). I 
also interacted with native locals on a daily basis. Most locals were gracious hosts and 
welcomed me to their countries as a guest. Even so, many were vehemently anti-migrant. 
Some took out their anti-immigrant frustrations on me. I distinctly remember speaking 
with a lady in Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, who screamed at me for “invading” France and 
praised Jean-Marie Le Pen, the then-leader of France’s far-right and extremely nationalist 
National Front political party. Her feelings were so strong that she continued screaming 
at me as I walked down the street and until I was out of sight. 
 Nationalist, anti-migrant anger nevertheless seemed less in Wallonia while I lived 
there. And it appeared relatively non-existent over the ensuing decade after I returned to 
the United States and followed Belgium from afar (although I returned for a short time in 
2008 to complete an internship). As far as I could tell, immigrant integration was not an 
issue. Things seemed to change after the November 2015 terror attack in Paris and the 
March 2016 terror attack in Brussels. I noted news reports that the attacks sparked 
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debates about immigrant integration across Europe, including in Belgium. Governments 
at all levels increasingly implemented “integration” laws. So I resolved to research 
Belgium and its integration laws as I began my doctoral program. 
I initially anticipated studying immigrant integration throughout all of 
Francophone Belgium (Brussels and Wallonia) based on my French language skills. But 
as I researched the issue more deeply, I learned that the legal systems regarding 
immigrant integration differed between the Brussels-Capital Region and Wallonia. The 
former was already the subject of multiple studies, including one presented by Eva 
Swyngedouw at AAG in April 2018.5 Studies regarding Wallonia were relatively non-
existent as described in Chapter Two. So I resolved to focus my research efforts 
exclusively on Wallonia.  
3.3 Research Design 
 Belgium presents a unique case to investigate as the country is a microcosm of 
Europe’s debates over immigration. Wallonia specifically is a compelling case 
concerning immigrant integration for the reasons detailed in Chapters One and Two. In 
this section, I present my original research questions before explaining how being in the 
field adjusted the initial inquiry to then shape the research questions ultimately guiding 
this study. 
My initial research questions were: (1) What are the legal formulations in the 
Belgian context that regulate the presence of immigrants and their access to formal rights 
 
5 I attended this presentation and spoke with Ms. Swyngedouw afterwards about my 
anticipated research and her experience. Her research regarding Brussels is now 
published (see, e.g., Swyngedouw 2019a; 2019b). 
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and societal resources? (2) How is the legal framework implemented in local spaces of 
immigrant settlement? (3) How do immigrants respond to this legal framework? These 
questions were effectively all migrant-centric and structural in nature. They largely 
ignored host-society perspectives other than those stated in the laws and assumed to be 
the dominant discourse. 
After arriving in the field, however, I recognized the need to revise my research 
questions to actively include non-immigrants’ perspectives as well. Because integration is 
typically a nationalist demand, and because nationalism is a mass phenomenon, 
researchers should do more to examine individuals who constitute the masses, the so-
called “ordinary’ people with unique identities and experiences in their everyday lives 
(Strømsø 2019). And while Wallonia is not overtly nationalist, there could be nationalist 
overtones in its integration laws and among its non-immigrant population. These 
sentiments may bleed over from Flanders and state-level ideals where Flemish 
nationalists maintain an outsize presence. So I simplified my research questions and 
focused my inquiry as follows: 
 1. What legal constructs (state and local) are shaping integration?  
 Empirical inquiry for this question considered the following issues: (a) how 
integration laws shape immigrants’ and non-immigrants interactions; (b) the mechanisms 
of inclusion and exclusion embedded in integration laws; (c) the embedded assumptions 
the laws have about the national community and those outside the community (i.e. 
immigrants); and (d) how local/municipal actions differ from national ideals and policies.  
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2. How do local actors interpret and implement these legal constructs?   
Empirical inquiry relating to question two focused on: (a) how immigrants and 
non-immigrants brought together by these laws at specific spaces understand and 
interpret the stated legal requirements, including how local actors communicate these 
requirements to immigrants; (b) how local actors enforce or subvert dominant integration 
discourses; (c) the extent that NGOs implementing integration laws “instruct” migrants to 
conform to a dominant narrative; and (d) how migrants manifest their own views about 
society in interacting with non-immigrants. 
3. How do immigrants and non-immigrants respond to integration laws? 
Empirical inquiry for this final question addressed: (a) how immigrants and non-
immigrants interpret “integration”; (b) what people think about integration and what the 
laws state; and (c) how people (immigrants and non-immigrants) see themselves 
“practicing” integration in their everyday lives and in everyday spaces of interaction. 
 Because each of these questions focus on the everyday, I use qualitative methods 
as described in greater detail below. Qualitative methods is the primary tool human 
geographers use since the discipline’s humanistic turn in the 1980s (Cresswell 2013). 
Indeed, qualitative methods seemingly defines human geography’s future directions as 
well (Hitchings & Latham 2020). Qualitative methods are all the more appropriate here 
because of the study’s focus on locality. “[L]ocal studies involving interviews and local 
written sources anchor understanding of the intersubjective worlds of daily life out of 
which politics is finally mapped” (Agnew 2002; p. 22) 
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3.4 Data Collection 
Collecting data for this study involved: (1) document analysis, (2) qualitative 
interviews, and (3) participant observation. Document analysis and interviews addressed 
the first research question listed above, while interviews and participant observation 
address the second and third research questions. I detail my data collection for each of 
these methods in this section. Fieldwork for this study occurred between May and August 
2018 with some follow up in September 2019. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the 
methods used and the sites and participants involved in my data collection effort. I also 
include in this section a discussion of my study sites. 
 3.4.1 Document analysis  
I began analyzing documents in March 2018. My analysis centered on laws and 
regulations concerning immigrant integration in Wallonia. I started by searching 
Belgium’s national code and Wallonia’s regional code through official government 
websites. I then reviewed legislative decrees concerning integration posted in the 
“Moniteur Belge” (the country’s official legislative reports). I also reviewed official 
documents relating to the CRIs as posted on each CRI’s website. I completed this initial 
analysis prior to leaving for the field in May 2018. In reviewing government decrees and 
regulations, I looked for directives and definitions affecting CRIs’ actions towards 
immigrants and the host society. I also examined CRI-specific mission statements and 
other, localized CRI policies relating to immigrant integration. The findings from this 
analysis informed the question template I used in qualitative interviews with key 
informants at CRIs and others. 
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Document analysis continued as I entered the field and visited the various CRIs. 
These CRI visits occurred in June and July 2018 and September 2019. Interviewees 
provided me with documents and reports relating to their centers that were not available 
online and that stated various policies specific to the CRI. Other documents received in 
the field included those relating to FIC. I received and reviewed these documents when 
attending training sessions for FIC instructors and attending FIC courses as a participant.  
3.4.2 Qualitative interviews  
Qualitative interviews served as my primary data collection method. Using the 
interview template informed by my document analysis, I conducted over 100 in-depth 
interviews and dozens more informal interview with migrants and non-migrants alike. 
Interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes. The shortest interview was approximately 15 
minutes; the longest lasted over two hours. I conducted them in each interviewee’s place 
of choice (work premises, parks, restaurants, homes, etc.). I digitally recorded the 
interviews and transcribed them. Participants seemed to enjoy the interview. Many 
expressed interest in my research and the results. I personally conducted all interviews in 
either French or English (sometimes a mixture of both) according to each participant’s 
preference and ability. Charles, for instance, was a native Anglophone and preferred 
English. All translations are mine. These interviews included several with key 
informants.  
Thirteen key informants included CRI directors and other CRI staff involved with 
the integration courses (parcours d’integration) at all eight of Wallonia’s CRIs. Figure 
3.1 shows the administrative action areas for the eight CRIs and the communes they 
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cover. Three of the eight CRIs are located within large cities that receive significant 
numbers of migrants. These include Charleroi (population ~202,000), Liège (~197,000), 
and Namur (~111,000). Another CRI is located in Verviers (~55,000), a city east of Liège 
near the German border. The remaining four CRIs are strategically located in varying 
smaller communes between large Walloon cities so as to be more accessible to the total 
communes they serve. Specifically, these CRIs are in Nivelles (~28,500), Saint-
Ghislain (~23,000), Libramont (~11,000), and Trivières (~4,000).  
As described in Chapter One, Wallonia’s CRIs are primarily administrative actors 
over a series of frontline actors and local government entities. Their locations are 
generally basic offices containing administrative workers with some staff conducting 
individual interviews and then directing migrants to various local organizations assisting 
migrants. Figure 3.2 shows the exterior of the offices for the CRI in Verviers known as 
CRVI. The inside of CRVI, as with each of the other CRIs, resembled a typical business 
with a receptionist and a small waiting area (approximately three seats). Each CRI had at 
least one conference room and several smaller offices for the various personnel. One CRI 
known as CIMB maintained an open floor plan with workers concentrated in a large 
central room at tables containing their workstations. Many CRIs are easily accessible via 
public transit while others are more readily reached via car. As an example, Figure 3.3 
shows CRIPEL’s location in downtown Liège near a major pedestrian shopping area and 
with easy access to a train station and bus depot at Place Saint-Lambert.  
I recruited CRI informants via cold-calling and snowball sampling. As workers at 
government-sponsored entities, CRI workers occupy a unique position relating to the 
Walloon government. They straddle the divide between frontline actors and legislators. 
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CRI directors are those overseeing the implementation of regional integration laws but 
not necessarily those interacting with immigrants on a day-to-day basis. CRI workers 
over the integration courses do have some frontline involvement with migrants, but it is 
more administrative, as explained above. The CRI also depend on government financing, 
and they are tasked with implementing legislative directives. Consequently, they must 
walk a finer line than workers at private organizations in critiquing Wallonia’s policies. 
Some expressed hesitancy to speak on the record absent guarantees that their statements 
could not be attributed to themselves or their specific CRI as one director likened 
financing battles between the CRIs as “war.” But once assured of their anonymity, 
workers and directors opened up. I identify the CRI directors here using only numbers 
(Director 1, Director 2, etc.) and gender-neutral terms. I use pseudonyms for the other 
CRI workers over the integration course. 
Other key informants included FIC instructors (including one of FIC’s creators 
and who is also responsible for training FIC instructors throughout the region), local 
government officials responsible for immigrant integration projects, workers at local 
NGOs serving as frontline actors with immigrants, and even a former regional parliament 
member.  
I recruited several participants by direct contact after meeting them at various 
functions including training seminars, FIC courses, municipal events, religious functions 
(I attended Friday prayers at a mosque, for example), and from past acquaintances I had 
known since 2003 when I volunteered in Belgium. I chose to attend functions and recruit 
participants primarily in Brabant Wallon, a province I had lived in for nearly eight 
months while serving as a volunteer. My knowledge of the area and connections to it 
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greatly facilitated my research. For example, I knew about a mosque centrally located in 
Brabant Wallon in the city of Louvain-la-Neuve that attracted both migrant and non-
migrant congregants (see Figure 3.4). So I attended Friday prayers at that mosque and 
recruited participants there. (I elaborate on my participant observation activities in the 
next section.) Many migrants I met in FIC courses were unable to meet for in-depth 
interviews outside of class but spoke freely during class breaks. FIC instructors 
encouraged me to speak with their students and similarly encouraged their students to 
speak with me.  
Beyond official, organized functions, I also sought to develop connections with 
others in what Tatiana Matejskova (2014) calls “interstitial spaces,” meaning those 
spaces containing unplanned moments such as waiting at a bus stop or riding public 
transportation. I met some of my research participants this way. Eid-Mohammed is one 
example. I was on a bus traveling back from an interview with a FIC participant when I 
heard a man talking on the phone and speaking a language that I did not recognize. When 
his phone conversation ended, I turned and asked what language he had been speaking. 
He replied that he was speaking Pashto, one of the main languages in Afghanistan. We 
spoke further and I discovered that he recently received refugee status in Belgium. We 
spoke further and he ultimately agreed to speak with me in a semi-structured interview.   
3.4.3 Participant observation 
Participant observation is something that the researcher should know/have 
experience with the matter, or at least be involved in it (Laurier, 2010). Accordingly, my 
initial plan going into the field was to volunteer at CRIs other NGOs assisting migrants in 
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Wallonia. I repeatedly offered to volunteer within both CRI and other NGOs, but the 
groups denied my offer. The best explanation that I can come up with is that there are 
varying administrative regulations on volunteer positions within Wallonia, and the 
respective organizations either did not want to deal with bureaucratic issues for a 
volunteer who would be in Belgium for a shorter time or they had concerns about 
volunteer positions going towards migrants who intended to stay in the country and so 
affording them the opportunity to develop skills.  
I nevertheless participated in as many functions as I could. As mentioned above, 
these activities included training seminars, FIC courses, municipal events, and religious 
functions. I selected varying activities to observe a mix of people relevant to this study. 
To observe workers involved with implementing integration laws, for instance, I attended 
a day-long training seminar for FIC instructors hosted at one of the CRIs. I acted only as 
an observer in this seminar, but it is how I gained access to multiple FIC instructors as 
well as one of FIC’s creators for subsequent interviews. This ability to make connections 
with those implementing FIC was a major motivator for choosing this seminar. Another 
event I attended for those implementing laws was a municipal workshop on migrant 
voting in local elections. It was primarily an information session detailing information on 
Belgium’s voting laws and directed towards those working with migrants such as persons 
at community non-profit organizations. Here too I participated in a more observational 
manner (as did most attendees), although I did ask some questions during the Q&A.  
To observe migrants impacted by integration laws, I attended over 55 hours of 
FIC courses run by two different instructors. In the first course, I sat with FIC students 
but was not an official student. Students in this course sat at tables placed together to 
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form a large U-shape around the classroom, a street-level space situated along a busy 
road not far from the train station. The setup allowed students to see one another 
throughout the course. I would occasionally participate when called on by Amelie, the 
course instructor. This usually occurred when Amelie asked course participants how 
certain activities in Belgium compared to what things were like in their native countries 
(such as appropriate public behavior, family structures, etc.), and Amelie or other 
students would want to know how things compared to America. Most of my observation 
in FIC courses (42 hours), however, resulted from my enrolling in and following a second 
course as a student. Students in this course sat around a large conference table in the 
center of a large room. Most students sat at the table, but space constraints forced some to 
sit at the back of the room. I actively participated in this second course in the same way 
that migrants did. Figure 3.5 is a copy of my certificate of completion for that course, 
while Figure 3.6 is a picture from inside that course. I describe these FIC courses in 
greater detail and share my observations from them (including the participants) in section 
5.3 of Chapter Five. 
The FIC courses I attended were both in the Brabant Wallon province. I chose to 
follow courses in this area primarily for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, I was 
familiar with Brabant Wallon because I had previously lived there years before. I had 
limited funding and time to be in the field, so selecting an area I was already familiar 
with greatly facilitated my ability to make contacts with various organizations. Second, 
Brabant Wallon is the closest francophone province to the Brussels-Capital Region. 
Figure 3.7 shows the province on a map colored in red; Brussels is the small circle 
located directly above the province. Brabant Wallon’s proximity to the capital meant that 
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persons from all over Wallonia could easily access FIC courses delivered there. This 
could then provide opportunities to snowball sample more migrants across Wallonia. I 
had some success with this although limited funding and time in the field ultimately 
curtailed my ability significantly snowball sample out of the migrants I met in FIC 
classes.  
Attending religious functions was a third participant observation activity used in 
this study. I chose religious activities as a way to make connections with migrants and 
non-migrants alike who attended these services. Besides attending Friday prayers at the 
Louvain-la-Neuve mosque that I mentioned above, I also attended Christian worship 
services and activities at two churches in Nivelles, one of the Brabant Wallon’s larger 
cities. Attending these Christian services brought me into contact with larger numbers of 
non-migrant Belgians. 
3.5 Data Analysis  
Per best practices, I typed my interview notes concurrently with my fieldwork and 
transcribed interview recordings (Maxwell 2012). I recorded my observations either in 
the moment if circumstances allowed or immediately after. I then organized these diverse 
types of data into broad themes that arose during the interviews. Some broad themes 
cutting across the study populations included the importance of speaking French, “being 
a part of” Belgian society, and frustrations with Wallonia's integration laws. On this last 
point, the various study populations had differing takes. Workers felt burdened by 
inordinate bureaucracy regulating their actions. Migrants often chafed at the numerous 
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legal requirements imposed on them to remain in Belgium/acquire citizenship. And locals 
comprising the “host society” expressed sentiments that the laws did little good.  
While considering competing perspectives on some few themes proved 
interesting, I noted that some topics arose more among the respective interviewee 
populations than others. This prompted me to rethink my analysis to first consider the key 
study populations and then look for themes within them. So for this dissertation, I 
narrowed my focus to certain themes grouped by the targeted study population they came 
from (workers tasked with implementing integration laws; immigrants affected by these 
laws; or locals comprising the “host society” into which migrants are to integrate 
according to the laws). The manuscripts set forth in Chapters Four through Six discuss 
some of the themes coming from these differing groups. 
3.6 Researcher Reflexivity 
The notion that research reflects the researcher’s own subjectivity is a given in 
qualitative research (Matejskova 2013). It grows out of feminist work emphasizing the 
impossibility to assume scholars as omniscient, detached observers (Gibson-Graham 
1994). Scholars employing a constructionist view, such as feminist and critical theorists, 
reject the premise that researchers discovers truth from pre-existing data (Staller 2013). 
Those researching minorities and marginalized communities (with migrants readily being 
in both groups) often focus on the “insider-outsider divide”, meaning a researcher’s 
membership status in the group being studied as either as an “insider” or “outsider” (e.g., 
Carling et al. 2014). Researchers often infer insider status “from the dominant and 
abstract identity markers such as race, gender, or, as in migration studies, ethno-national 
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origin, rather than from long-term groundedness in a localized, small-scale community” 
(Matejskova 2014; p. 18-19). However, some researchers advocate moving beyond the 
dominant “‘laundry list’ of identity markers” like national origin, race, or gender to 
consider “insiderness” situationally (Matejskova 2014; p. 20; see also Carling et al. 
2014). That was my experience in this research. 
While I have some similarities with my research participants, I mostly had little in 
common with them. I am not Belgian. Yet I physically appear to be “Belgian” based on 
my not-too-distant European ancestry. Like the local population, I speak French. But 
similar to many of those migrants who also speak French, I speak it with an accent 
(thankfully not an American accent). I shared similar academic and professional 
backgrounds with some participants, both from the locals and the migrants. My family 
status (married with four children) was also be similar to some participants, but not 
others. The key factor creating a connection with many participants was my experience 
living in Belgium. This prior experience was a key strength. 
For example, many native Belgians I spoke with initially viewed me skeptically. 
They questioned why an American like me would be in Belgium. But when I explained 
that I had lived in Belgium years earlier and had wanted to return to the country to 
explore immigrant integration, their demeanors visibly changed. They smiled and 
expressed pride in participating in the study by sharing their viewpoints. Many made 
comments suggesting that I understood what they were talking about, that I “got it.” 
Many immigrants did the same thing. When commenting on Belgian culture and 
adjusting to life in the country, migrants often punctuated their statements with, “you 
know,” as if to signify my understanding what they described based on my own 
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experience. For migrants from the FIC classes I attended, my not being a native Belgian 
and following the same course as they did caused some to see me as one of “them.” A 
few continue to contact me to this day. 
Both groups (migrants and non-migrants) freely spoke with me about various 
laws and regulations. Migrants did so perhaps because I had no part in the laws’ 
existence. In other words, they were able to critique these issues without alienating me as 
the listener whereas they may be more guarded and not say the same thing to a Belgian. 
Similarly, local Belgians more readily expressed agreement with certain right-wing 
political views concerning immigration because Donald Trump, my country’s president, 
uses far-right rhetoric similar to Theo Francken a far-right, Flemish nationalist then 
serving as the Belgian federal government’s top official over migration. So perhaps these 
Belgians felt that they had a sympathetic ear in speaking with me simply because of who 
my president is (and possibly erroneously assume that I voted for him). 
Perhaps the greatest limitation that I had due to my subjectivity and positionality 
is my nationality. One could say that I do not have a “personal stake” in the issue since I 
am not Belgian or a migrant to the country. On these counts, a critic would be correct. 
Yet my status as a non-European and non-migrant actually seemed to prompt both locals 
and migrants to be more open with me about their feelings regarding the “other.”  For 
instance, some locals said things to me about migrants that social courtesy would prevent 
them from saying directly to migrants, and vice versa. It was surprising to see how 
unfiltered people became in speaking with me when they knew that I was neither Belgian 
nor a migrant to the country.  
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Methods Sites and Participants 
Document analysis - Belgian National Code (Code de la nationalité Belge) 
- Walloon legislative code (Code wallon),  
- CRIs literature available on internet and provided in 
person during site visits,  
- FIC instruction manuals 
Site visits and 
formal/informal 
interviews 
- All eight regional integration centers (CAI – Namur; 
CIMB; CeRAIC; CRIBW; CRIC; CRILUX*; CRIPEL; 
CRVI) 
- DisCRI (the Walloon agency responsible for training 
FIC instructors and creating course content) 
- Local NGOs acting as frontline actors (Génération 
Espoir; Collectif des femmes; ASBL 6 Beaufort; Céfop) 
- Municipal government offices (Braine-le-Château; 
Court-Saint-Étienne; Enghien; Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve) 
In-depth interviews - 100+ (including 13 CRI workers; 8 FIC instructors; 5 





- Training seminar for FIC instructors (5 hours) 
- FIC courses (55 hours over two separate courses)  
- Various CRI-sponsored/promoted events  
- Religious organizations (churches, mosques)  







Figure 3.1. Administrative action areas for Wallonia’s CRIs. 
 
 
Source: CRIC (Centre Régional d’Intégration de Charleroi); 


















Figure 3.3. CRIPEL’s location in downtown Liège 
 
  




























































Figure 3.7. Brabant Wallon province. 
 
 
By TUBS - Own work. Based on File:Belgium location map.svg by 
NordNordWest, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/ 
index.php?curid=14364888.  
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Abstract 
This article explores how integration cannot conceptually be categorized as an 
either/or proposition set forth by the state along a multicultural versus assimilationist 
ideological spectrum. It does so through a case study of workers tasked with 
implementing integration laws in Wallonia, Belgium’s francophone region. Drawing 
from in-depth interviews with 13 key informants at all eight of Wallonia’s government-
sponsored regional integration centers (centres régionaux d’integration (CRI)), as well as 
analyzing applicable legislation and policy statements from each CRI, this article reveals 
how workers simultaneously incorporate elements from normative assimilationist and 
multicultural models to create a localized sense of integration. Workers implementing 
integration laws within Wallonia do so differently—at a localized level—based on 
divergent ideas of belonging and community. Workers largely considered integration to 
be immigrants and host society members creating a new culture together; they determine 
together who and what belongs. Finally, local actors actually implementing integration 
laws shape the laws’ reality. This all reveals that scholars and policymakers alike should 
rethink integration as a political and a cultural process that varies across national space. 
4.1 Introduction 
Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel resigned in December 2018 largely over a 
single issue: migration. Michel had taken an accommodative stance on migration and had 
promoted more sympathetic policies towards migrants since assuming office in October 
2014. This position put him at odds with many members of his unlikely governing 
coalition, a four-party alliance that counted the nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 
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as its largest member. The N-VA had enjoyed substantial authority as part of the 
governing coalition, with N-VA ministers put in charge of migration, security, and 
defense. But the party quit Michel’s coalition after Michel endorsed the United Nations 
Global Compact for Migration and committed Belgium to the legally non-binding accord. 
(Belgium’s federal parliament previously endorsed the measure in a vote.) N-VA’s exit 
prompted Michel’s resignation and resulted in a caretaker government until scheduled 
general elections in May 2019.  
What occurred in Belgium reflects a broader divide in Europe over migration. 
Roughly one year before Michel’s resignation, for instance, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s party suffered significant electoral losses primarily due to her decision in 2015 
to welcome 800,000 refugees to Germany. The anti-immigration party Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) received 12% of the popular vote in Germany’s 2017 election and 
became the German parliament’s largest opposition party. Germany’s election occurred 
15 months after Britain’s vote to leave the European Union—a vote largely attributed to 
concerns about migration. And in 2018, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Slovakia also rejected the UN migration pact, although Belgium’s government was 
the first to fall for supporting the accord (Apuzzo & Schreuer 2018). 
Europe’s migration divide is decades in the making largely due to varying policies 
aimed at “integrating” immigrants. Multiculturalism enjoyed a favored status starting in 
the 1970s as states adopted policies promoting tolerance and cultural diversity (Gońda, 
Lesińska, & Pachocka 2020). This changed in the 1990s as politicians and the broader 
public pushed back against multiculturalism ideals (Joppke 2007; Goodman 2010). Many 
Europeans reconsidered integration in more assimilationist terms, meaning they saw 
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integration as both a static, idealized end-state of social homogeneity and also a 
predictable trajectory wherein migrants adopt the norms and values of the (presumably 
coherent) “national” and/or European society (Nagel & Staeheli 2008). States soon 
adopted these assimilationist integration policies through formalized laws (Joppke 
2017a). The policy pendulum was such that multiculturalism now has little purchase in 
European political circles (Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos 2015). Some even question 
whether multiculturalism is dead (Joppke 2017b). The net result is that contemporary 
“integration” laws often reflect assimilation attitudes.  
Scholars studying integration in Europe frequently focus on state-level laws and 
policies, presupposing that national-level discourse drives integration (e.g., Boucher & 
Maclure 2018; Joppke 2018) and ignoring local policies (Zapata-Barrero 2018). Scholars 
also categorize these national laws as either assimilationist or multicultural in nature (or 
variants of either) (e.g., Joppke 2017a; Barou 2014). This assumes, (even inadvertently) a 
homogeneous national space. And it privileges the perspectives of those creating the 
integration laws over any others (e.g., Antonsich & Petrillo 2019; Xhardez 2019; see also 
Nielson 2020). Because this research is top-down and institutional, it overlooks everyday 
lived experiences that may not be consistent across national space. It also fails to 
recognize that integration policies, in word or in practice, may not necessarily fit within 
either assimilationist or multiculturalist paradigms. Indeed, while assimilationist 
discourse currently dominates immigration politics in Europe, such discourse and the 
laws that stem from it are not uniform either between or within European countries (e.g., 
Brubaker 1992; Dekker et al 2015).  
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This article explores how integration cannot conceptually be categorized as an 
either/or proposition set forth by the state along a multicultural versus assimilationist 
ideological spectrum. It does so through a case study of workers tasked with 
implementing integration laws in Wallonia, Belgium’s francophone region. Focusing on 
these workers rather than politicians responsible for creating the laws represents a 
“bottom-up” approach to understanding integration. The workers, employed at several 
government-sponsored regional integration centers (centres régionaux d’intégration 
(CRI)) across Wallonia, have the ability to both represent and challenge the government’s 
assumptions about what integration means.  
Before delving into the empirical material, this article first critically examines the 
concept of integration and notions of community and belonging that are central to 
integration. It then introduces the Belgian context and the everyday reality within which 
Wallonia’s CRIs operate. After outlining the research design, the article analyzes CRI 
workers’ interpretations of integration in three key themes. First, workers did not 
maintain rigid ‘multicultural’ or ‘assimilation’ integration perspectives. Rather, they 
combined elements of both normative models to create a localized sense of integration. 
Second, workers largely considered integration to be immigrants and host society 
members creating a new culture together, determining together who and what belonged. 
Third, workers considered Wallonia’s integration laws as providing directives but with 




4.2 Conceptualizing Integration  
Scholars and policymakers alike often use the term ‘integration’ in a general sense 
to signify a process of immigrants incorporating into a dominant ‘host society.’ Many 
scholars see integration in this sense as synonymous with assimilation theory and its 
variants.
1 Studies thus focus on the stepwise, generational processes by which immigrants 
become more like (i.e., ‘integrate’ into) the host society in measurable ways (Nagel 
2009). These ways include examining the immigrants’ using the host society’s language, 
their marriage patterns, employment patterns, and so forth (cf. Alba & Nee 1997). 
Simultaneously, scholars and politicians sometimes use the term integration to describe 
normative models establishing what incorporation looks like and how immigrants achieve 
it. When used in this sense, ‘integration’ becomes a milder, less demanding term than 
assimilation, signifying the incorporation into ‘mainstream’ life without the requirement 
of total conformity (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).  Multiculturalism, which became popular in 
many immigrant-receiving countries in the 1970s, takes integration’s normative claims of 
integration a step further by actively validating cultural/ethnic differences and affording 
immigrants flexibility in maintaining their identities in the public sphere (e.g., Modood 
2005). 
Important policy implications attach to these different normative models, with 
most scholars arguing that assimilationist policies look very different from 
multiculturalist policies (e.g., Boucher & Maclure 2018; Modood 2017). Broadly 
 
1 Key literature frequently uses integration and assimilation synonymously, with 
Europeans using the former term and Americans adopting the latter (Modood 2005). 
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speaking, debates tend to vacillate between the two philosophies, with each seen as being 
ideologically opposed to the other. Further, these normative models also have much in 
common: each rests upon idealized notions of what national communities should look 
like, and each makes assumptions about who ‘we’ are and who ‘they’ (i.e. immigrants) 
are (e.g., Simon & Beaujeu 2018; Modood 2018; Drouhot & Nee 2019). They are also all 
prescriptive in nature, laying out a supposedly coherent national polity’s rules of 
belonging and also its terms of inclusion and exclusion. In all cases, there is a noticeable 
feedback effect between scholarly analysis and public discourse: scholars tend to analyze 
immigrants as a ‘problem’ for national society, highlighting incorporation’s successes 
and failures and suggesting ways to remove barriers to immigrant success; policymakers, 
in turn, use scholarly analyses (sometimes developed in partisan think-tanks) to advocate 
certain policy prescriptions. Simply put, scholarly literature on integration rarely escapes 
the state’s political objective of transforming immigrants into national citizens.  
Integration’s connection to state objectives of transforming citizens, particularly 
in Europe, has a historical basis. Long before contemporary migration, and even before 
the nation-state’s rise, people’s sense of territory was geared towards a combination of 
local communes, ruling elites, and also broader ecclesiastical ideals (Murphy 1996). 
Following the Peace of Westphalia, however, leaders began to sweep away attachment to 
community in favor of state-defined national identities. (Murphy 2018). “Nationalism as 
an ideology was premised on the link between people and territory” (J .Anderson 1986, p. 
97), whereby the people linked to the territory comprised the “nation” (Jones & Fowler 
2007). The concept of a territory “belonging” to a people created grander ideas of “us” 
and “them” with some states pitted against others (Murphy 1996). Nationalism also 
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served to divide one political community or “nation” from another, thus determining the 
geographical boundaries of the state in many instances (J. Anderson 1986). Membership 
is open only to a certain group of people (described as sharing a common origin and/or 
destiny) living in a certain place. A closure exists vis-à-vis those outside of that place 
(Brubaker 1992), with those inside maintaining a sense of “one nation” based on ideals of 
common origins, ancestry, consanguinity, and so forth (Dekker, Malova, & Hoogendoorn 
2003). Persons not fitting within this mold or living in the territory do not belong (Soysal 
2001; Gustafson 2005). This historical reality may help explain why integration is such a 
sensitive issue in Europe.  
Here, I use the term ‘integration’ generally to refer to the political process 
centered on public deliberation and debate about incorporating immigrants into the 
national community and polity. In other words, integration refers to who and what 
‘belongs.’ Integration is thus a contentious process of creating, reproducing, and 
enforcing collective understandings of the criteria of difference/sameness that matter 
(Nagel 2009; Erdal & Oeppen 2013). This process carries with it assumptions about 
language, race, ethnicity, religion, and gender (e.g., Askins 2015; Leitner 2012; Yeh & 
Lama 2006; Nagel & Staeheli 2005). While this article’s focus is on those implementing 
integration laws, one cannot ignore immigrants themselves as active participants in the 
politics of integration. For instance, immigrants can assert their personal and social 
qualities’ sameness and ‘mainstream’ nature, or they can advocate more broadly defining 
‘mainstream’ itself. I thus wish to complicate broad conceptual understandings by not 
simply considering multicultural or assimilation policies as static or exclusive. Rather, 
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actors creating and implementing policies locally may combine elements of both 
philosophies. 
As a public, political issue, integration frequently becomes a matter of law and 
policy. Laws and policies that address immigrants’ behaviors and comportment reflect, 
reinforce, and enact particular understandings of who ‘we’ are and who ‘they’ (i.e. 
immigrants) are. Justifying these divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ constitute the politics 
of belonging (Antonsich 2010; Trudeau 2006). Laws and policies also spell out specific 
ways immigrants must conform to national norms in order to achieve citizenship and 
cultural belonging (Joppke 2007). They seek to pin down a particular understanding of, 
or to fix in place, the end state immigrants must achieve. These may or may not reflect 
broader societal attitudes. Belgium’s revised citizenship law, for instance, sets forth 
various, identifiable measures of ‘integration’ one must ‘prove’ to secure 
citizenship (Article 12bis Code de la nationalité Belge). These measures include 
linguistic competency along with fulfilling specific educational and socio-economic 
requirements. Enumerating these measures in the revised law reflect Flemish lawmakers’ 
integration ideals demanded in a 2011 coalition agreement (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 
2015). 
Scholars often focus on the host society’s laws that shape the politics of belonging 
for immigrants. These laws often function to exclude migrants. Examples range from 
international agreements to municipal ordinances. Hyndman and Mountz (2008), for 
instance, demonstrate how formal agreements between EU member states and North 
African countries to detain would-be asylum seekers effectively excluded asylum 
seekers, most of them black Africans and so visibly ‘Other,’ from European space. On 
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the local scale, Monica Varsanyi (2008) examined municipal laws as a means of 
excluding Latino day laborers from public spaces in the Phoenix metro area. The 
laborers, primarily undocumented immigrants from Central America, congregated in 
large groups and spoke Spanish with each other while awaiting work opportunities. 
Despite many of them living and working within these municipalities making the 
legislation, in other words being de facto community members, the immigrants were 
visibly and audibly Othered. Linguistic differences, legal status, and potentially race thus 
held importance for what community leaders (and so presumably community members) 
considered crucial for belonging in the Phoenix metropole. 
At the same time, laws can operate to include immigrants. Walker and Leitner 
(2011) highlight this reality in their study of municipal laws across the United States that 
target immigrants. Some municipalities, they found, actively legislate to embrace 
migrants within their borders. Various cities grant residents the right to vote in local 
elections, regardless of national citizenship status, for example. Others prohibit local law 
enforcement from cooperating with national immigration enforcement officers to 
investigate a city resident’s legal status. These laws’ net effect is to incorporate migrants 
on a local level.  
Beyond laws themselves, actors implementing applicable laws shape belonging 
on localized levels. Susan Gordon (2007) described how actors tasked with implementing 
national U.S. immigration law in the early 20th century privileged the law’s requirements 
of morality and loyalty to America over the requirement that immigrants prove their 
knowledge of U.S. history and government. These actors’ choice to do so resulted in the 
subsequent development of educational programs focused more on instilling ideals of 
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proper American behavior than on civics or history. Such actions, Gordon argues, then 
shaped the host society’s exclusionary attitudes and laws towards immigrants and other 
minorities over the next century. Sutton and Vigneswaran (2011) examined South 
African immigration judges’ determinations in deporting immigrants. The judges, as 
actors applying laws towards immigrants, greatly shaped the immigrants and host 
society’s ability to make sameness by determining who could or could not be present to 
encounter one another.  
Highlighting locality and the actors involved in integration debates draws our 
attention to negotiations between immigrants and non-immigrants—to everyday 
interactions taking place within certain legal contexts. Integration policies and politics 
vary by locale, with dominant/native groups and immigrants negotiating community 
membership (local or national) within a variety of socio-spatial contexts—schools, city 
planning boards, workplaces, etc. (e.g., Joppke 2007; Brubaker 2001; Wise 2005). The 
negotiations focus on those differences that do/do not matter in creating community 
membership (local or national). A growing body of literature highlights such localized 
integration politics. For instance, Helga Leitner (2012) has examined localized 
encounters between immigrants and host society members in a rural American town. 
These encounters, whether at supermarkets, houses of worship, or residential 
neighborhoods, affected host society members’ understandings of belonging and 
community membership. Certain host society members Leitner interviewed no longer see 
some differences as important while insisting that other differences—notably language 
use—remain important in defining community membership.  
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Local policies can further shape localized integration politics, as can other aspects 
of local contact. Such is the case with Kye Askins’ (2015) account of a ‘befrienders’ 
program established by a refugee center in the UK. The center created a policy directing 
befrienders and asylum seekers to spend time ‘being together’ in the local area rather than 
engaging in a ‘mentoring’ relationship. This directive resulted in participants forming 
genuine friendships and thus remade society at a local level as participants learned of 
similarities they shared, and also of the differences between them, to then determine 
which differences–if any–mattered. Although the refugee center’s policy directives were 
self-initiated rather than legally mandated, and while participants in the 
befriender/befriendee program volunteered for it rather than complying out of legal 
compulsion, the study provides an important window into localized integration dynamics 
and the ways local practices complement but also cut against state laws and policies. 
In sum, integration is a political process referring to boundaries determining who 
and what ‘belongs.’ Laws shape these boundaries through exclusion or inclusion. Those 
implementing integration laws shape belonging on a localized level independent of a 
national assimilation or multicultural perspectives. Here, this article focuses on those 
persons implementing Wallonia’s integration laws ostensibly intended to include 
migrants by their stated purpose (e.g., 27 Mars 2014 Décret). These persons work at 
government-sponsored regional integration centers (CRI). 
4.3 The Case Study: Belgium 
Wallonia is the subject for this study because Belgium exemplifies variations in 
integration discourse, law, and policy across national space. Divides in Belgium over 
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immigration and integration policies coincide with, and flow from, political and 
administrative divisions in the country. Belgium has a federal parliament, three regional 
parliaments (for Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital region) and two linguistic 
parliaments (one each for Francophone and German-speaking Belgians; Flemish-
speaking Belgians combined their linguistic parliament with the Flanders regional 
parliament to create one federated entity legislating for all Flemings, as Flemish-speakers 
are known) (see, e.g., Deschouwer 2012). The Belgian Constitution grants responsibility 
for immigrant integration to the linguistic communities and their 
parliaments (Swyngedouw 2016). Integration legislation in Belgium can thus vary 
significantly on a sub-national scale. 
Research on Belgian politics notes the differences in integration philosophies 
between Flanders and Wallonia (e.g., Adam 2013; Martiniello 1995). For years, Flanders 
has had clearly defined integration legislation and policies known as inburgering 
(Flemish term approximately meaning ‘citizenization’) (Martiniello 2013). Scholars and 
policymakers alike see inburgering as assimilationist (Adam 2011; Swyngedeouw 2016), 
though the N-VA, Flanders’ most popular party, disputes this characterization by 
claiming that ‘anyone can be a Flemish citizen without having to renounce their own 
identity’ (N-VA’s Ideology and Purpose n.d.). Wallonia also has well-defined integration 
legislation that some describe as striking a balance between assimilation and 
multiculturalism (Torrekens et al 2014). And Walloon legislators themselves consider 
Wallonia’s integration laws as reflective of an ‘intercultural’ society as opposed to one 
that is either multicultural or monolithic (e.g., Décret 27 Mars 2014, Article 151).  
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Wallonia’s laws, in turn, diverge from those applicable to Francophones in the 
Brussels-Capital region. In the mid-1990s, Belgium’s French Community shifted 
immigrant integration policy to the Walloon Region and the French-Community 
Commission of the Brussels-Capital Region, which developed its own integration 
policies different from Wallonia’s (Adam 2013). Accordingly, integration policy for 
Francophones is particularly place-based depending on whether one lives in Brussels or 
Wallonia. Having approached immigration from a distinctly Wallonian standpoint, Prime 
Minister Michel managed to alienate N-VA representatives, precipitating Belgium’s 
federal government’s collapse in late 2018. 
This article considers this uneven policy landscape in Belgium through the 
workers at Wallonia’s CRI. The Walloon government created the CRIs to oversee 
Wallonia’s integration projects. The CRIs are government-sponsored non-profit 
organizations with responsibility over certain, localized territories across Wallonia that 
do not necessarily coincide with standard provincial boundaries. The region’s integration 
laws spell out the CRIs’ role both in introducing immigrants to Belgian society and also 
in raising the host society’s awareness of immigrants (27 Mars 2014 Décret). The CRIs 
thus present a unique opportunity to explore interactions between migrants and dominant 
groups and the everyday relationships and encounters that produce ‘integration’ (e.g., 
Leitner 2012; Ehrkamp 2006).  In focusing on CRIs, I want to suggest that integration is 
not a single, uniform state policy, as has been described in recent accounts of Europe’s 
general shift towards assimilation (e.g., Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos 2015). Instead, 
integration is a political process marked by the inconsistent implementation and 
performance resulting from varied understandings of community and belonging. 
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4.3.1 Integration politics in Wallonia 
Belgium, and more specifically Wallonia, experienced large-scale immigration 
from other countries after World War II when the state actively sought guest workers. 
These migrants first came from Italy followed by Spain and Greece, with Moroccans and 
Turks subsequently arriving starting in the 1960s (Gsir, Mandin, & Mescoli 2015). Still a 
unitary state2 at the time, Belgium considered these migrants to be temporary guest 
workers and tasked the National Ministry of Employment and Labor with responsibility 
for welcoming the migrants entering Belgium (Adam 2011). Even so, localities receiving 
large numbers of immigrants created provincial reception and welcome centers to provide 
these newcomers with legal services and administrative guidance, literacy and training 
courses, and cultural activities. In Wallonia, Liège created the first such center in 1964 
followed by Namur in 1965 (Torrekens et al. 2013; Adam 2011).  
While some localities voluntarily assumed accountability for welcoming 
immigrants, these obligations soon became regional rather than central-state 
responsibilities. State reform in 1970 transitioned Belgium from a unitary to a federal 
state by creating three cultural communities (French, Flemish, and German) and three 
regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels). The central government then transferred 
competencies concerning the welcome of ‘migrant workers’ to the regions in 1974 
(Adam 2011). This transfer coincided with a halt in guest worker recruitment that same 
 
2 Belgium began in 1830 as a state effectively created by outside powers, with its first 
king, Leopold I, placed on the throne by the British. The country’s creation followed a 
brief rebellion by the United Kingdom of the Netherlands’ southern provinces. The 
provinces were majority Catholic, and many contained Francophones angry at their 
treatment by the Dutch-speaking, Protestant majority. For further information, see 
Murphy (1988). 
105 
year. Six years later, and in conjunction with the state reform of 1980, the central 
government transferred competencies for the welcome and integration of ‘immigrants’ to 
the communities. This shift in policy and terminology recognized that these immigrants 
were no longer ‘guests’ but rather long-term residents (Adam 2007). The communities 
maintained control for these affairs until 1993 when the French Community transferred 
its competencies to the Walloon Region and the French Community Commission (now 
known as the Federation Brussels-Wallonia) of the Brussels-Capital Region. This split in 
competencies remains today. 
4.3.2 Wallonia’s integration laws and the regional integration centers (CRI) 
implementing them  
Wallonia’s integration laws received their start in 1996. That year, the Walloon 
government adopted a “decree on the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign 
origin” (4 juillet 1996 Décret). The law created six “regional integration centers” (centres 
régionaux d’intégration (CRI)) throughout Wallonia and tasked them with specific 
integration objectives. These objectives included “promoting participation by foreigners 
and persons of foreign origin in cultural, social and economic life” as well as “promoting 
intercultural exchanges and respect for differences.” Neither assimilationist nor 
multiculturalist in character, the law’s aim was to provide a coherent integration policy 
that would, as the decree’s title suggests, target established migrants who had been in 
Belgium for a long period of time or their Belgian-born children (Torrekens et al. 2013; 
Adam 2013). The CRI would not take a frontline position vis-à-vis immigrants; they 
would instead partner with local associations that assisted immigrants on a day-to-day 
basis. In these partnerships, the CRIs would produce socio-cultural activities for 
106 
immigrants and encourage civil society institutions to engage with immigrants (Adam 
2013). Their actions were similar to the Flemish Community’s creation of integration 
centers across Flanders in the 1980s. A significant difference, however, was that the 
Walloon Region did not establish a coordination structure to harmonize the CRIs’ 
policies (Adam 2013). The CRIs had great autonomy in their undertakings, and with that 
flexibility each had the ability to adapt to the needs of the localities they served. Some 
CRI have more Maghrebian immigrants in their service areas, for example, while other 
CRI encounter more sub-Saharan African immigrants; the “intercultural exchanges” each 
CRI promote could thus vary depending on the localized host and immigrant populations 
they serve. So everyday integration policies in Wallonia became more decentralized and 
determined at the sub-regional level by the CRI workers operating within their respective 
localities.  
Another factor fostering localized applications was that four of the first six CRI 
already existed as non-profit organizations with their own established objectives and 
missions regarding immigrants (cf. Torrekens et al. 2014). Such was the case in Namur, 
Wallonia’s capital city. There, locals started the non-profit Socio-Cultural Center for 
Immigrants in Namur Province (Centre Socio Culturel Des Immigres de la Province de 
Namur) in 1982 to assist immigrants in the community. The association focused first on 
immigrants with European origins but then expanded its scope based on the changing 
nature of immigration to the area. In 1997, the association became one of the CRI and 
changed its name to the Intercultural Action Center – Namur (Centre d’action 
interculturelle – Namur (CAI – Namur)). But it continues to operate largely in the same 
manner since becoming a CRI. 
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In 2009, the Walloon government amended the original decree creating the CRI to 
give the centers additional responsibilities. For the first time these included “frontline” 
responsibilities to provide French language instruction and impart “knowledge of Belgian 
institutions” (i.e., citizenship classes) (30 avril 2009 Décret). But CRIs acting as frontline 
actors would be limited. The CRIs would assume these duties only when other local 
associations or public authorities did not provide them or requested that the CRI offer the 
services. Second, the 2009 law tasked the CRIs with coordinating integration activities 
considered part of “local integration plans,” defined in the same law as plans created by 
individual municipalities (communes) within the CRIs’ localities. The purpose for each 
commune’s plan is to “promote[] the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign 
origin” by “highlighting their specific needs and defining strategies to be developed to 
better meet them.” So the 2009 decree further localized Wallonia’s integration policies as 
each CRI assumed greater contact with local political leaders crafting integration policies 
within that CRI’s locality. Each CRI working with local partner organizations also 
crafted language and citizenship classes that might differ in a variety of ways, such as 
content emphasized, target audience (new arrivals versus persons of foreign origin 
already present in Belgium), participant composition (i.e., catering to specific ethnic 
groups), and so forth. The CRIs maintained a supporting role in this effort as second-line 
actors; the frontline actors actually working with migrants were the local organizations 
partnering with the CRIs or the local communes.  
 In 2014, the Walloon government issued another decree reshaping the CRIs’ 
missions yet again. This decree was the most expansive regarding the CRIs’ roles in 
integration. It assigned the centers primary responsibility for a newly mandatory 
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“welcome course” (parcours d’acceuil) intended to “integrate newly arrived immigrants” 
within the CRIs’ territory and that immigrants had to follow (27 Mars 2014 Décret, 
Article 10). The CRIs became designated frontline actors for welcoming new arrivals. 
This role includes two parts. The first involves interviewing immigrants individually to 
better understand their needs and abilities. Second, the CRIs use information from those 
interviews to then guide migrants to the various local organizations providing French 
language lessons, citizenship classes (known as “Citizen Integration Training”), and other 
instructional/training components that comprise the welcome course. So the CRIs’ 
frontline contact with migrants is largely administrative in nature.  
The 2014 decree maintained the CRIs’ principal role as second-line actors 
ensuring coordination between all of the various local public and private actors 
implementing Wallonia’s welcome courses operating within their respective territories. 
The 2014 decree also ordered each center to “consult with the other centers in order to 
carry out coherent policies” throughout Wallonia (27 mars 2014 Décret, Art. 28). The 
directive to consult with one another did not mean that each CRI lost its independence; 
the CRIs retain significant autonomy in developing projects and partnering with local 
associations who assist immigrants on a day-to-day basis. Rather, the directive provided 
the government with greater justification to fund a non-profit known as the Consultation 
and Support System for Regional Integration Centers (Dispositif de concertation et 
d’appui aux Centres Régionaux d’Intégration (DisCRI)) that provides technical, 
logistical, and education support to Wallonia’s CRIs and that had been in existence since 
2009. Some nevertheless argue that the enhanced legal requirements in this decree and 
the one from 2009 made Wallonia’s laws increasingly assimilationist (e.g., Gsir, Mandin 
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& Mescoli, 2015) and more similar to Flemish integration laws (e.g., Xhardez, 2019). Yet 
the 2014 law stated that the region sought an “intercultural society” (27 mars 2014 
Décret, Art. 6). The flexibility afforded the CRI in their frontline and second-line 
responsibilities means that the laws’ implementation nonetheless remains highly 
localized through the CRIs and their workers. 
One other decree bears briefly mentioning here. It passed in April 2016, just over 
one month after the Brussels terror attacks (27 avril 2016 Décret). The decree changed 
the name of the CRIs’ “welcome course” to “integration course” (parcours 
d’intégration). Since the terrorists came from Belgium but had foreign backgrounds 
(Schreur and Bilefsky, 2017), perhaps the name change resulted from political leaders 
seeking to appease an aggrieved public as the course’s requirements did not substantively 
change. The name change could have also been a way to appease Flemish politicians at 
the federal level, and specifically N-VA members. Regardless of the reason, the law was 
a name change, nothing more. 
Today, there are eight CRI throughout Wallonia. Each one incorporates the name 
of the locality it covers. For some, the names also reveal their philosophical approach as 
the term “integration” does not appear in their name despite their status as one of the 
“regional integration centers.” The eight centers are: 
 Intercultural Action Center of the Namur Province (Centre d'Action 
Interculturelle de la Province de Namur (CAI)) 
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 Verviers Regional Center for the Integration of Foreigners and Persons of Foreign 
Origin (Centre Régional de Verviers pour l'Intégration des personnes étrangères 
et d'origine étrangère (CRVI)) 
 Regional Center for Intercultural Action of the Center Region (Centre Régional 
d'Action interculturelle de la Région du Centre (CeRAIC)) 
 Intercultural Center of Mons-Borinage (Centre Interculturel de Mons-Borinage 
(CIMB)) 
 Regional Integration Center of Brabant-Wallon (Centre Régional d'Intégration du 
Brabant-Wallon (CRIBW)) 
 Regional Integration Center for Foreigners of Liège (Centre Régional 
d'Intégration des Personnes Étrangères de Liège (CRIPEL)) 
 Regional Integration Center of Charleroi (Centre Régional d'Intégration de 
Charleroi (CRIC)) 
 Regional Integration Center of the Province of Luxembourg (Centre Régional 
d'Intégration de la province de Luxembourg (CRILUX)) 
Each center’s locality contains a varied population of immigrants, host society 
members, and frontline integration actors (the assorted nongovernmental organizations 
implementing components of Wallonia’s integration course). For example, CRILUX, the 
CRI whose locality includes 44 communes throughout the Luxembourg province, has a 
much more rural-based population and coordinates with relatively few frontline actors 
compared to CRIPEL, the CRI centered in Liège,the anchor city to Wallonia’s largest 
metro area. CRIPEL works with 55 urban communes. Brabant-Wallon, CRIBW’s 
locality, includes thousands of European immigrants drawn to Belgium because of EU 
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institutions headquartered nearby and who are not subject to Wallonia’s integration laws. 
The localities thus create different everyday engagements and negotiations for CRI 
workers implementing integration laws and the immigrants and host groups they work 
with.  
In terms of physical locations, three of the eight CRIs are located within large 
cities that receive significant numbers of migrants and non-profit organizations serving 
them. These include Charleroi (population ~202,000), Liège (~197,000), and Namur 
(~111,000). Another CRI is located in Verviers (~55,000), a city east of Liège near the 
German border. The remaining four CRIs are strategically located in varying smaller 
communes between large Walloon cities so as to be more accessible to the total 
communes they serve. Specifically, these CRIs are in Nivelles (~28,500), Saint-
Ghislain (~23,000), Libramont (~11,000), and Trivières (~4,000). Staff at the respective 
CRIs ranges from 11 at the smallest CRIs (CRIBW and CRILUX) to approximately 30 at 
the largest CRIs (CRIPEL and CRIC).  
4.4 Research Approach for Examining Wallonia’s CRIs 
This article draws on qualitative data collected during fieldwork in Belgium from 
May through August 2018 and September 2019 as part of a larger study concerning 
immigrant integration in Wallonia. Begun in 2017, the ongoing study to date involves 
more than 100 in-depth interviews with immigrants and non-immigrants alike. This 
article draws on thirteen of these interviews, each with key informants working at CRI, as 
well as an analysis of applicable legislation and policy statements from each CRI, an 
approach favored by related studies (e.g., Careja 2019; Jørgensen 2012).  
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The key informant interviews addressed here included CRI directors and other 
CRI staff involved with the integration courses (parcours d’integration) at all eight of 
Wallonia’s CRIs. As described above, Wallonia’s CRIs are primarily administrative 
actors over a series of frontline actors and local government entities. Their locations are 
generally basic offices containing administrative workers with some staff conducting 
individual interviews and then directing migrants to various local organizations assisting 
migrants. I recruited CRI informants via cold-calling and snowball sampling. Eleven 
interviews occurred at the CRIs’ offices; two occurred at alternative locations due to the 
interviewees' schedules. Some initially viewed me skeptically, questioning why an 
American like me would be in Belgium. But when I explained that I had lived in Belgium 
years earlier and had wanted to return to the country to explore immigrant integration, 
their demeanors visibly changed. They smiled and expressed pride in participating in the 
study by sharing their viewpoints. Nearly all asked me to provide them with the results of 
my larger study on immigrant integration; some said they desired “qualitative data” from 
the study to use in communicating with Walloon government officials. 
As workers at government-sponsored entities, CRI workers occupy a unique 
position relating to the Walloon government. They straddle the divide between frontline 
actors and legislators. CRI directors are those overseeing the implementation of regional 
integration laws but not necessarily those interacting with immigrants on a day-to-day 
basis. CRI workers over the integration courses do have some frontline involvement with 
migrants, but it is more administrative, as explained above. The CRI also depend on 
government financing, and they are tasked with implementing legislative directives. 
Consequently, they must walk a finer line than workers at private organizations in 
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critiquing Wallonia’s policies. Some expressed hesitancy to speak on the record absent 
guarantees that their statements could not be attributed to themselves or their specific 
CRI as one director likened financing battles between the CRIs as “war.” But once 
assured of their anonymity, workers and directors opened up. I identify the CRI directors 
here using only numbers (Director 1, Director 2, etc.) and gender-neutral terms. I use 
pseudonyms for the other CRI workers over the integration course. 
In the course of the interviews, I asked CRI workers to explain their 
understandings of integration and to comment on whether their understandings 
coincide—or conflict—with legislative edicts. This assumed that workers were familiar 
with legislative edicts; workers seemed keenly aware of the relevant legislation, perhaps 
resulting from their working at government-sponsored institutions guided by these rules. 
(Relevant statutes are also easily accessible on CRI websites.) I also asked what type of 
society they believed immigrants should aspire to, and whether the laws’ stated 
objectives for inclusion in Walloon society reflected the realities confronting immigrants. 
It bears briefly mentioning that I asked interviewees their political preference; each 
declined to state and explained that they would not share because of their unique status is 
depending on government support, as explained above, and a desire to avoid pushback 
from politicians. I personally conducted all interviews in French and provide the 
translations used here.  
In reviewing government decrees and regulations, I looked for directives and 
definitions affecting CRIs’ actions towards immigrants and the host society. I also 
examined CRI-specific mission statements and other, localized CRI policies relating to 
114 
immigrant integration. The key informant interviews here come from workers at all eight 
CRI. 
Prior research concerning Wallonia’s integration laws is limited. Ilke Adams 
(2011, 2013) provides perhaps the most comprehensive account in describing the laws’ 
historical background as part of her work comparing and contrasting integration models 
present in Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital region. Yet her work predates and 
thus fails to include significant legislative changes in 2014 and 2016 that have 
dramatically reshaped Wallonia’s integration policies, including CRIs’ role in the 
integration process. Other accounts regarding Wallonia’s laws tend to examine them in 
the context of general integration philosophies (e.g., Martiniello 1995, 2013; Adam and 
Martiniello 2013), in informational terms of comparison (e.g., Adam and Jacobs 2014; 
Van Avermaet and Gysen 2009), or only superficially when contrasted to Flemish 
policies that are the primary focus of a study (e.g., Pulinx and Van Avermaet 2015). 
Research concerning Wallonia’s CRI is narrower still. Corrine Torrekens et al. (2014) 
studied the CRI. Yet their account primarily focused on assessing ‘Europeanization’ 
within Wallonia and its CRIs, meaning the extent of the European Union’s effort to 
‘harmonize’ member states’ integration policies. In terms of the CRI directly, the account 
also briefly considered each CRI director’s philosophy on a continuum ranging from a 
willingness to work with religious groups to one eschewing any relationship with 
religious organizations. The article derived from previous work considering the same 
issue, and one that provided greater information and background to CRIs generally 
(Torrekens et al. 2013). But both articles examined CRI prior to the Walloon 
government’s 2014 decree revamping the CRI and their missions, and which placed CRI 
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in more active roles in integration. These significant legal changes require renewed 
analysis of CRI and their legally mandated role in Wallonia’s integration politics. 
Some of the activists working at the CRIs have migrant backgrounds. Most do 
not. But rather than provide the perspective of one group or the other alone (i.e., either 
migrants or host society members), the workers present a unique population for inquiry 
because of their relations with immigrants and the host society alike. Indeed, Wallonia’s 
laws dictate these workers role to both introduce immigrants to the Belgian host society 
and also to make the host society aware of the immigrants (27 Mars 2014 Décret). I seek 
to understand these workers’ actions, asking questions such as: How do these workers’ 
perceptions of ‘integration’ coincide – or conflict – with legislative edicts? What do these 
workers consider critical for one to belong in Belgian society when the laws state specific 
objectives? Do the laws’ stated objectives for inclusion in Walloon society reflect the 
reality the workers see as confronting immigrants? Are there unified perspectives among 
the workers (i.e., do workers share the same values/ideas across the CRI)? What type of 
society do workers believe immigrants should aspire to? 
4.5 Assessing Integration and Belonging in Wallonia 
Workers implementing integration laws within Wallonia do so differently—at a 
localized level—based on divergent ideas of belonging and community. Exploring these 
ideas revealed three key themes among all 13 CRI workers from each CRI. First, workers 
did not maintain rigid ‘multicultural’ or ‘assimilation’ integration perspectives. Rather, 
they combined elements of both normative models to create a localized sense of 
integration, one that they termed ‘interculturalism.’ Second, workers largely considered 
116 
integration to be immigrants and host society members creating a new culture together; 
they together determined who and what belonged. Third, workers considered Wallonia’s 
integration laws as providing directives but with the local actors actually implementing 
the laws shaping their reality. I address these in turn. 
4.5.1 Rethinking integration as ‘interculturalism’ 
Despite working at government-sponsored integration centers, and regardless of 
role at the CRIs, each interviewee had a personal perspective on ‘integration’ and what 
that entailed. This resulted, in part, because the Walloon government never defined the 
term. As Director 2 put it, ‘I’ve never heard the Walloon government answer the question 
“what is it to be integrated?”’ Workers’ perspectives usually varied depending on the 
workers’ personal experiences as perhaps shaped by the locality where the worker was 
originally from, not necessarily the CRI location where the worker was employed. Adele, 
a worker without an immigrant background who works at a CRI within a large city, for 
instance, conceptualized integration as ‘living side by side in seeking each other, not 
ignoring one another. It’s not essential that we understand one another, but that we 
remain curious of each other.’ Consistent with her more multiculturalist outlook, she 
opined further that integration is ‘not being the same or necessarily different, but being 
connected.’ Nevertheless, Adele stressed that immigrants had the responsibility to learn 
French for these connections to occur, a seemingly assimilative perspective. Another 
worker without an immigrant background, Roman, who hailed from a more rural 
environment, conceptualized integration more in French republican terms. That is, 
Roman considers integration to mean that an ‘immigrant is to not have more or less rights 
than any other citizen in Belgium.’ Yet Roman revealed a more multiculturalist mentality 
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when emphasizing that immigrants need not aspire to a particular ‘Belgian’ identity as 
society can have ‘multiple, changing identities.’ 
By and large, however, workers saw integration in a manner similar to a young 
worker named Pierre. When asked what he understood ‘integration’ to mean, Pierre 
laughed and said that integration itself was a ‘hackneyed’ notion understood in so many 
different ways, even in Belgium. After briefly describing the varying integration models 
present in Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia, Pierre said, ‘I see myself more in line with 
Wallonia’s approach to integration, at least the one found in this last decree. It is to 
conserve one's values, one’s culture, their manner of living, and so on; and then to still 
conform to the host country’s laws. That’s integration.’ 
The approach Pierre referenced—and to which he believes his perspective 
aligns—is one stated in Walloon legislation since 2009 that expresses hope that 
Wallonia’s CRI will help shape an ‘intercultural society’ (e.g., 27 Mars 2014 Décret). 
Some workers thus pointed to the ideal of an intercultural society as equating integration 
even though ‘intercultural’ itself is also undefined. As Director 3 put it: ‘I do not like, and 
I cannot use this word [integration] because it too commonly implies that immigrants 
must integrate into [society]. So I want us to use the concept of an “intercultural society” 
and creating an intercultural society. That is clearer.’ Asked to elaborate on what 
constituted an intercultural society as relating to work being done by CRIs, Director 3 
said: 
Intercultural is that the two parties must be able to work together, meaning 
that immigrants must be able to integrate by respecting the rights and 
responsibilities [present in the host society]. And the host society must 
also make room for and be open towards immigrants, although this is 
rarely the case. 
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The director thus expanded upon Pierre’s notion to address the host society’s role 
in integration efforts, albeit calling the concept ‘interculturality’ rather than integration. 
Other interviewees maintained the same understanding of integration being both 
immigrants and society adjusting together. Bernadette, a young worker at one of the 
larger CRI, called integration ‘a two-way movement that is not only for the person who 
arrives’ concerning their respecting legal ‘rights and duties, these kinds of things, but also 
that the host society can open to the other and adapt as well.’ Another worker at CAI 
Namur noted, ‘we chose to be called “Intercultural Action Center”’ rather than an 
integration center because they wanted to emphasize that their mission was ‘a work of 
both sides.’ Like CAI Namur, two other CRI – CeRAIC and CIMB – deliberately use 
‘intercultural’ rather than integration in their names as a means of emphasizing this two-
way communication. In this respect, one has to wonder if the legislation declaring an 
‘intercultural society’ resulted from CRI lobbying efforts more than inherent political 
inclinations as the three CRI using intercultural in their names each predated the 
legislative directive by more than 10 years. And multiple directors at other CRI noted 
during interviews their preference for using ‘intercultural’ rather than integration to 
describe their organization’s visions. Wallonia’s stated policy could thus be no more than 
using preferred terminology but without more behind it; indeed, a CRI director stated, ‘In 
the Walloon region there are no integration policies in the sense of interculturality.’ The 
legislation uses the terminology but again does little else, leaving the CRI to develop 
their own policies considered intercultural.  
Many CRI create their own policies they consider intercultural to guide them in 
their localized efforts. These differences presumably derive from each CRI’s history and 
119 
circumstances in becoming a CRI. CAI Namur, for instance, existed as an entity prior to 
Wallonia creating CRIs. CAI Namur declares in its introductory literature its stated goals 
to ‘promote the values of freedom, justice, equality for all and especially for people of 
foreign origin’ and also ‘to achieve harmonious cohabitation in a society where all its 
members can participate in a democratic and equal way, fully enjoy their rights and 
provide for all their needs’ (CAI Namur projet politique et stratégie globale). CeRAIC 
similarly sets forth its intercultural ideals in the form of four values: citizenship, 
diversity, equality, and human dignity (Ce.R.A.I.C. Qui sommes-nous?). Other CRI, 
notably CRIBW and CRIPEL, repeat Wallonia’s decree (CRIBW Les Missions n.d.; 
CRIPEL Missions n.d.). CIMB and CRIC likewise repeat Wallonia’s decree but do so 
using layperson language (CIMB Historiques et missions n.d.; Les missions du CRIC). 
Interculturality for these CRI thus does not vary from the legislative decrees, which is to 
say that it leaves ‘intercultural’ undefined. So in practice, intercultural combines 
assimilation and multiculturalism perspectives in the local environment, on a case-by-
case basis, as Roman’s and Adele’s comments discussed above suggest. 
4.5.2 Creating culture together 
Yet another dimension to CRI workers’ conceptualizations of integration is the 
idea of creating a new culture altogether. To some of them, this is exactly what the legal 
directive to have an intercultural society implies. Director 3 put it in these terms: ‘To talk 
about integration is to put [immigrants] on the outside,’ whereas interculturality allows 
for ‘the production of a new culture that is the result of mixing all of the cultures 
together.’ Most interviewees tended to express some form of this idea when discussing 
integration. Some even analogized integration/interculturality to making a cake; 
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immigrants from one country with all of their culture would be like the eggs, immigrants 
from another country would be like the flour, native Belgians would be the sugar, and so 
forth. When placed together in a bowl and mixed, an entirely different product results. 
One worker gave the annual African Night Festival (Nuit Africaine) in the Brabant-
Walloon province as a specific example of this process in Wallonia. The festival started 
in 1994 with a Belgian-based non-profit organization known as ‘Friends of Guinea’ 
inviting a Guinean musician to perform in Belgium during the country’s popular music 
festival season and the organization invited the Belgian public to attend free of charge. 
Two years later, the festival expanded to include music from other African nations, and 
by 1997 the provincial government began providing financial and logistical support to 
host the event (including bringing in contemporary musicians from Africa. The festival 
expanded to include recreated sub-Saharan African villages for attendees to experience. 
By 2015, the villages included recreations from North African countries as well to better 
represent the African continent and the origins of the local population in Belgium as 
Belgians with North African origins created and staffed the villages. Those manning the 
villages are persons living in Belgium but with origins in the respective country they 
depict. 
The African Night Festival borrowed a Belgian cultural element (music festivals) 
and combined it with African music to create what a worker at CRIBW, which helps 
coordinate the event, considered to be one of the Belgium’s most popular music festivals. 
It is consistent with a CRI director’s comment that, ‘One keeps a little bit of her original 
culture, but then then also benefits from the host society’s culture, and inversely the host 
culture takes a little bit of the immigrants’ culture as they arrive’ in the host society. So 
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conceptually, these workers’ perspectives about mixing aspects to create a new culture 
coincide with those present in early assimilation literature about combining to create 
something original, what Draschler (1920) called a ‘synthetic culture.’ There is no large-
scale abandoning of past culture. Rather, immigrants and host society find the differences 
that do or do not matter. This is the fault line for belonging. Whether the festival achieved 
this objective or not is debatable. But its success in bringing together people with African 
origins and European origins is real.3  
Where the interviewees’ perspective on creating something together moves 
beyond early theories, however, is the interviewees’ focus on the host society’s laws and 
immigrants adherence to them. Pierre’s statement quoted above – that integration 
involves conforming to the host country’s laws while still conserving ones values, 
culture, and manner of living – was not an aberration among workers. Nor was expecting 
compliance with the laws unique to native-born workers like Pierre. For instance, Karena, 
a worker with an immigrant background, explains, ‘I can’t deny what the Belgians built 
over decades, and I comply with all laws because that is relevant’ to the host society’s 
identity, just as, she says, ‘I preserve traditions, beliefs, and everything that made me the 
person I am today’ to shape her identity and present contributions to Belgium. Another 
worker with an immigrant background, Bella, related the words that her father often told 
her in his native tongue after he immigrated to Belgium: ‘The country where you go has 
its practices, and you have to accept them because they are in the country that welcomes 
you. … You have to accept that the host country has its own way of life.’ The ‘practices’ 
Bella’s father referenced meant the host country’s laws that then shape how people live in 
 
3 Several interviewees in my broader research (both those with migrant backgrounds and 
those without) pointed to the African Night Festival as an event that they enjoyed. 
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the country. For Bella and the other interviewees, immigrants’ complying with the laws 
did not mean that they accepted all cultural aspects of the host society. The workers’ 
focus on law is not assimilative in nature. Rather, it is recognition that a host society’s 
laws are critical parts of its culture.  
The focus on laws also gives immigrants connection to the host society that is 
more concrete as the society’s identity is not always fixed. The host society culture is 
always changing, despite the general tendency among politicians and assimilationist 
academics to fix an identity. To be sure, the interviewees consistently rejected the idea of 
assimilation wherein immigrants lose their identity to conform to a host culture. This 
differs from Flemish integration workers’ perspectives of integration programs creating 
‘little Flemish persons’ (Swyngedouw 2016). One reason is that the Walloon workers 
readily acknowledged that there was no set culture for immigrants to conform to even if 
there was assimilation. They pointed out how society was always changing and 
legislative attempts suggesting otherwise belied reality. The worker Roman put it this 
way: 
I think that we are mistaken to suggest that there is an identity that is 
fixed, that there are values that are fixed. That’s not the case. … Take 
abortion or homosexuality as an example. Talk to 20 Belgians and ask 
them their thoughts about these issues. There won’t be a unanimous 
position on them. But with an immigrant, we basically demand that they 
go completely into something, you know, that’s fixed. There’s multiple, 
plural identities. 
Roman continued on to explain that immigrants must recognize that things in Belgium 
will be different from their home countries while Belgian society must determine how 
much difference it will tolerate from immigrants. Again, it is about making sameness. 
Roman’s statement and explanation came in response to questions about legislation 
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requiring immigrants to sign a pledge to uphold ‘Belgian values’ and his frustration with 
that legislation and others like it that attempt to establish Belgian society as one thing and 
immigrant cultures as another rather than seeing them create something together. And 
while the law Roman referenced was a federal Belgian policy shaped by Flemish 
integration ideals, workers nevertheless leveled multiple critiques at the Walloon 
government regarding its own integration laws. It is to some of these criticisms that I now 
turn. 
4.5.3 Walloon laws and their limits 
Many workers criticized what they considered to be an increasingly 
assimilationist approach to integration making its way into Walloon legislation. In 
particular, interviewees disliked the mandatory nature of the integration course with 
monetary fines levied on immigrants who do not comply with all requirements within a 
specified time period that some consider as too short. Skepticism with this approach 
abounded. Pierre bluntly observed: 
We never talked about integration in the 1950s. Integration happened 
systematically with past immigration waves – Italians, Greeks, Poles. 
They worked and people said that they were part of society. Now, work is 
harder to come by. So one has to complete an integration course to 
integrate into Belgium, or at least in Wallonia. That’s at least what 
politicians tell us; it’s “We have a miracle solution to integration in 
Wallonia: come and take our integration course, meet people, do the 
welcome module [with CRI], take French classes, explore how 
professional employment works, learn societal rules for citizenship and so 
forth, then bam! You are integrated.” I’m a little skeptical of this vision, or 
rather critical of it, even though I work in the integration courses. 
For Pierre, elements of Wallonia’s integration legislation are more politically motivated 
than aimed at actually helping immigrants. Director 2 expressed similar skepticism: 
‘Today there is political pressure to say that “integration” is the integration course’ 
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defined by Wallonia’s decrees. And these decrees increase obligations on immigrants and 
the CRI without these new laws necessarily being tied to findings from past legislation or 
feedback from CRI workers implementing the laws.  
To be sure, the government receives statistical reports from CRI. And workers 
state that the information contained in the reports is only increasing. Yet, as Director 5 
and another worker Bernadette observed, the time spent preparing reports takes workers 
away from other tasks assisting immigrants. Further, the information requested by the 
government might not allow for a broader understanding of the integration that is 
occurring because of its limited nature. ‘All of the evaluation metrics are often more 
quantitative rather than qualitative,’ observed Director 4, because the politicians ‘are not 
interested in [qualitative information].’  
 Another common complaint among CRI workers was that the Walloon 
government’s ever-increasing integration laws are made without consulting CRI workers. 
According to Director 5: 
In recent years, the consultation mechanisms have been less effective than 
before. So there are still exchanges and contacts, but the government does 
not systematically take into account its partners on the ground to improve 
the policies. And so, you know, it puts me back to answer … that 
Wallonia regularly consults the CRIs but does not necessarily hear what 
we have to say. 
What constitutes ‘consultation’ varies. Circumstances surrounding Wallonia’s 
2018 integration decree evidence this reality. (The Walloon government currently revises 
its integration decrees every two years.) The decree significantly increases the hours 
immigrants must spend in French language classes (from 120 to 400) and civic 
integration courses (from 20 to 60) (Décret 8 novembre 2018). Director 6 recounted how 
government officials provided the proposed text to CRI officials on Monday April 30th; 
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May 1st was a holiday, and the officials had a meeting planned to publicly reveal the 
finalized text on May 2nd. Director 6 noted, ‘Government officials will say, “Yes, we 
consulted the CRIs.” That’s the official version. But how could one say that we were 
consulted when we were not able to read over the text, you know? We weren’t 
consulted.’ Other CRI directors confirmed this scenario, although some said that the 
government provided the proposed language via email on April 28th, a Saturday. 
Regardless, it is hard to argue with Director 6’s conclusion that, ‘we aren’t really 
consulted,’ or statements by Director 4, Pierre, and others that they sometimes learn of 
legislative changes through the media rather than from the government. 
Although increasingly left out of the legislative process, CRI workers 
nevertheless navigate through the decrees to achieve the broader integration goals each 
CRI sets for its localized area. ‘We have decrees, and within the decrees we see how we 
can maneuver within them,’ declared Director 7 before adding, ‘we have always been 
like this.’ CAI Namur similarly explains in its global strategy document that it has 
‘always worked to build a structure that is both in line with the law but also with the 
organization’s history and meaning’ (Projet politique et stratégique globale 2015). Other 
CRI workers expressed analogous views, particularly those at CRIs with well-defined 
local missions as described above. Director 4 nevertheless recognized that Wallonia 
increasingly limits CRIs’ ability to act independently and cautioned against ‘imposing a 
standardized model that will ultimately not be relevant to anyone because it is 
disconnected from the local realities.’ This fact explains why CRI workers directed some 
of their sharpest critiques towards smaller, more mundane regulations about 
implementing the larger, more general laws.  
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Workers faulted Wallonia’s administrative dictates for the meddlesome effects the 
rules and regulations had on various integration activities sponsored or overseen by the 
CRI. Essentially, workers did not disagree so much with the larger laws’ stated objectives 
as they did with the prescriptions in how to achieve them. Director 2 summed up the 
sentiment this way, ‘We work against the regulations. I purposely use the word “against.” 
It’s not a detail.’ Director 2 explained the combative statement in the context of negative 
results flowing from Wallonia’s regulations regarding French-language instruction. 
Wallonia’s integration laws require immigrants to learn French. Director 2 did not oppose 
that requirement at all, asserting instead – like most CRI workers I interviewed – that 
immigrants learning French is critical to creating a new culture together. While the 2018 
decree significantly increases the time immigrants must be in French courses, Director 2 
highlighted administrative regulations imposing higher language proficiency/training on 
French-language instructors. Director 2 objected to these regulations by stressing that 
they forced out many valuable instructors simply because those instructors do not have 
the defined certifications or degrees now demanded by the government. Fewer available 
teachers means fewer available French courses and so fewer opportunities for immigrants 
to learn French. The move also increases the costs to course operators because they must 
hire teachers with more advanced degrees even if those teachers are lousy pedagogues; 
effectively making the government pay more for less. And all of this occurred, Director 2 
notes, without a well-defined reason for the regulatory change in teacher certification. 
Jean-Jacques concurred with Director 2 and expressed his concern that the language 
regulations were increasingly removing local organizations from servicing immigrants. 
With an immigrant background himself, Jean-Jacques learned French through 
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neighborhood organizations as a child and stressed their importance in helping 
immigrants participate in society. 
CRI actors working against tedious regulations is not happenstance. Some put 
aside administrative directives to achieve the desired end result. In his role at the CRI, for 
example, Pierre must interview newly arrived immigrants to assess each person’s 
situation (health, children, housing, French language skills, professional training, etc.). 
He shared the following: 
Wallonia tells us that we have to do interviews individually. But I have to 
say that in my practice, sometimes I do interviews with a couple – the two 
of them – because you simply have to accept cultural differences, in a 
general fashion. One could say, “Look at that woman, that woman is 
submissive, the man has a hold on the woman,” when in the end it is 
simply something cultural where the man has always managed 
administrative papers, the woman doesn’t know about their health 
insurance, you know.  
Pierre did not hesitate to adjust the administrative rule of a one-on-one interview 
to achieve the larger legal objective of completing the interview and assessing the 
immigrants’ situation. He justified his actions as follows: 
What does it matter? As long as there’s no violence [in the relationship], 
what does it matter if their roles are different in a couple? We have the 
tendency to forget that 50 years ago in Belgium it was completely normal 
for the woman to stay at home, the man to work, the woman to take care 
of the children. We still have this same reality in other societies, perhaps 
more in the Middle East, when the reality is that 50 years ago feminism 
passed through Europe and there was this emancipation of women. 
In short, Pierre expressed his belief that it is okay for Belgians (including CRI 
workers) to take immigrants as they are and work with them rather than demand complete 
adherence to a policymaker’s regulation. As Director 2 said, ‘It’s a process. … You have 
to take it step by step.’ 
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Multiple workers expressed similar sentiments and their belief that the host 
society needs greater understanding of, and patience with, the immigrant groups. Director 
7 observed, ‘For us at [this CRI], the most important part in our efforts is the host 
society’ in making them more culturally aware of immigrants. He continued, ‘We are not 
immigrants’ defenders. Personally, I don’t defend them. I defend a vision, a vision that 
encompasses immigrants and natives, whether they’re born Belgian or born to parents of 
foreign origins, that they live together in friendly, supportive way.’ Director 3 
commented, ‘Around 80% of the regional centers’ efforts and time should be spent on the 
host society and 20% on immigrants’ in seeking understanding of one another. But 
Wallonia’s current legislation makes this difficult, Director 3 observed, noting that the 
laws ‘provide for French classes only with foreigners in the classroom, for example. They 
do not foresee any activities where immigrants meet with Belgians. There is nothing. 
Nothing.’ Other workers express similar concern that the laws do not address immigrants 
and locals being together. Adele, a CRI worker who assists in French language courses, 
said that students frequently ask where the Belgians are to help practice French. These 
are issues currently not addressed by Wallonia’s laws. And they may not be in the near 
future as laws increasingly put pressure on immigrants. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Workers implementing Wallonia’s integration laws show how integration cannot 
conceptually be categorized as an either/or proposition set forth by the state along a 
multicultural versus assimilationist ideological spectrum. At a local level, workers 
simultaneously incorporate elements from normative assimilationist and multicultural 
models. Walloon workers call this mingled approach ‘interculturalism.’ Yet regardless of 
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terminology, integration workers shape societal boundaries for inclusion and exclusion in 
their localized spaces. The local host society they interact with, along with the 
immigrants living there, will create a new culture together that will vary from one locale 
to the next depending on those comprising it, much as a cake depends on the ingredients 
used in making it. CRIs with more sub-Saharan African immigrants promote different 
cultures than those with more Maghrebian immigrants, for instance, as shown by the 
African Night Festival.  
Next, the Walloon experience reveals how scholars and policymakers alike might 
rethink integration. Integration is broader than a uniform state or subnational policy; it is 
a political and a cultural process that varies across national space. This variance can be 
both regional, as Flanders and Wallonia adopt differing ‘integration’ laws in their 
respective regions, and local as actors implementing integration laws within Wallonia do 
so differently—at a localized level—based on divergent ideas of belonging and 
community. Workers have their own notions of how things should be, or how they are on 
the ground, and act accordingly. So while laws may dictate one thing, workers may do 
another. Director 2’s comments that workers ‘work against the regulations’ and Director 
7’s emphasis that workers ‘maneuver’ within the decrees are just two statements 
exemplifying this reality. No two workers will maneuver within and work against 
integration laws in the same way regardless of any uniform integration law.  
More broadly, this study demonstrates the methodological strength that an 
approach focused on ‘belonging’ contributes to integration literature due to its conceptual 
emphasis on immigrants and locals together determining the differences that do/do not 
matter on a local scale. Belonging incorporates local actors’ ideals of community and 
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prioritizes them over regional or national policymakers’ perspectives as those 
implementing integration legislation are those ultimately shaping immigrants’ everyday 
inclusion and exclusion based on the workers’ interacting with immigrants and host 
society members alike. How these workers shape inclusion/exclusion boundaries may be 
uneven and not always according to the stated laws. Researchers examining integration 
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Abstract 
Amid rising nationalism, many European states demand that migrants 
‘assimilate,’ with some states requiring migrants seeking legal citizenship to complete 
formal ‘citizenship’ courses. Nationalists often see such training as critical for 
constructing national identities and facilitating immigrant ‘integration.’ Too often, 
however, academic and public policy debates center on states’ citizenship conceptions 
delineated in law and policies. Research focuses on the state, is top-down, and 
institutional. These studies thus address what states believe migrants should imagine 
about the state, leaving aside what the migrants actually envision, thereby overlooking 
migrants’ own conceptions regarding formal membership and informal belonging in the 
state and community. This article addresses this omission by directly appealing to 
migrants’ viewpoints, adding to an emerging scholarship centered on migrants’ 
citizenship perspectives. It considers migrants’ attitudes and the emotions they ascribe to 
legal citizenship in their new state. Doing so enhances understandings of nationalism’s 
presence/absence in localized contexts as individuals (including migrants) locally 
produce national identities. The article reveals that migrants’ seemingly instrumental 
decision to acquire legal citizenship is not devoid of emotion. Many maintain an 
attachment to the country’s political culture, meaning safety, personal liberty, and legal 
institutions, rather than the national culture. Others seek legal citizenship to secure a 
sense of belonging in their new state. The migrants’ emotional attachments to the state 




Nationalism is sweeping across Europe. No country seems immune from its 
influence as far right and populist parties gain prominence in local, regional, and national 
legislative bodies. Election results since 2015 in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
Hungary, and Sweden evidence this reality. These parties’ appeal has a variety of 
sources. But one issue stands out in promoting their popularity with an agitated 
electorate: immigration. 
Native Europeans fret about losing their culture and identity as newcomers arrive 
with different cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. An influx of immigrants—
particularly during the 2015 migrant crisis—amplified European anxieties. Nationalist 
parties prey on this popular angst, promising to “preserve” national culture from 
immigrants. They promote love for the nation culturally and suggest that migrants fail to 
love the same (see Ahmed 2014; Ho 2009). Anti-immigrant Alternatives for Germany 
(AfD), for instance, released a series of campaign posters focusing on cultural 
preservation leading up to national elections in 2017. One poster depicted white women 
in traditional German dress from various regions (the Black Forest and Lower Sorbs) 
with the caption, “Colorful Diversity? We already have it.” Another bore the caption, 
“New Germans? We’ll make them ourselves” above an image of a smiling white woman 
lying on her back with a visibly pregnant belly carrying (presumably) a German child. 
The posters and their message had an effect; AfD captured over 12% of the vote, the best 
showing by a far-right German party since World War II.  
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Similar posters appeared in Belgium in late 2018 from the New Flemish Alliance 
(N-VA) as it opposed Belgium’s proposed involvement with the United Nations’ 
Migration Pact.1 The N-VA is a nationalist party active in Belgium’s Flanders and 
Brussels-Capital regions. It is also the largest party in Belgium’s national government. 
One of its posters opposing the Migration Pact shows fully veiled Muslim women 
walking in an obviously European city street above the caption: “UN Migration Pact = 
focus on migrants preserving their own culture” (see Figure 5.1). The poster posited that 
immigrants maintain their own (foreign) culture rather than adopting Belgian/European 
culture, presumably justifying the N-VA’s anti-immigrant stance and strenuous 
opposition to the UN’s non-legally binding accord. After Belgium’s Prime Minister 
pledged to support the UN accord in December 2018, the N-VA left Belgium’s federal 
governing coalition, causing the government’s collapse. 
A key feature of Europe’s current nationalist, anti-immigrant politics is the 
increase in integration measures aimed at immigrants. Such measures include civic 
integration courses, language exams, and citizenship tests (Goodman 2010, 2014; 
Groenendijk 2011; Joppke 2017). Civic integration courses exist across the continent, 
including in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom (Joppke 2007a). Their purpose is to facilitate immigrant “integration” into the 
national polity by providing language as well as civic and cultural (history, politics, 
culture) instruction (Williams 2018). Nationalists often see these courses as critical for 
preserving national identity (Jacobs & Rea 2007). And states often tie residency permits, 
 
1 The measure’s is officially known as the United Nations’ Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration. 
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welfare benefits, work permits, and entry to successfully completing the courses 
(Goodman 2014; Paparusso 2019).  
These broad patterns of nationalist integration sentiment and policy across 
Europe, however, hide some important variations, including those occurring within states. 
Belgium is one example. It is a federal state divided into two main regions, Flanders and 
Wallonia, with immigration attitudes and integration courses varying in each. Flanders, 
Belgium’s Flemish-speaking region,2 is a nationalist hotbed. The N-VA mentioned above 
and other nationalist parties earned over 43% of the Flemish vote in the 2019 federal 
elections, for instance. (IBZ, n.d.). Flanders in 2003 introduced a mandatory integration 
requirement known as inburgering (Flemish term approximately meaning “becoming a 
citizen”) borrowed from the Netherlands’ civic integration course mandating Dutch 
language instruction and citizenship classes covering Dutch societal organization (Pulinx 
& Van Avermaet 2015; Martiniello 2013). Inburgering is known for its assimilationist 
nature, being likened at times to “a little Flemish factory” (Swyndegouw 2016; see also 
Adam 2011).  
Conversely Wallonia, home to Belgium’s francophone minority, lacks strong 
nationalist parties. Such parties garnered less than 0.004% of the region’s vote in the 
2019 federal elections. But this is not to say that Wallonia has a laissez-faire attitude 
towards immigrants. Indeed, the region maintains its own civic integration course that 
includes citizenship classes known as “Citizen Integration Training” (Formation à 
l’Intégration Citoyenne, or FIC) (27 Mars 2014 Décret). Since 2014, Wallonia mandates 
 
2 Flemish is also known as ‘Belgian Dutch.’ 
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that all newly arrived migrants with visas longer than three months complete FIC.3 The 
requirement does not demand that migrants demonstrate complete loyalty to Wallonia or 
Belgium, or even that they emotionally connect to the place; indeed, much of FIC’s 
content revolves around the practicalities of everyday living. The stated goal is to foster 
an (undefined) ‘intercultural’ society (e.g., Décret 27 Mars 2014, Article 151). This 
curious context makes clear that researchers cannot assume a homogeneous, nationalist, 
and anti-immigrant landscape. It also raises questions about the different ways that 
migrants engaging with compulsory civic integration programs envision citizenship 
themselves. 
Integration courses in Belgium gained greater importance in 2012 after the federal 
parliament changed Belgium’s citizenship laws to require a person to first “prove” their 
“social integration” before receiving formal citizenship (Article 12bis Code de la 
nationalité Belge (‘Article 12bis’)). The national government had always retained power 
over citizenship while the regions controlled integration. But pressure by the N-VA and 
other Flemish parties to tighten citizenship rules resulted in the change to first require 
integration (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015). Prior to this, Belgium’s prevailing 
philosophy was that first granting legal citizenship facilitated migrant integration (see 
Goodman 2010). After the law’s change, completing an “integration course” like FIC 
became one way to “prove” integration (Article 12bis). So it is that migrants seeking 
formal citizenship, as well as newly arrived migrants like those mentioned above, enroll 
in and follow the same civic integration course. Questions then arise as to those in 
 
3 There are some exemptions from this requirement including persons from other EU-
member states, the European Economic Area, Switzerland, Turkey, and members of their 
families. Those under age 18 and over 65, diplomatic corps, and members of international 
organizations are also exempt. 
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Wallonia’s FIC. How do those participating in FIC conceptualize citizenship/Belgian 
identity? For them, is it more legal or relational? What is their sense of belonging? Does 
it vary depending on whether one is attending a citizenship course as a new arrival or in 
applying for legal citizenship? And as it relates to the change in citizenship laws, do 
migrants seek formal citizenship to secure a sense of belonging? In short, what does 
citizenship mean to course participants? 
This article answers these questions with information gathered through qualitative 
interviews with, and in-class observation of, immigrants attending Wallonia’s FIC 
courses. These are persons directly affected by Wallonia’s integration laws. The article 
thus employs a “bottom-up” approach to understanding citizenship, one increasingly 
emphasized in literature but underutilized in practice (see, e.g., Harpaz & Mateos 2019). 
Yet the bottom-up approach employed here does not completely ignore state 
perspectives. Indeed, the primary research sites are government-sponsored courses that 
migrants attend either as a condition of formal citizenship or as a condition of their 
residence permits (Article 12bis; 2014 Decret). So this research simultaneously draws in 
state power over citizenship and migrant conceptions of the same. In other words, it gives 
voice to migrants engaged with state citizenship laws. These findings may then inform 
state-level actors creating and implementing citizenship policies. This impact is 
extremely significant but not yet examined in research. Further, addressing migrants’ 
perspectives enables a secondary focus, which is to consider emotions and emotional 
attachment in citizenship processes, thereby responding to calls to re-engage emotion in 
geographic scholarship (Askins & Swanson 2019). 
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This article begins by reviewing and integrating literature on citizenship and 
emotion. Next, it briefly summarizes Wallonia’s FIC course structure and the methods 
used. It then discusses the empirical results. The main finding is that immigrants affected 
by the integration laws have emotional attachments to Belgium’s political culture, not its 
national culture. Love of the nation (culturally) is critical for most nationalists (Ho 2009) 
and seemingly an objective for citizenship course proponents (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 
2015), yet it is not a primary motivator for those migrants in Wallonia’s FIC courses 
interviewed here. A second finding is that some migrants see formal citizenship as a 
means of acquiring an identity, meaning a sense that one belongs in their new state. 
Finally, this article presents FIC participants’ perspectives on the courses themselves.  
5.2 Citizenship and Emotion 
The analytical framework used in this article centers on “citizenship,” a mode of 
membership conventionally associated with the modern state. The framework also 
considers emotions doing so emphasizes migrants’ citizenship perspectives. 
Citizenship is at once a legal category, with citizenship being the laws dictating 
relations between insiders and outsiders (Steil & Ridgley 2012), as well as a social and 
cultural construct (Staeheli et al. 2012). As a legal category, citizenship highlights 
notions of rights and obligations that are encoded in laws. It also suggests values and 
virtues associated with participation in a national community or polity. As a social and 
cultural construct, citizenship occurs in spaces of everyday life and includes attachments 
individuals may make (Nagel & Ehrkamp 2016). Citizenship in this latter sense is often 
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associated with nationalism and a presumed attachment to an imagined community of 
fellow citizens (Anderson 2006) within the territorial state.  
Historical understanding of citizenship dates back to the Greek city-state and 
classical philosophers such as Strabo and Ptolemy (Painter and Philo 1995). There was a 
mark of belonging and commitment to a particular place (Desforges et al. 2005) — a sort 
of legal formula dictated who did and did not belong (Ho 2008). For those deemed to 
belong, their belonging stemmed from a created identity that carried with it certain rights 
and obligations as tied to a specific place or territory (Painter & Philo 1995).  
  The rise of the nation-state and ideas of national citizenship in the late eighteenth 
century, however, weakened citizenship’s local, city-based focus and changed it to more 
of a national ideal (Desforges et al. 2005). The scale change from the local to the national 
did not necessarily remove the idea of rights and obligations, what may be referred to as 
the legal status of citizenship. Indeed, long-established citizenship conceptions, and the 
study of them, did not begin changing for an additional two centuries after the nation-
state’s rise (Ho 2008). Territory was considered the dominant citizenship factor 
throughout this time (Waite 2012; Murphy 2013). That is, citizenship focused on the 
formulation of political relationships within the nation-state territory.  
Rapid globalization and migration altered nation-state citizenship in various ways.  
Globalization since the late twentieth century rescaled notions of citizenship to also 
include those above the nation-state such as group identities based on religion, ethnicity, 
and culture (Desforges et al. 2005; Waite 2012). Migration similarly changed notions of 
citizenship because, while not formal citizens, migrants in many contexts maintain 
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certain rights and are subject to similar obligations attendant to citizenship within those 
areas where the migrants live (Ehrkamp 2010). Citizenship, or “belonging” (e.g., Secor 
2004; Ho 2009), formulates the terms of membership in legal and social categories both 
on the “national” level (in national policy and constitutional law, for instance), as well as 
everyday spaces—localities—where migrants and locals negotiate membership and what 
it means to belong in the community of citizens such as churches, neighborhoods, 
schools, workplaces, and so on (Nagel & Ehrkamp, 2016). Recognizing citizenship as 
more than a singular national narrative consistent across a country is important because 
such a scenario is typically unrealistic (Agnew 2013) and impossible in Belgium as a 
multinational state (see, e.g., Adam & Martiniello 2013). 
In basic terms, citizenship in the migration context is both a formal legal status 
with rights and entitlements as well as a marker of identity and belonging (Joppke 2007a; 
2010; Pogonyi 2019). Identity is often associated with nationalism. Indeed, nationalism 
presumes an attachment to an imagined community of fellow citizens (Anderson 2006). 
Scholars tend to categorize nationalism as “ethnic” or “civic” in nature (e.g., Sharma, 
2016; Smith & Hutchinson, 1994). The former presumes a community based on ideals of 
common origins, ancestry, consanguinity, and so forth (Dekker, Malova, & 
Hoogendoorn, 2003). Civic nationalism, on the other hand, focuses on sharing a common 
political culture, which suggests the majority culture as being detached from the wider 
political culture shared by all citizens (Antonsich & Petrillo 2019). The integration 
courses in Europe generally fit within a civic nationalism ideal as they focus on national 
principles, values, and histories (Goodman 2010; Joppke 2010). 
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In considering citizenship as identity, scholarship often centers on official views 
propagated by the state (Pogonyi 2019; Joppke 2007a). Indeed, academic and public 
policy debates tend to focus on states’ and/or political parties’ citizenship conceptions 
delineated in law, policies, or campaign literature, or by policymakers themselves (e.g., 
Joppke 2010; Spiro 2008). Such research focuses on the state, is top-down, and 
institutional (Knott 2019). Consequently, studies generally consider what the state/party 
expects immigrants to do to become like a defined ideal and then use this measure as a 
condition of securing legal citizenship (Brubaker 2001; Nicholls 2012). Waerniers & 
Hustinx (2019) for instance, reviewed integration policy documents in Flanders to reveal 
the region’s expectation that migrants “earn moral citizenship through assimilation” to 
the dominant “Western culture” (p. 277-278). Put differently, these studies address what 
the state believes a migrant should imagine about the state, leaving aside what the 
migrants actually believe. They thus overlook migrants’ own conceptions regarding 
formal membership and informal belonging in the state and community (Ramos et al. 
2019). And despite calls for researchers to increasingly talk with migrants rather than 
about them (Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006; p. 1616), scholars still note an ongoing “lacuna of 
research” that considers migrants’ perspectives on the how and why they seek citizenship 
or conceptualize it (Szewczyk 2016: p. 363; see also Harpaz & Mateos 2019). The same 
is true in citizenship literature generally (see Joppke 2007a).  
There is nevertheless an emerging scholarship directly revealing migrants’ and 
minorities’ views on citizenship and belonging (e.g., Pogonyi 2019, 2017; Hoekstra 
2019). This research employs a “bottom-up” approach to understanding citizenship 
increasingly emphasized in literature but underutilized in practice (Harpaz & Mateos 
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2019; Studemeyer 2015). The bottom-up approach contributes a greater understanding of 
nationalism’s presence/absence in localized contexts as individuals (including migrants) 
locally recreate nations and national identities (Antonsich & Matejskova 2015), identities 
that nationalists may seek to shape by promoting particular emotional attachments (Koch 
2016).  
This bottom-up approach emphasizes citizenship’s emotional dimensions. 
Emotional attachments frame how individuals live in the world, how they live their 
everyday (Anderson & Smith 2001). These attachments help form a sense of belonging 
and are dynamic according to one’s social and material experiences (Wood & Waite 
2011). Emotions can include a “longing to be”, or a desire for attachments, with others 
and to place (Askins 2016). For migrants, emotions acquire increasing importance as they 
engage with their new countries after migration (Herrero-Arias et al 2020). Accordingly, 
migration scholars are increasingly incorporating emotion in their research (e.g., Van 
Ramshorst 2019). By focusing on emotions and experiences in connection with certain 
laws, such as laws for the integration courses, researchers and policymakers can better 
understand those laws’ implications in everyday practice and their connection to 
achieving policy objectives (see Hoekstra 2019). 
Although scholars increasingly consider emotions, their inquiries at times 
essentialize migrants’ emotions in ways that may contribute to nationalists’ frustration 
with, and hostility towards, migrants. They assume that migrants make citizenship 
choices in cold, calculating ways designed to either maximize their personal economic 
interest in the host society or to increase social capital in their homelands (e.g., Joppke 
2019; Altan-Olcay & Balta 2016). There is little consideration given to citizenship’s 
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emotional meaning for migrants (Ho 2009), or what migrants’ connection to the host 
country actually is, including their sense of place (Agnew 1987; Massey 2005). Migrants 
may seek formal citizenship for a variety of personal reasons unrelated to economics 
(Studemeyer 2015). This can include emotional connections such as memories or pride in 
the territory (Wood & Gilmartin 2018). Symbolic implications, such as perceived social 
status in or connection to the state, can also play a part in how migrants emotionally 
conceive citizenship (see Pogonyi 2019). For refugees, a key emotion is a sense of 
security (Askins 2016), as it can be for other immigrants too (Staeheli & Nagel 2008). 
Citizenship can be closely intertwined with national identity (Miller-Idriss 2006). So 
seeking formal citizenship, emotionally speaking, can be a form of identity management, 
meaning how one claims an identity vis-à-vis her country of residence (Pogonyi 2019; 
see also Nyers 2010).  
This article explores citizenship by considering the emotions underlying migrants’ 
seemingly utilitarian decisions to secure formal citizenship, as well as the migrants’ 
emotional attachments to the territorial state (i.e., their sense of place). Why are migrants 
seeking formal citizenship? What are the attachments prompting them to pursue formal 
citizenship? This article considers these questions in the context of Wallonia’s FIC 
courses. It does so because completing FIC is one action migrants take to receive legal 
citizenship (see Article 12bis). Consistent with the bottom-up approach, this article 
focuses on migrants’ motivations to attend FIC more than FIC’s content. The next section 
describes FIC generally along with the FIC courses observed in this study and the 
migrants participating in them to provide greater context to the empirical responses 
addressing migrants’ citizenship conceptions detailed in section 5.4.  
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5.3 Setting the Scene: Researching Wallonia’s FIC 
This article draws on formal interviews with 12 FIC students and field notes from 
approximately 55 hours of participant observation in two different FIC courses I 
attended. Interviews and participant observation are two methods used in similar studies 
of integration courses in Germany (Williams 2018) and France (Onasch 2017). Roughly 
42 of my observation hours resulted from a course I enrolled in and followed as a student 
alongside migrants. I selected interviewees based on conversations with FIC participants 
and their ability to meet for an interview. Many students were unable to meet for in-depth 
interviews outside of class but spoke freely during class breaks. I incorporated summaries 
of such conversations in my field notes. It total, I spoke with 32 FIC students but was 
only able to have extended interviews with 12 of them. I detail my study sites and study 
participants below following a brief overview of FIC’s history in Wallonia. 
5.3.1 FIC’s history 
By way of context, and in contrast to Flanders, Wallonia had long offered 
optional ‘welcome courses’ for migrants to learn more about Belgium. It created FIC in 
2009 as a means of introducing migrants to Belgium (30 avril 2009 Décret). The course 
also envisioned participation in the course by long-term Belgium residents with foreign 
origins (i.e., those born in Belgium to immigrant parents). But Wallonia did not engage in 
compulsory citizenship training. This changed in 2014—two years after the national 
citizenship change—when the Walloon government made its welcome course mandatory 
for newly arrived migrants and included the requirement of receiving at least 20 hours of 
citizenship training (27 Mars 2014 Décret). This training increased to 60 hours in late 
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2018 (8 novembre 2018 Décret). Wallonia made FIC one of the four mandatory 
components of its welcome course (renamed ‘integration course’ in 2016) along with an 
individualized social report, French language training, and a socio-professional 
orientation (27 Mars 2014 Décret; 28 avril 2016 Décret). FIC became and remains 
Wallonia’s de-facto civic integration course for persons seeking Belgian nationality. So it 
is that migrants seeking legal citizenship, as well as newly arrived migrants, enroll in and 
follow the same citizenship course.  
5.3.2 FIC sites for this study 
The two FIC courses I attended were both in located in the Brabant Wallon 
province. I chose to follow courses in this area primarily for two reasons. First, I was 
familiar with Brabant-Wallon as I had lived in the province for eight months years earlier 
when volunteering with an NGO in Belgium. I had limited funding and time to be in the 
field, so selecting an area I was already familiar with greatly facilitated my ability to 
make contacts with various organizations. Second, Brabant-Walloon is the closest 
francophone province to the Brussels-Capital Region. Figure 5.2 shows the province on a 
map colored in red; Brussels is the small circle located directly above the province. 
Brabant-Wallon’s proximity to the capital meant that persons from all over Wallonia 
could easily access FIC courses delivered there.  
My first experience with FIC occurred in a course run by a community non-profit 
geared towards migrants. The instructor, Amelie, invited me to observe the course to both 
better understand how FIC courses worked as well as to meet students. Twelve students 
attended Amelie’s course. Four of them were “new arrivals” (primo arrivants) obligated 
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under Wallonia’s 2014 decree to complete FIC. “New arrivals” are those in Belgium less 
than three years but with a residence permit longer than three months (other than some 
exceptions, such as students, persons from other EU-member states, Switzerland, etc.). 
Three of the four – Amina, Rima, and Pauline – were Syrian refugees; Amina, a Muslim 
wearing a headscarf, entered Belgium in 2015 while Rima and Pauline, Christians, 
arrived in 2017. The fourth new arrival was Raul, an Argentinian who arrived roughly six 
months before the course following his marriage to a native Belgian. The other eight 
participants attended FIC to acquire citizenship. Two of them came from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, two from Morocco, and one each from Peru, Macedonia, 
Mauritius, and the United Kingdom. Most of these first arrived in Belgium around 2011, 
although Charles, from the UK, had been in Belgium since the 1980s. Brexit motivated 
his push to secure Belgian citizenship because, while he had permanent residence in 
Belgium, traveling abroad with his family could become more complicated. The students’ 
primary reasons for being in Belgium were: marriage, school, or refugee status. Eight of 
the twelve were women. 
While Walloon law required FIC to be at least 20 hours, Amelie’s course totaled 
27 hours. She held three-hour classes on three weeknights over a three week period (total 
of nine class sessions). Offering the course at night made it quite popular as many FIC 
students also work, and attending at night did not require them to take time off of work. 
Students sat at tables placed together to form a large U-shape around the classroom, a 
street-level space situated along a busy road not far from the train station. The setup 
allowed students to see one another throughout the course. The two Moroccan students 
sat together near the front on one side, the two Congolese students sat next to them, the 
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Christian Syrians sat together further down, with the remaining students interspersed. 
While students sat in a somewhat segregated fashion, they all regularly spoke with one 
another before and after class as well as during short breaks. They seemed to genuinely 
take an interest in one another.  
The second FIC course I attended also took place in Brabant-Wallon at a non-
profit center primarily for women located less than four kilometers from the first. 
Pascale, the course instructor, encouraged me to observe the course as a student. I thus 
joined twenty students in attending the course. Nine students—all refugees—were new 
arrivals mostly coming from Syria as well as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. The other eleven 
students attended to fulfil their nationality requirements. Five came from sub-Saharan 
Africa (Cameroon, Guinea, Rwanda, Togo), three from North Africa (Algeria and 
Morocco), two from Europe (Bulgaria and Russia), and one from Asia (China). Refugee 
status was the primary reason for most students to be in Belgium followed by marriage 
and work. Twelve of the twenty were women. 
Pascale’s course totaled 45 hours over a two-week period. Students seeking 
citizenship sought out the course because of its condensed timeframe, with one student, 
Khaled, coming from the Brussels-Capital region to attend rather than follow a course 
offered in Brussels. The new arrivals enrolled because of the course’s proximity to their 
residences. The classroom consisted of a large conference table in the center of the room. 
Most students sat at the table, but space constraints forced some to sit at the back of the 
room. Several students alternated where they sat each day; some did so because they 
arrived late and no longer could find a place at the table while others seemed to purposely 
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try to meet class members by sitting next to them. The primary constant was two veiled 
women, Yasmin from Yemen and Rima from Syria, sitting next to each other. 
5.3.3 FIC participants in this study 
Table 5.1 broadly identifies the 32 FIC students in this study as reflected in the 
courses I attended. Interviews occurred in either French or English (sometimes a mixture 
of both) according to each student’s preference and ability. Charles, for instance, was a 
native Anglophone and preferred English. Viktoriya had been an English teacher in her 
native country and sometimes found it easier to express herself in English than French. I 
translated the interview transcriptions into English (all translations in this article are thus 
my own). Questions included their thoughts on their FIC course, Belgian citizenship, 
what it means to be part of Belgian society, and what attracts them to Belgium as a place. 
I typically had multiple informal conversations with formal interviewees and the other 
FIC students before and after classes and during breaks. To protect the students’ privacy, 
I use pseudonyms and remove identifiable characteristics in this article.  
Regarding participant observation, FIC courses are designed to be participatory 
and interactive (Manuel de délivrance 2015). Both courses I attended were participatory 
and interactive (although one was more so than the other). Amelie and Pascale, the FIC 
instructors leading the respective courses, were both Belgian citizens (although Pascale 
had emigrated from Chile in her early 20s). They each created discussion questions from 
select topics mandated by Walloon law and other topics suggested by DisCRI, the 
Walloon agency responsible for training FIC instructors and creating course content. 
Because of the flexibility in delivery, including topic selection (the vast majority of 
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which was not mandatory), class discussions reflected localized citizenship conceptions 
that both adhere to and depart from regional directives while simultaneously reflecting an 
interplay between what FIC instructors and migrants each imagine. The in-class 
discussion format thus provided a means of learning migrants’ perspectives on a range of 
topics identified by various state actors as relevant to membership in Wallonia and 
Belgium. I briefly address these topics below. 
FIC’s topics came from six themed modules centered on Belgium: daily life; 
family relations; communicating with different cultures; and understanding new 
professional, political, and sociocultural contexts (one module for each context) 
(Bibliothèque FIC). There are 45 topics across these modules, with 12 of them being 
mandatory under Walloon law (27 Mars 2014 Décret; 28 avril 2016 Décret; Structure 
thématiques de la formation). Instructors have discretion in how much time to spend on 
the topics (Manuel de délivrance 2015). These mandatory topics address everyday 
living/basic functioning in Belgian society, covering matters such as taxes, housing, 
health care, social security, education, and Belgium’s laws and government structure. 
Within these topics, course participants learn fundamental information such as what 
insurance is, how to secure housing, getting along with neighbors (i.e., basic manners 
such as not playing loud music after 10:00 pm, not visiting unannounced, etc.), how taxes 
work, and so forth. The greatest required emphasis, however, is on Belgium’s laws and 
legal system. Issues addressed include the separation of powers, neutrality of the state, 
universal suffrage, parliamentary democracy, proportional voting, political pluralism and 
constitutional monarchy (see generally Structure thématiques de la formation.) So FIC’s 
overarching goal—and the state perspective in creating the course—seems to be instilling 
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in participants an understanding and appreciation of Belgium’s legal system. This being 
said, focusing on law does not mean that FIC courses are devoid of emotion. Emotion 
may arise as students and instructors discuss morals and values associated with the law as 
discussed in the empirical section below. 
Twenty out of the 32 students in this study (63%) were present in FIC to secure 
legal citizenship, meaning they were not legally compelled to attend FIC to remain in the 
country but attended FIC to complete legal requirements for formal citizenship. The 
remaining 12 attended out of legal obligation due to their status as new arrivals, although 
several of these expressed a desire to eventually become Belgian citizens. And while FIC 
is a necessary step to achieve Belgian citizenship on paper, the Belgian state presumably 
expects FIC to create ‘Belgian’ citizens as well since the course is how one ‘proves’ 
integration into Belgium (Article 12bis). Accordingly, I next address FIC participants 
themselves, specifically what they imagine and what their emotional attachments are to 
the state where they secure formal citizenship. 
5.4 Migrants’ Citizenship Imaginations: Making Emotional Attachments and 
Creating Identities 
The FIC participants I interviewed, each of whom was in the course based on 
legal requirements (as a condition to either secure residence or for legal citizenship), 
primarily imagine citizenship in emotional terms centered on Belgium’s political culture. 
Their emotional attachments were to laws and rights afforded by their presence in 
Belgium and by Belgian law. While nationalists might typically expect emotional 
attachments to a national culture (Ho 2009), and some integration course proponents 
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might expect as much (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015), the migrants I spoke with express 
emotional attachments to a legal structure provided by Belgium’s political culture rather 
than a Belgian (or even Walloon) national culture. This might be due to FIC’s emphasis 
on law. Even so, the attachments to laws and rights does not mean that migrants are 
treating citizenship instrumentally; instead, migrants are making connections to the 
country, to their places of residence, and the privileges afforded in place.  
A second citizenship conception FIC participants expressed during interviews or 
in class is the idea of formal citizenship as an identity. Immigrants make emotional 
investments in formal citizenship and attend FIC for that reason—to secure an identity, 
meaning a sense that one belongs in their new state. These emotional attachments are real 
connections migrants make to Belgium that better make sense of their presence in the 
state. After addressing interviewees’ affinity for political culture and emotional 
conceptions of identity, I present FIC participants’ perspectives on the integration courses 
themselves. 
5.4.1 Attachment to political culture 
The “political culture” FIC participants expressed attachment to centered on three 
key points: safety, personal liberty, and legal institutions. 
Safety was a core emotional attachment many FIC students made to Belgium. 
Safety for these migrants was not simply instrumental (see Harpaz and Mateos 2019). 
Rather, the migrants expressed gratitude for their presence in Belgium. Being in Belgium 
was paramount. This was most apparent for migrants who were in Belgium as refugees. 
All eight Syrians in the FIC courses fled Daesh (the Arabic term for Islamic State). So 
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did Seif, an Iraqi. Yesrin fled war in Yemen and the Houthi rebels who invaded her city. 
Each of these students clearly expressed gratitude for their safety in Belgium. Safety also 
motivated Riza and Esther, refugees from Iran. “The goal was to find a safe place,” Riza 
says, after Iranian authorities threatened him following his conversion to Christianity 
three years earlier. His wife Esther had always been Christian, yet she faced constant 
persecution because of it. After weighing their options, the couple decided to flee with 
their young daughter to England based in part on their ability to speak some English. 
They also believed that England would be easier to reach than America where some of 
Esther’s family had fled years earlier. Yet after first reaching France on fake visas, the 
family determined instead to seek asylum in Belgium based on what they believed to be 
less restrictive asylum laws. They perhaps were correct as their family received asylum 
one year after arriving. With physical safety in Belgium, Riza says, with a smile, “I am 
happy, and I am not dead!” 
Being in Belgium meant a different sort of safety to Ping: consumer safety. 
Originally from China and readily familiar with tainted foods there, Ping admired 
Belgium for its consumer protections. She repeatedly commented during her interview 
that being in Belgium removed concerns that her food could be contaminated. “I love 
Belgium,” Ping says while praising its “clean food” along with its abundance of “plants 
and clean air” and its having “few people.” (Belgium’s entire population is smaller than 
that of Ping’s hometown.) Belgium also presented what Ping called political “safety,” or 
what others refer to as “freedom,” meaning the basic freedoms associated with Western 
democracies such as freedom of speech that China aggressively restricts. 
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The personal liberty in Belgium that Ping discussed was another factor shaping 
migrants’ emotional attachments to the state. Riza and Esther certainly love their liberty 
to attend church and openly practice their faith. “I am happy now because I have 
freedom,” Riza says. Riza and Esther had greater attachments to Belgium because of this 
freedom than they did to Iran, similar to Eliassi’s (2016) findings about Kurds in Sweden, 
who felt greater attachment to Sweden and a sense of belonging because of the rights 
afforded to them as minorities. For Guinean-born Fatoumata, being in Belgium means 
freedom to avoid—and not worry about—cultural practices prevalent in her home 
country like female genital mutilation. Fatoumata cried as she related to the class her own 
experience with the practice and expressed her gratitude that Belgium prohibited its 
occurrence so it would never be an issue for any daughters she might one day have. Were 
she present in Guinea with daughters, Fatoumata shared that she would be constantly 
worried about relatives or others taking a daughter and performing the horrific procedure 
without her consent. Belgium freed Fatoumata in this regard. Her love was more for the 
law than it was for Belgian society. And that law was based on legal protections afforded 
to Fatoumata in place. In some respects, Fatoumata expressed what Walloon leaders 
might hope for from FIC students—greater appreciation for Belgium and its legal system. 
Yet not all students considered freedom as being synonymous with their presence 
in Belgium. To be sure, students recognized and enjoyed freedoms typical in Western 
society (freedom of speech, religion, etc.). But freedom to work where one wished was a 
different matter, especially for new arrivals. Asmaro lamented the restrictions placed on 
his employment due to bureaucratic determinations about his educational and 
professional backgrounds. He had an MBA and operated a successful company in Syria 
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for several years; yet Belgium mandated that he secure another master’s degree so that 
his qualifications could be ‘equivalent’ to others in Belgium. This significantly limited 
Asmaro’s employment prospects and pushed him to take menial jobs rather than those 
better suited to his skills and expertise. Riza also expressed disappointment with his 
limited employment freedom. An engineer by training, Riza received a job offer in his 
field while awaiting his asylum decision. He says that accepting the job would have 
jeopardized his asylum application as he could be considered an ‘economic migrant’ 
rather than a religious refugee. So he declined the offer. Then, after receiving refugee 
status, Riza found himself in a similar situation as Asmaro with the bureaucratic claim 
that his education and experience was not ‘equivalent.’ Yet Riza gladly accepted limited 
employment freedom in exchange for full religious freedom. So did Asmaro for his 
family’s physical safety.  
Class observations and interviews revealed that FIC participants expressed 
attachment to legal institutions without necessarily agreeing with the values promoted by 
some laws enacted by Belgium’s government. This conception came out during in-class 
discussions of sensitive topics like same-sex marriage and euthanasia, both of which are 
legal in Belgium. One reason perhaps for the increased connections is that the discussions 
allowed students to consider their backgrounds and the similarities Belgium had to their 
homelands. Another reason, and perhaps a more central factor, is that students were able 
to understand that just because something is legal in Belgium does not mean that they 
must support it.  
Same-sex marriage, for instance, came up during a far-reaching discussion of 
Belgian family structures and as a counterpoint to polygamy, a practice that more 
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students were familiar with based on their religious backgrounds. Students sat together in 
small groups and reviewed different pictures showing groups of persons, determining 
together what the photo portrayed. The groups then shared with the class their beliefs. 
Two of the 10 or so photos bear mentioning here. One showed an adult man in the 
photo’s center with four adult women near him, and the five of them surrounded by 
roughly 20 children ranging in age from toddlers to early 20s. The other photo showed 
two men seated together. Sub-Saharan African and Latin American students guessed that 
the first photo was of a large extended family. Muslim students, however, corrected them 
by stating that it was a polygamous family. The class then discussed polygamy’s presence 
in some of their home countries (Syria and Mauritius), its relative absence in others 
(Morocco), and its illegality in Belgium. The discussion allowed participants to be 
comfortable with difference.  
For the picture showing the two men, Bondeko, from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, said, “They’re brothers.” Class members corrected him that the men were 
likely a gay couple since Belgium recognized same-sex marriage. Another broad 
discussion ensued during which Amelie, the native-Belgian instructor, shared that while 
Belgian law permitted same-sex families, not all Belgians supported the practice. 
Bondeko, a fervent Catholic, later revealed during an interview that Amelie’s comment 
assuaged him and other students opposed to same-sex marriage that they too could find a 
place in Belgian society by acknowledging, but not necessarily embracing, legal matters 
within the state. Amelie’s noting that native Belgians acknowledge laws but do not 
always endorse them, essentially emphasizing a respect for laws and the legal process, 
was consistent with Wallonia’s directive that migrants appreciate Belgium’s legal system. 
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It also allowed migrants to make greater identifications with other Belgians rather than 
seeing all of society as monolithic in nature.   
A similar result unfortunately did not occur when discussing euthanasia in the 
course taught by Pascale, herself an immigrant to Belgium of nearly 40 years. Once the 
topic arose, a devout Muslim named Khaled questioned the wisdom in permitting 
euthanasia, especially with no age limit. (Belgium is the world’s only country to allow 
euthanasia at any age and, as of May 2020, has two confirmed cases of euthanizing 
children under age 12.) Ali, another student with a Muslim background but who had lived 
in Europe most of his life, vociferously responded, “It’s how things are here! Miracles 
with Mohammed and Jesus and all of that don’t exist!” Missing the opportunity to 
explain how many Belgians still opposed the practice, and also to compare Belgium’s 
laws with those in students’ homelands, Pascale responded: “It’s how things are here, so 
you just have to accept it.” This ended further discussion and many students seemed 
genuinely uncomfortable; the statement made FIC assimilationist in nature and 
complicated migrants’ efforts to make connections to Belgian society based on the 
premise that everyone in the state supported assisted suicide. To be sure, FIC instructors 
played a role in these discussions. When they encouraged participatory dialogue, as FIC 
courses are supposed to do, more students seemed comfortable with their understanding 
of issues and imagining themselves as part of Belgian society. But when instructors 
explicitly took sides in a debate, it resulted in consternation among students, particularly 
for those who disagreed with an issue, because of the assimilative approach and sense 
among students that they could not find common ground with Belgian laws and so create 
emotional attachments. Such unease might also discourage some migrants from seeking 
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an identity with Belgium—a sense that one belongs there—which is a significant reason 
why many to seek formal citizenship in the first place, as discussed in the next section. 
5.4.2 Citizenship as an identity 
Beyond attachments to Belgium’s political culture (its legal system and rights 
related to formal citizenship), several students imagined citizenship as an identity. They 
saw their acquiring citizenship more as a means of belonging than as a utilitarian tool like 
nationalists might claim. Seif is a prime example. An Iraqi refugee, Seif wanted Belgian 
citizenship because he believed that it would allow him to be part of the country. 
‘Something that is very important to really feel like you are a Belgian person is to have 
Belgian citizenship, be a Belgian citizen. That way, you can have confidence that you are 
Belgian, that there is not a distance with people, that you are like the others.’ Seif made 
this statement after proudly showing a video of him in Brussels’ Grand Place at an event 
welcoming back Belgium’s national team from the World Cup. The brief video showed 
Seif near the center of the Grand Place as the team stood on a balcony 50 meters away 
and addressed the crowd. Seif explained that he felt a connection with the crowd but did 
not quite feel that he fully belonged because when the crowd chanted, ‘We are Belgium!’ 
he did not have anything to show that he was. And Seif wanted a new identity based on 
his history. He resented Iraq for its soldiers abandoning him and his family to Daesh (the 
Arabic name for Islamic State) in 2015. Seif left Iraq in June 2015, weeks after Daesh 
overran his native Anbar Province. Aid workers in Greece recommended that he re-
establish his life in Belgium, telling him that the path to legal citizenship there would be 
easier there than elsewhere in Europe. Wishing to find a new, permanent home and never 
return to Iraq, even if it becomes safe to do so, Seif followed their advice and went to 
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Belgium. After three years in the country, Seif says, ‘I feel that I am lost between Iraqis 
and Belgians. Maybe when I am Belgian—when I have Belgian nationality—perhaps 
then I will say, ‘I am Belgian, I am not Iraqi.’’ 
In Belgium and elsewhere in Europe, immigration and citizenship policies now 
generally assume that one must be ‘integrated’ in order to acquire legal citizenship (e.g., 
Article 12bis; Paparusso 2019). Seif’s perspective, however, suggests the inverse: that 
legal citizenship generates a sense of belonging. Other studies provide similar 
observations. For instance, Barzoo Eliassi’s (2016) account of Kurdish immigrants in 
Sweden describes an Iraqi Kurd who, like Seif, asserts that securing Swedish citizenship 
would give him ‘an identity and when you have this identity, people respect you as a 
human being’ (p. 103). Szabolcs Pogonyi (2019) lends some empirical support to this 
contention, pointing to research that shows that ‘Citizenship is a boundary creating 
category that distinguishes members from non-members and thus, in addition to securing 
status and rights, it has the potential to ground identification’ (p. 977).  
The potential for grounding one’s identification could explain Viktoriya’s 
situation. A native Russian, Viktoriya enrolled in FIC to secure formal citizenship. 
During class introductions, Viktoriya flippantly said that she wanted Belgian citizenship 
so that she could eventually ‘move to the south of France’ with her Belgian-citizen 
husband. This statement seemingly confirmed a strategic citizenship choice (Ramos et al 
2019). But when later asked about this statement during an interview, Viktoriya said that 
she and her husband had no plans to move to France. Pressed further about her reason(s) 
for seeking citizenship, Viktoriya responded, ‘I feel like I need it. I don’t know why.’ She 
explained that she did not currently have a sense that she belonged in Belgium, noting, ‘I 
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feel a little frustrated right now because I am not necessarily at home here in Belgium, 
nor do I feel like I’m at home in Russia either.’ But Viktoriya did note that she preferred 
to be in Belgium over Russia because Belgians are ‘very kind, friendly, people who are 
eager to help.’ Being among them in the country made her a happier person. Viktoriya 
also no longer enjoys returning to Russia because the people there, she says, are ‘cold and 
distant.’ She has emotional attachments to Belgium, as shown by her preference to be in 
the country over her homeland. So Viktoriya’s seeking formal citizenship could really be 
a way of acquiring an identity and integrating into Belgian society. Ironically, Belgium’s 
national philosophy concerning citizenship prior to the 2012 changes pushed by N-VA 
and other nationalists was based on the idea that granting legal citizenship facilitates 
immigrant integration and attachment to country (see Gordon 2010).So the shift to 
additional hurdles migrants must overcome may have only succeeded in making some 
migrants feel unwelcome. 
I must acknowledge that some migrants seek formal citizenship solely for 
instrumental purposes and not because of an emotional affinity to Belgium: nationalists 
may pejoratively call such citizenship seekers ‘belge de papiers’ (paper Belgians) (see 
Brubaker 1992). However, my research indicates that these migrants’ decisions are far 
from emotionless. Juliana is one example. Originally from Peru but married to a Belgian 
and living in the country for 10 years, Juliana must pass through customs separate from 
her Belgian-citizen family because she does not have a Belgian passport. Customs 
officials often select her for extra screening, causing concern and frustration as she is not 
able to communicate with her immediate family during these moments that sometimes 
last for hours. Formal Belgian citizenship will allow her to return to Belgium unimpeded, 
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so Juliana’s seeking citizenship is a strategic decision (see Ramos et al. 2018). Juliana 
admits that she is seeking citizenship without deeper emotional connections to Belgium. 
“I am a Peruvian living in Belgium,” she says, adding that she and her husband plan to 
return to Peru once their children finish school. (Juliana’s Belgian husband lived in Peru 
for nearly two decades before they moved to Belgium when their oldest entered middle 
school.) Juliana’s heart never left Peru, and she sees Belgians as too ‘cold and distant’ for 
her to wish to stay. In this respect, Juliana exemplifies emotions revealed in transnational 
and flexible citizenship (e.g., Soysal 1994; Ong 1999). Her love for Peru overrode any 
affinity for Belgium. 
FIC student Nikolai from Bulgaria is a second example of migrants making 
strategic decisions based on emotional attachments to places other than the host state. In 
class discussions and in conversations, Nikolai often expressed his view of Belgium as a 
transit country where people do not come to stay long-term. This is likely true in his case 
as well. He had previously spent significant time in Florida (USA) and several times 
expressed a desire to return and stay long term. Although unspoken, Nikolai hinted his 
belief that Belgian citizenship might improve his chances of eventually immigrating to 
the United States, a ‘stepwise’ migration similar to that revealed by Jaeeun Kim (2019) 
with ethnic Koreans from China securing South Korean citizenship to then use their new 
status for subsequent migration to the United States. Indeed, Nikolai spoke more 
affectionately of Florida than he did of his native Bulgaria. 
5.4.3 Participant perspectives on FIC courses 
FIC participants had varied thoughts regarding their FIC course and the emotional 
attachments it offered. Some appreciated an understanding of cultural nuances that would 
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allow them to better navigate Belgian society. One example occurred during a class 
discussion on the boundaries between harassment and welcome behavior regarding 
women’s appearance in public. Immigrants from Islamic countries shared that women 
wearing revealing clothing invite harassing behavior (whistles and catcalls) in their home 
countries. Other students pointed out that such conduct was unacceptable in their home 
countries as well as in Belgium regardless of what a woman was wearing. Yet Raul, an 
Argentinian, surprised other students with his comments that whistling at a woman was 
“complimenting” her “on her beauty.” Students thus confronted cultural differences that 
they may not have expected, and Raul learned the boundaries of acceptable behavior in 
Belgium. 
By and large, however, FIC participants had mixed feelings about the course and 
its ability to create connections to Belgium. FIC students believed the courses served a 
purpose to bring them in contact with others. Seif commented, “It’s not just a course to 
understand Belgium’s laws, but it’s a way to mix with other people too.” As an example, 
Seif pointed to meeting new people in class and learning from them that two other 
refugee families lived near his home. Classroom observations also made these 
connections clear; students increasingly interacted with one another in class and out of 
class, including eating together. 
Viktoriya shared a similar belief as Seif regarding classes offering the chance to 
meet people. She believes classes to be good because they force immigrants like her to 
get out and to make friends. She spoke favorably of prior courses she had attended, such 
as dance and tennis courses, and how she enjoyed them because she met others. Ping 
shared a similar observation about her participating in a local badminton club. But 
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Viktoriya did not find FIC useful in meeting Belgians, largely due to its failure to put her 
into contact with non-immigrant Belgians. The fact that FIC participants were all 
immigrants like Viktoriya caused her to criticize the course as not providing an 
opportunity for greater connections with Belgium.  
Viktoriya’s criticism is consistent with classroom observations. FIC participants 
congregated by similar backgrounds; Moroccans sat with Moroccans, Syrians with 
Syrians, and so forth. Sometimes these seating patterns simply resulted from language 
difficulties as those less capable in French would rely on those sitting around them to 
sometimes translate. But sitting in this way complicated efforts to achieve social 
connections with a wider range of persons. And the lack of Belgians made it nearly 
impossible to achieve any sort of broader connection with Belgian society. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Those within Wallonia’s FIC courses do imagine citizenship by emotional 
attachments, albeit with feelings different perhaps than those desired by nationalists. 
Nationalists often push for migrants to love a country’s national culture and show that 
love by becoming culturally similar to other national members (see Ahmed 2014; Ho 
2009). Those migrants I interviewed, however, focused their emotional attachments on 
Belgium’s political culture, meaning its legal system and rights related to formal 
citizenship that they previously lacked like safety and personal liberty. While seemingly 
suggesting that migrants see citizenship in purely instrumental terms, the overall picture 
is more complex than an attachment to the new country and its culture as nationalists may 
advocate. Indeed, some interviewees see formal citizenship as a means of securing an 
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identity. They believe that legal citizenship will provide social acceptance—belonging—
in Belgian society (e.g., Eliassi 2016). These findings may be at odds with what 
nationalists might expect, but consistent with Wallonia’s seemingly relaxed attitude 
towards migrants (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015; Adam 2011; Martiniello 1995). In 
short, migrants make emotional attachments to the state as a place, but the feelings they 
express may differ from what nationalists might expect. This complicates current 
understandings of citizenship as state-centered and with migrants making citizenship 
decisions devoid of attachments to the host country, thereby highlighting that national 
citizenship is not an either/or proposition. 
Next, migrants’ emotional attachments are useful in the process of integration, 
and in the ways that nationalists desire, because the migrants’ attachments are to the 
territory. Indeed, attachment to territory is nationalism’s primary premise (J .Anderson 
1986; Williams & Smith 1983). So migrants’ love for Belgium as a territory based on 
ideals of the safety, personal liberty, and the legal institutions found there, for example, is 
seemingly consistent with nationalists’ goals for connections to a national place. Migrants 
and nationalists both share a sense of place in the country. 
Third, the Walloon experience reveals how scholars and policymakers alike 
should rethink citizenship and migrant expectations in nationalist environments. Migrants 
develop emotional attachments to the state, just different attachments from what native-
born nationalists might have themselves. The migrants’ attachments do not imply any 
less devotion to the state. And even then, each migrant has his or her own notions of what 
citizenship means. Riza and Esther, for instance, see citizenship as religious liberty. For 
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Seif, it is an identity. Fatoumata sees citizenship as safety within Belgium. Each has their 
own emotional attachments tied to Belgium as a place. 
Fourth, the appearance of a relatively robust system of citizenship and integration 
education for immigrants in Wallonia, in the absence of a broader swing toward 
nationalist parties, raises questions about the meaning of ‘citizenship’ and ‘integration’ 
across European space. Europe’s nationalism swing is unmistakable in recent years, yet 
the shift away from multiculturalism and toward “assimilationism” and exclusion (the 
subject of nationalist policies), has not been entirely uniform. This study suggests that as 
much as one might recognize the power of nationalist movements in Europe, they need to 
be mindful of more localized variability and unevenness.  The politics of citizenship and 
immigration, while directed at the nation-state and national polity, in reality unfolds in 
more localized contexts. 
More broadly, this study contributes to citizenship discourses regarding identity 
creation and formation. Nationalists who see citizenship courses as key to 
preserving/maintaining a coherent national identity may need to reconsider course 
implementation and connections that immigrants may or may not make in them with the 
broader society. 
Areas for further exploration include the content and pedagogy of classes and 
instructors’ perspectives. Is there an expectation that an identity is something distinctly 
Belgian? Do the instructors have a unified Belgian identity? Focusing on the instructors 
themselves still steers clear of a set “state” identity and so in many respects maintains a 
“bottom up” approach to study integration as the instructors may also have citizenship 






Figure 5.1. N-VA Campaign Poster. 
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Figure 5.2. Brabant Wallon province 
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Characteristics of Observed FIC Course 
Participants  
(N = 32) 
 
  
Sex Men 12 
Women 20 
   
Reason for FIC 
Attendance 
Legal Citizenship 20 
Legal Residence  
(new arrival) 
12 
   
Region of Origin Africa (sub-Saharan) 10 
Latin America 2 
 Asia  
(excluding Middle East) 
1 
 Europe (EU) 2 
 Europe (non-EU) 1 
 Middle East 12 
 North Africa 4 
   
Arrival in 
Belgium 
Before 2005 1 
2006-2010 5 
 2011-2014 11 
 2015-2017 15 





Family (marriage) 12 
Labor 9 




RETHINKING THE NATION IN INTEGRATION DISCOURSES BY 
LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT THE LOCALS1
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Abstract 
Europe’s rising nationalism often advances the idea that migrants do not “belong” 
in Europe. An accompanying ideal is that, if migrants do arrive, they must integrate into 
an imagined “host society” or nation present there. While not usually sympathizing with 
nationalist politics, scholars studying integration often incorporate nationalist imaginaries 
by applying various frameworks viewing the host society as monolithic. These 
frameworks ignore perspectives from the host society other than those dictated by elites. 
Ordinary persons’ perspectives remain untouched. The present article critically 
interrogates the ideal of a uniform host society through a case study of local persons 
living in Wallonia, Belgium’s francophone region, who claim to feel “at home” there. 
The article provides empirical evidence contesting the idea of uniform host societies and 
congruity between society and state (or even substate) boundaries. It contributes to an 
increasing literature focused on host society perceptions. And it provides a new 
framework for considering ordinary persons’ perspectives by engaging elements from 
existing frameworks addressing nationalism and identity (everyday nationhood and 
belonging). 
6.1 Introduction 
“We’re all Belgians right now. But when it’s over, we’ll be divided again.” 
– Municipal mayor in Wallonia, Belgium, discussing Belgium’s national 
team during the 2018 World Cup  
 
            Belgium fielded a talented national team in the 2018 World Cup. Known as the 
“Red Devils,” the team surprised many by finishing third in the tournament, beating 
powerhouses Brazil and England before losing to eventual champion France. To World 
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Cup observers unfamiliar with Belgium’s political situation, Belgium seemed every bit a 
unified and integrated country, as its multi-ethnic/racial team advanced through the 
World Cup matches played in Russia. Back in Belgium, jubilant fans hung Belgian flags 
from their home windows and balconies or flew Belgian flags from their cars. (See Figure 
6.1) The country came together. It did not matter that many of the team’s top players 
were children of immigrants from Congo, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Albania, Mali, and 
Martinique. Everyone was Belgian. 
The euphoria and unity over the Red Devils’ success sharply contrasted with 
Belgium’s everyday, fractious reality neatly summarized by the mayor quoted above. 
Indeed, Belgium’s internal divisions reflect how traditional nationalist ideologies fail to 
capture the political dynamics present in modern states. Nationalism seeks unity, if not 
homogeneity, within a state’s defined territory (Murphy 1996; Anderson 1986). The 
modern state at times fosters national unity through laws based on notions of 
“universality” (Weber 1977), public rituals and myths (Billig 1995), and naturalization 
systems that clearly demarcate “nationals” from “foreigners” (Yuval-Davis 2004). But 
even in Europe, the heartland of the modern nation-state system, nationhood and national 
identity remain incomplete and contentious ideals. This is particularly so in Belgium, 
where strained relations between Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia 
complicate notions of national identity (Adam & Martiniello 2013; Murphy 1988). The 
two regions operate with a significant measure of independence in matters relating to 
migrants and even pass their own “integration” laws (Swyngedouw 2016, 2019). This 
context makes migrant incorporation and integration particularly problematic. Integration 
presupposes a unified nation, a national “host society,” which newcomers can easily 
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identify and to which they conform and adapt (Nagel 2009). But what if the host society 
lacks even the semblance of coherence? What if there are relatively few “national” 
institutions, narratives, rituals, or policies to provide clear cues for migrants on what it 
means to belong? 
Belgium provides a compelling case to consider these questions. The country’s 
lack of unifying national narratives or political-territorial coherence, combined with its 
increasing and divergent integration laws, provide an entry point to more explicitly probe 
how ordinary people envision themselves as a “host society.” Integration laws like those 
in Belgium increasingly dictate the notion of a host society and what it means for 
newcomers to become part of that society, i.e., how migrants “integrate.” (e.g., Article 12 
bis code de la nationalité Belge; Decret 27 Mars 2014, Article 151). Yet there is little 
literature on the “host society” into which migrants are to integrate according to these 
proliferating integration laws. Indeed, Christian Joppke (2007b) considers the absence of 
ordinary persons’ perspectives “one of the biggest lacunae in the literature” (p. 44). 
Existing integration research primarily focuses on migrants’ perspectives (Leitner & 
Ehrkamp 2006) or those held by local elites (Antonsich 2012), not ordinary persons. 
This article makes three important contributions. First, by focusing on the host 
society, it responds to Marco Antonsich’s (2018) call to engage the nation in migration 
research and not simply treat is as a site of exclusion and discrimination. Antonsich’s call 
is particularly salient in an era of increased nationalism and integration demands. Too 
often migration researchers dismiss the nation outright to focus instead on migrants as the 
researchers employ approaches such as cosmopolitanism, postnationalism, and 
transnationalism in their work (see, e.g., Nussbaum 1994; Baban 2006; Leitner & 
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Ehrkamp 2006). This article thus adds to a limited—but growing—literature focused on 
host society perceptions (e.g., Clarke 2020; Strømsø 2019; Antonsich 2012; Miller-Idriss 
2006). Second, this article provides an empirical counterpoint to studies suggesting that 
one’s sense of local belonging can lead to national belonging (e.g., Antonsich 2018; 
Clarke 2020). It shows how some may have a national sense of belonging but not 
achieve, or be able to secure, a local one. Third, it provides a new framework for 
considering ordinary persons’ perspectives by engaging elements from existing 
frameworks addressing nationalism and identity (everyday nationhood and belonging). 
The next section introduces this article’s theoretical framework linking 
nationalism, integration, and belonging. The article then describes the Belgian context 
and outlines the research methodology. The empirical section presents two primary 
findings: (i) locality significantly influenced participants’ identities, and (ii) participants’ 
emotional attachments to a broader “Belgian” identity arise situationally—not uniformly 
or automatically—and primarily in comparative contexts. The conclusion addresses how 
these findings complicate migrant-centered analyses and draw attention to “host 
societies” being produced on a localized scale.  
6.2 Theorizing and Framing the Nation, Integration, and Belonging 
 The “nation” is a central consideration in integration discussions. Indeed, 
integration presumes an identifiable nation that minorities (including immigrants) 
integrate into (Nagel 2009). Scholarship traditionally approaches nations and national 
identity as either a fixed, a-historical phenomenon predating the nation state (Smith 1995) 
or as an ideal invented by elites seeking to build states and consolidate power 
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(Hobsbawm & Ranger 2012). Both approaches focus on a nation’s origins and study the 
nation as a historical, institutional unit (Antonsich 2015). Territory is also a key element 
in these analyses. The people linked to a territory comprise the “nation” (Jones & Fowler 
2007). “Nationalism” is thus the desire to maintain a shared, uniform national identity 
within a territory by creating and maintaining a state (Murphy 1996; Anderson, 1986, p. 
97; see also Williams & Smith, 1983). Pursuing a uniform nation—what integration 
discourses label the “host society” (Antonsich & Matejskova 2015)—within a territory 
often shape integration demands. These demands can come from the state (Mitchell 
2003) or members of the national community (Antonsich 2012).  
 Starting in the mid-1990s, scholars started considering nations in new ways. One 
approach sees nations as social creations; persons seeking to situate themselves in 
relation to others create the nation in everyday contexts (Thompson & Fevre 2001; 
Brubaker et al 2018). The individuals were part of an “imagined community” that 
(re)produced nationhood in individuals’ everyday lives (Anderson 2006; Fox & Miller-
Idriss 2008). So while nationalism is a mass phenomenon, this everyday approach seeks 
to understand the individuals constituting the “masses” (Strømsø 2019; Smith 2008). 
Sometimes referred to as “sociology of nationalism” because of sociologists’ lead in 
advocating its use, this approach’s focus on the everyday often results in its being labeled 
“everyday nationalism” in geographic literature (Jones & Merriman 2009). 
 Scholars tend to approach everyday nationalism through one of two 
methodological frameworks: banal nationalism (Billig 1995) or everyday nationhood 
(Brubaker 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008). The former is top-down in approach; the 
latter is bottom-up. Specifically, banal nationalism focuses on national symbols such as 
174 
flags hanging in public buildings, national songs, and so forth that presumably create a 
shared sense of identity in everyday life. It is top-down and state centered because it 
emphasizes the state and its elite members dictating the nation’s identity through these 
everyday items that people passively consume (Antonsich 2016; Antonsich 2020). 
“Everyday nationhood,” on the other hand, provides a bottom-up framework for 
analyzing the nation by examining ordinary persons’ perspectives (Miller-Idriss & 
Rothenberg 2012). Its proponents see the “nation” as simultaneously resulting from state-
level forces and “ordinary people engaging in routine activities” (Fox & Miller-Idriss 
2008, p. 554). Everyday nationhood explores how ordinary individuals interpret, respond 
to, identity with, and distance themselves from the nation (Brubaker et al. 2018; Fox & 
Miller-Idriss 2008). In some respects, the “nation” in everyday nationhood means the 
“state” as it conceptually considers ordinary people’s everyday relations with a state-
defined nation (Jones & Merriman 2009).  
Despite being differing frameworks for analyzing the nation (either top-down or 
bottom-up), banal nationalism and everyday nationhood both share a common limitation 
in how they see nations. Banal nationalism “operates with an unrealistic notion of a 
uniform, homogenous national audience” (Antonsich, 2016, p. 33). So does everyday 
nationhood. As Anthony Smith (2008) argues, everyday nationhood assumes “an 
undifferentiated ‘ordinary people’” (p. 565). Methodological nationalism thus 
unfortunately follows from these two approaches (Antonsich 2016).  
Mainstream migration scholarship similarly sees nations as monolithic. It 
generally imagines “integration” as a process wherein immigrants incorporate into a 
uniform and immediately apparent nation/host society (Antonsich & Matejskova 2015; 
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Nagel & Staeheli 2008). Three broad perspectives dominate integration literature: 
classical assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and transnationalism (Nelson & Hiemstra 
2008). These perspectives in turn fashion how scholars perceive the host society. 
Classical assimilation theory conceptualizes a one-way process between migrants 
and the host society, one in which the migrant minority gradually adopts/conforms to the 
dominant “core culture” (Gordon 1964). Some scholars argue that this absorption and 
loss of difference is partial, multigenerational, or segmented based on a host society’s 
existing hierarchies (racial, economic, etc.) (e.g., Alba & Nee, 1997; Portes and Zhou, 
1993).  
Multiculturalism emerged in the 1980s as an alternative approach to classical 
assimilation’s requirement of conformity; it seeks to better understand immigrant and 
host society interactions and adaptations (Nelson & Hiemstra 2008). Rather than 
immigrants absorbing the host culture, however, the concept considers both cultures 
existing side-by-side (hence the ‘multi’ aspect of culture) and valuing the differences 
(e.g., Modood 2008). Many nevertheless fault multiculturalism for its tendency to see 
host and immigrant cultures as fixed and mutually exclusive (Hoon 2006; Yuval-Davis 
1997). 
Transnationalism gained prominence in the 1990s to explain ongoing attachments 
and active social networks migrants have across national boundaries (e.g., Basch, 
Schiller, & Blanc 1992; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006). It effectively questions the idea that 
migrants discard previous identities and adopt those of the new host culture (Nelson & 
Hiemstra, 2008). Its focus is on migrants’ perspectives (Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006; Nagel 
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& Staeheli 2008). Scholars employing transnationalism often see the host society (i.e. the 
nation) as either an afterthought or as a site of discrimination and exclusion (Antonsich 
2018). 
Cultural assimilation, multiculturalism, and transnationalism also all tend to 
assume a uniform host society as tied to a place, and more specifically the boundaries of 
a nation-state (Wimmer & Schiller 2003; Antonsich 2012). For example, studies 
regarding immigrant integration in Germany consider “German” society as national and 
undifferentiated within Germany (Ehrkamp 2005), those examining immigrants in France 
envision “French” society coterminous with the state’s borders (Brubaker 1992), and so 
forth across numerous states (Antonsich 2012).  
Some integration scholars admittedly seek to challenge ideas of the host society 
by deconstructing taken-for-granted categories like “ethnicity” and “race” (e.g., Roediger 
1999). Even so, this critical work maintains the idea of a uniform host society; it 
seemingly substitutes “host society” with whichever dominant group is the focus of 
study, be it race (Clarke 2020), religion (Egorova 2015), or some other national trait. So 
instead of an “Italian” society, for example, these scholars see “white” culture (Antonsich 
2012). The critical integration scholarship also remains tied to a predefined, national 
territory, with researchers projecting the perceived/imagined dominant group onto the 
whole of a national territory (e.g., Leitner 2012) rather than considering the nation as 
variegated and contextual as has been more common among cultural geographers 
researching post-colonial contexts (e.g., Mills 2010). In many respects, the persistence of 
a fixed host society within integration literature (regardless of approach employed), and 
the ongoing methodological nationalism in migration studies, is indistinguishable from 
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the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) confounding political geographers wherein states are 
“containers” of societies with analysis centering on the nation-state.  
Efforts to move beyond methodological nationalism in integration scholarship can 
conceptually benefit from political geographers’ efforts to escape the territorial trap. 
These scholars broke free from nation-state-based analyses by problematizing territory 
and prioritizing place (Murphy 2010; Agnew 1994, 2015). Place is a geographic location 
with human attachment and meaning (Cresswell 2014; Tuan 1990). It necessarily 
includes everyday spaces where people conduct their lives and socially engage with one 
another (Agnew 2015). These everyday spaces, localities, are where individuals and 
groups create notions of national identity (Mills 2010). Locality thus shapes identity 
through the feelings of belonging to a place, and so to the nation as an imagined 
community (Mills 2008; see also Tuan 1990). Place’s connection to the nation/national 
identity shows why place should play a prominent role in host society conceptualizations 
for scholars studying integration. Integration scholars should also critically consider the 
population living in places where integration is an issue. Some people may have localized 
understandings different from the broad, nationalist narratives set forth in laws or policies 
as to what constitutes the “host society.” And some of these people may have personal 
attachments to place that shape everyday interactions and thus integration (Huot, Dodson, 
& Rudman 2014). So using a framework addressing place helps move beyond 
methodological nationalism in integration studies. 
“Belonging,” as put forth by Marco Antonsich (2010), is a framework that 
considers attachments to place (see also Yuval-Davis 2006). Indeed, belonging “can be 
understood as a sense of feeling at home, where individuals build an attachment to place 
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over time” (Huot, Dodson, & Rudman 2014; p. 330). The framework contains two foci; 
the first is collective acts of inclusion and exclusion whereby people police the 
boundaries of communities (Yuval-Davis 2011). Marco Antonsich (2010) calls this the 
“politics of belonging.” This first focus addresses how one interacts with, or feels part of, 
a broader community. Because the nation may be one such community, scholars often 
use belonging “more or less consciously, as a synonym for identity, and in particular 
national or ethnic identity” (Antonsich 2010, 644). The politics of belonging does not 
necessarily coincide with place but may be more of a relational attachment with others. 
Yet even that relational attachment connects   
Belonging’s second focus is an individual’s personal sense of belonging and 
emotional attachment to place (Antonsich 2010). Personal belonging centers on two 
primary points of inquiry, namely one’s: (1) identifications, and (2) emotional 
attachments (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Both points center on who people are/are not, what it 
means to be a member of certain groups, an individual’s construction of identity, and may 
even include legal citizenship or residency (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006). These 
points consider whether one feels “in place” or “out of place” (Cresswell 1996). 
The geographic literature emphasizes that belonging is a process that consistently 
redefines one’s relationship with people and places rather than a static definition of one’s 
connection to persons or a place (Wright 2015; Antonsich 2010; Massey 2005). 
Regarding place as a component in the process of belonging, Doreen Massey (2005) 
observes, “We are always, inevitably, making spaces and places” (p. 175). So it is that 
“belonging” is not simply a social practice, but rather a process affecting, and in turn 
affected by, the place in which it occurs (see Nielson 2020). This understanding of 
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belonging coincides with critical approaches to the nation and national identity as 
continuously re-created and subject to multiple meanings (Mills 2010; see also Herzfeld 
2014).  
The framework applied in this article combines elements from both belonging and 
everyday nationhood to better understand the nation/host society. It engages everyday 
nationhood’s focus on ordinary people and attaches it with belonging’s idea of personal 
belonging to examine ordinary persons’ personal sense of belonging. That is, the 
framework focuses on ordinary persons’ identifications and emotional attachments. 
Findings from this framework admittedly are not broadly representative, but as with 
results from qualitative inquiries, they are not intended to be so (Baxter & Eyles 1997). 
The study’s purpose is instead to provide a window into current conditions shaping 
integration discourses and better understand those persons who comprise the host 
societies into which migrants are to integrate according to the ever-increasing integration 
laws. 
6.3 The Belgian Context 
Belgium provides a unique environment to consider immigrant integration and 
one’s personal sense of belonging. First, the state lacks the coherence and resurgent 
nationalism that has been linked to anti-immigrant politics in Europe. Belgian nationhood 
has been a vexing concept since the Belgian state’s creation, sitting uneasily with 
competing nationalisms and multiple concepts of “community.”  
Belgium began in 1830 as a unitary state with French as the sole official 
language. The country had been part of the Netherlands since 1815, but the 
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predominantly Catholic population resented interference in their territory by a protestant 
king (see, e.g., Cook 2004). Prior to Dutch rule in the early 19th century, large parts of 
what is now eastern Belgium once comprised the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, a self-
governing state in the Holy Roman Empire for over 800 years. The remaining parts of the 
present-day Belgian territory had been ruled at times by Spanish, Austrian, and French 
sovereigns (Cammaerts 1921). Perhaps owing to this varied history of outside rule, 
Belgium has significant local attachments, often at the level of the commune, and 
certainly along linguistic lines (see, e.g., Murphy 1988).  
Following independence from the Netherlands, a minority French-speaking elite 
dominated government and educational institutions, as well as commerce in urban areas 
throughout the country, including the country’s Flemish-speaking1 northern half known 
as Flanders. Starting in the mid-19th century, Flemish speakers began advocating for 
linguistic equality with French, with some even advocating for complete independence 
for Flanders (see, e.g., Murphy 1988). This advocacy eventually led to six state reforms 
between 1970 and 2014 that decentralized authority across three regions (Flanders, 
Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital region) and three linguistic communities (Flemish, 
French, and German).2 Each federated entity has its own parliament equal in authority as 
the national parliament within their legally assigned competencies (Deschouwer 2012). 
The linguistic communities’ competencies including policies regarding “immigrant 
 
1 Flemish is also known as “Belgian Dutch.” 
2 Dutch-speakers comprise the Flemish Community and live in Flanders and the Brussels-
Capital Region. The French Community consists of Wallonia’s residents and all French-
speakers in the Brussels-Capital Region. The German-speaking Community consists of 
nine municipalities located in Wallonia near the German border. This community 
represents a tiny fraction of Belgium’s total population and does not have a separate 
region. 
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integration” (Swyngedouw 2016).3 This being said, much of the nationalist ‘integration’ 
rhetoric comes from Flanders and Flemish members of the national parliament, with the 
rhetoric increasingly favoring Flemish nationalism rather than a Belgian identity (see, 
e.g., Boonen & Hooghe 2014). Wallonia, on the other hand, references “integration” in 
various laws but leaves the term largely undefined (e.g., 2016 Décret). And the region 
does not seek out a separate “Walloon” identity.  
Second, identifications and emotional attachments (i.e., personal belonging) may 
vary more in Belgium than in other European countries based on its immigrant 
population’s origins. Eighteen percent of its total population was foreign born in 2010 
(Petrovic, 2012), with roughly 70% of all immigrants who live in Belgium coming from 
other European Union countries (“A statistical overview,” n.d.). So the country has large 
numbers of immigrants that are neither racial nor religious minorities because of their 
European origins, meaning that integration discourses in Belgium may differ, as might 
the lived reality for immigrants and local citizens alike, vis-à-vis societal expectations 
and immigrant integration. Even so, the country also receives large numbers of 
immigrants from non-EU countries; the 2015 immigrant wave into Europe contributed to 
a greater proportional population increase in Belgium than it did in Germany or France 
(Connor & Krogstad 2016), two countries that dominate integration scholarship (e.g., 
Ehrkamp 2006; Croucher 2009).  
Third, state-level integration narratives in Belgium closely parallel those in its 
larger neighbors, especially in terms of the growing salience of securitization discourses. 
 
3 The Flanders region and Flemish community combined their parliaments into a single 
entity. 
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Belgium served as the base of operations for the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks in 
2015 and 2016, and the attackers all had migrant backgrounds (Schreur & Bilefsky 
2017). European politicians seized on the attacks to call for stricter laws governing 
immigrants and mandating integration (Erlanger 2016). One measure from Belgium’s 
national parliament requires immigrants to sign a pledge promising to accept Belgium’s 
(undefined) “local values” (Guardian 2016). Integration laws effectively gained new 
urgency and prominence in Belgium and across Europe following the attacks.  
But again, such narratives primarily come from Flanders and the Flemish-
dominated national parliament, not Wallonia. Wallonia itself lacks nationalistic rhetoric; 
there is no “Walloon” movement or even an overt “Belgian’ nationalism. The 
“integration” laws passed by the Walloon parliament focus on welcoming migrants and 
creating an “intercultural” society (e.g., 27 Mars 2014 Décret, Article 151). Some 
commentators describe Walloon legislation as striking a balance between assimilation 
and multiculturalism (Adam 2011; Torrekens et al 2014). Wallonia’s using the term 
“integration” in legislation may be nothing more than appeasing Flemish politicians at the 
federal level as legal citizenship is a federal competency, and Flemish lawmakers 
successfully changed citizenship laws to require “proof” of “integration” (see Pulinx & 
Van Avermaet 2015).  Consequently, persons in Belgium may make identifications and 
emotional attachments more local in nature than in many other countries. 
Finally, Belgium has always had a weak national identity. Indeed, identification 
with a Belgian “nation” is relatively weak (Biliet, Maddens, & Frognier 2006). The 
federalization and Flemish nationalism at play cause some to claim that Belgium is 
deconstructing a national identity (Rosoux & Van Ypersele 2012). Regardless, its local 
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attachments in many ways resemble those in Italy, where a similar history of local city-
states shaped modern attachments to the Italian state (Agnew 2002). 
6.4 Methods and Data Collection: Researching “Belgium” and “Belgian” 
Recognizing Belgium’s internal divide and its potential to shape integration 
debates as to persons’ identifications and emotional attachments, and while engaged in a 
larger study regarding immigrant integration in Wallonia, I resolved to explore how 
Walloons conceptualized a ‘Belgian’ identity (if at all) along with their emotional 
attachments to place. Conducted in 2018 and 2019, this exploration included more than 
100 in-depth interviews with immigrants and host society members alike, more than 60 
hours of participant observation in civic integration courses and training seminars for 
workers participating in integration projects, and informal conversations with hundreds 
more individuals.  
This article draws on sixty-seven of the in-depth interviews with ordinary people 
who might be considered part of the host society. To avoid making my own 
determinations as to who that might be, I followed Mette Strømsø’s (2019a) approach of 
recruiting participants without predefined notions of nationhood such as ethnicity, 
religion, class position, or formal citizenship. The primary criteria for being part of the 
study for this article is that the participants be living in Belgian national space at the time 
of the interview (Bauböck 2002) and that they claim a feeling of being “at home” 
there (Antonsich 2010). I refer to the participants in this article as “locals.” 
The locals include persons with family roots dating back generations, those born 
in Belgium to migrant parents, and those who are immigrants but married to Belgian 
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spouses (see Table 6.1.) So long as they claimed to be “at home” in Belgium, I included 
many second generation persons as “locals” because those descended from migrants 
comprise as much as one quarter of Belgium’s total population according to some 
estimates (e.g., Hertogen 2012), suggesting that having a foreign background is fairly 
regular in Belgium. Approximately 25% of the participants here were born in Belgium to 
immigrant parents, with another 9% being married to Belgians. Those whom I include as 
locals in this study are either migrants married to Belgians or are born in Belgium to 
migrant parents (second generation) who identify more with Belgium than with their 
countries of origin or their parents’ countries of origin. They are not “transnationals” per 
se but instead individuals emotionally connected to their current country. 
I recruited participants through various civic, government, religious, and non-
profit organizations around Wallonia. Several of the locals interviewed work at 
government-sponsored integration centers and so have direct responsibility for 
implementing regional laws aimed at migrant integration. Many of the others work at 
local non-profit organizations directly assisting new migrants with language acquisition, 
job training, and so forth. Both those at the integration centers and those at the NGOs are 
on the front lines in actively shaping host-society narratives about Belgium that migrants 
encounter in everyday living. I also recruited participants by knocking on doors in a 
public housing project mixed with migrants and locals.  
Interviews for this article occurred in French and lasted between 30 and 120 
minutes. Questions related not only to immigration and migrants, but also to participants’ 
understanding of the community and place to which they belong and how one can be part 
of it. I asked, for instance, what does it mean to be “Belgian”, and what defines Belgian 
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society? How do you identify yourself and what are the communities to which you feel 
you belong? What are the boundaries of your community/society?  I digitally recorded 
the interviews and transcribed as appropriate. Interview translations used here are my 
own. I identify all participants using pseudonyms. Content analysis followed an “analytic 
induction” approach (Crang 2013: 224) in which ideas emerged through an iterative 
process of going back and forth between the data and key concepts to categorize the 
material and explore relationships between individual experiences and perceptions, 
institutional structures and narratives, and place-based processes and patterns. 
6.5 Exploring Locals’ Personal Identifications and Attachments  
As described in section 2, integration discussions often assume a coherent 
national society awaiting migrants as they arrive. Many scholarly analyses take this as a 
given; the emphasis remains on nationalist ideologies and institutions’ hegemonic power 
over subordinate groups. Belgium provides a good case to explore this power’s uneven 
influence in a divided national society. Questions of place and belonging surface 
frequently in Belgium, as detailed above in section 3.  
Wallonia emerged as the choice for this study in part based on past survey data 
showing a stronger “Belgian” identity in Wallonia than in Flanders (Billet, Maddens, and 
Frognier 2006). Paradoxically, much of the nationalist “integration” rhetoric in Belgium 
comes from Flanders and Flemish members of the national parliament, with the rhetoric 
increasingly favoring Flemish nationalism rather than a Belgian identity. While Belgian 
identity has more purchase in Wallonia, the region does not have strong nationalist 
political parties. Indeed, nationalist parties garnered less than 0.004% of Wallonia’s vote 
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in the 2019 federal elections (in contrast, nationalist parties secured over 43% of the 
Flemish vote in 2019). Wallonia’s low levels of nationalism stand in sharp contrast to 
what is occurring in neighboring northern France, where French nationalist parties enjoy 
their greatest electoral strength and where the populace has comparable demographics to 
Wallonia. The region also has a mandatory “integration course” for newly arrived 
migrants, although the course emphasizes personal autonomy rather than conformity in 
Belgium (e.g., Manuel de délivrance 2015). These facts prompted me to explore how 
Walloons conceptualized a “Belgian” identity (if at all) along with their emotional 
attachments to place. Understanding these ordinary persons’ perceptions gained 
importance in the broader integration study as potentially varying identities might make it 
more difficult for migrants to identify a coherent host culture that they encounter in their 
everyday living and so complicate integration efforts. 
While I entered the field expecting that locals’ attitudes about Belgian identity 
would be complicated, and that more localized conceptions of identity might be more 
salient than a national Belgian identity, two points stood out. First, locals tended to 
identify themselves more by their locality (localized area where they lived) than their 
nationality (Belgian). Their emotional attachments were localized in scale, de-
territorialized from state or even regional boundaries. And expressions of identity were 
quite uneven among host-society members. Second, participants who claimed emotional 
attachments to a broader “Belgian” society did so primarily in comparative or situational 
contexts. They identified with Belgium more when away from the state, with their 
connection coalescing on their ability to return to Belgian territory and localities within it 
rather than an emotive link to a “Belgian” national community. The “Belgian” attachment 
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for many locals centered on their passport, not the state, and the passport’s ability to 
return to a specific place—their home. In many respects, locals themselves 
unapologetically adopted a “paper citizen” identity, echoing a critique commonly 
expressed by nationalists who claim that migrants are attached to the country on paper 
only (Brubaker 1992). I address these in turn. 
6.5.1 Creating an identity, albeit one often defined by locality 
 Many interviewees noted that one’s primary identity in Belgium often derived 
from their locality, meaning their local village or commune, rather than a broader 
nationality. Claude is one example. An ancestral Belgian, Claude was raised in Brussels 
but has lived in Wallonia much of his adult life. He says, “In my case, I am Bruxellois 
[someone from Brussels], so I never had strong attachments to either Flemish or 
Walloons” despite his having both Flemish and Walloon progenitors. Consequently, 
Claude says, “I identify myself first as Bruxellois” and adding “I’ve never felt Belgian.” 
Nor does he consider himself “Walloon.” Locals who were ancestrally Belgian and also 
students attending a university in Wallonia with a high percentage of foreign students 
recounted how classmates routinely made distinctions based on where they each came 
from within Belgium. Students were not simply “Belgian” to foreign students, but instead 
“Namurois” or “Mouscronaise” or “[fill in the locality].” Based on the country’s size, a 
comparable analogy would be if persons living in the United States identified themselves 
by their county instead of as “American.” 
 The attachment to locality was similar for locals who were not ancestrally 
Belgian. Carolina, for instance, was born in Belgium to Italian migrants. She says, “I feel 
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and identify more as Liègoise than I do anything else.” Matteo, another Belgian-born 
child of Italian immigrants and also a Liège native, provided a similar response. He 
surmised that it had to do with the city’s past as an independent principality. (The Prince-
Bishopric of Liege existed from AD 980 to 1795.) Regardless of the reason for these 
responses in Liège, locals in other places expressed comparable feelings. David and 
Marie, two university students of African origin who grew up in Brussels, share a similar 
mindset to Claude. David says, “I don’t really feel Belgian; I feel more Bruxellois.” 
Marie adds, “I too don’t feel Belgian, but I feel at home in Brussels.” Conversely 
Constança, another university student born and raised in Brussels to parents from France 
and Portugal, claimed a “Belgian” identity but limited it to Brussels, saying, “I feel 
Belgian, but I don’t identify with Flanders or Wallonia. I’m at home in Brussels.” Both 
Constança’s and Marie’s statements of feeling “at home” demonstrate the attachment to 
locality that typifies belonging imaginations in Belgium (Antonsich 2010). Constança 
considers being “Belgian” synonymous with Brussels, while many Walloons and others 
hold the opposite view presumably for reasons relating to Belgium’s history as set forth 
above in section 3. 
Claude considered the local attachments to be based on a broader mindset 
prevailing in Wallonia. He observed, “When someone from Charleroi has to go to 
Brussels, a distance of 30 to 50 kilometers depending on which part of the city one is 
going to or leaving from, it’s, “Whoa! [moving his hands away from his head like it is 
exploding and then making an explosion sound] Whoa!” Claude frequently traveled 
around Belgium for work, both in Flanders and Wallonia, and recounted how in place 
after place persons maintained a focus on their local village. He then proclaimed, 
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“Belgium is a village. It has a village mentality,” meaning that the inhabitants will not 
look beyond their local area. 
Some locals commented that even for themselves not being from a particular 
locality kept them outside of the local community. There was no larger “Belgian” identity 
to unite them. Louise’s experience exemplifies this. Louise is a white Belgian woman 
born and raised in Brussels. Her family roots in Belgium predate the Belgian state. Yet 
when Louise married and moved with her family to a small town in Wallonia, she felt as 
though she did not belong. “For 15 years,” she says, “I lived in a small village near 
Namur, and I was considered a foreigner because I was from Brussels. I always felt a 
difference. It was evident that I was not from there.” Louise continued, “Everyone who 
came from more than 10 kilometers from the village was foreigners.”  This experience 
shows just one of the challenges migrants face in identifying a coherent “host society” 
and that nationalists would have to confront in Belgium if promoting a “Belgian” 
identity.  
Jean-Michel’s experience while working in Brussels further demonstrates how 
local identities dictate belonging imaginaries. Born and raised in Liège, Wallonia’s 
largest city, Jean-Michel moved to Brussels in the late 1960s/early 1970s. He soon 
adopted a Brussels accent to avoid problems at work, which was dominated by native 
Bruxellois, some of whom were native Flemish speakers and who treated Walloons 
poorly. While the antagonism towards Walloons could be tied to Belgium’s linguistic 
divide (e.g., Murphy 1988), for Jean-Michel it was evident that workers banded behind a 
Bruxellois identity rather than a Belgian one. The issue was not one of language but more 
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where one came from. Indeed, Jean-Michel dropped the Brussels accent entirely once he 
returned to Wallonia in the 1980s. 
When asked about identity on more of a national scale, however, many locals 
directly tied their identities to where they lived on a state level. They considered 
themselves “Belgian” simply based on their residence, without necessarily identifying a 
deeper emotional attachment. This perspective cut across racial lines and familial or 
ancestral connection to Belgium. For example, a white, ancestrally Belgian male in his 
early 20s named Antoine says, “To be Belgian means to live in Belgium and desire to 
live in Belgium. It doesn’t really go farther than that.” Antoine has significant 
involvement with immigrants through a community volunteer program. He does not see 
cultural differences migrants might have as impeding their path to integration; for 
Antoine, so long as migrants lived in and wished to stay in Belgium, they could be 
“Belgian.” Their presence and intent to stay overrode other considerations. A non-profit 
worker named Clarisse, the Belgian-born daughter of a white ancestrally Belgian father 
and a Latin American migrant mother, similarly states that “living here [in Belgium]” 
makes one Belgian. She identified herself as Belgian based on her living in the country 
and assumed that identity even though she was racially mixed. Hisham, born in Belgium 
to a Spanish mother and Moroccan father, agrees; he says that he is “just Belgian” despite 
his mixed ancestry because he is “living in the territory.” 
The above examples of local attachments trumping national identities, and with 
national identities not being able to overcome local affections, provides empirical 
counterpoints to literature suggesting that persons use local attachments to claim national 
identities (e.g., Antonsich 2018; Clarke 2020). These strong local attachments preclude 
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membership by nationals who might otherwise maintain the same “national” traits such 
as race and language, as Louise’s and Jean-Michel’s experiences attest.  
Despite interviewees overwhelmingly disclaiming a “Belgian” identity in favor of 
a localized one or otherwise identifying as “Belgian” because Belgium is where they live, 
a small minority did claim a “Belgian” identity based on emotional attachment to the 
country, and most of these held fast to it. Many of those adhering to this identity worked 
at Wallonia’s regional integration centers designed to help immigrants adapt to Belgium. 
One ancestrally Belgian worker at a non-profit named Roman says, “I am attached to a 
Belgian identity first, before anything else.” Yet he still had a localized identity, stating, 
“I would say that I’m attached to the Luxembourg province” in southern Belgium as his 
next identity. Another worker, Patrizia, born in Belgium to Italian immigrants, related, “I 
have always felt Belgian. I tell people that I am Belgian and that my parents are Italian.” 
These workers’ attachment to Belgium inform their interactions with migrants. Indeed, 
many locals emphasize what Belgium means to them personally, including how all are 
considered equal under law, when speaking to migrants. Belgium’s laws and promise of 
equal justice for all are key themes these locals emphasize. Addressing universal Belgian 
laws potentially help immigrants arriving in the country aspire to a more inclusive 
Belgian identity rather than the fractured, scale dependent imaginations that currently 
exist among the broader populace. Migrants could thus identify a coherent host society 
based on laws (although some laws will be limited to Wallonia due to Belgium’s federal 
structure). 
Ironically enough, the vast majority of those strongly asserting a “Belgian” 
identity were not ancestrally Belgian. Patrizia, discussed above, is one example. Another 
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is Tawfiq, the Belgium-born, twenty-something son of Moroccan immigrants. He says, 
“I’m Belgian first. Then I would say a Moroccan. You could say I’m ‘multicultural’ 
(smiling). But I’m proud to be Belgian before anything else!” Pascal, born in Belgium to 
Congolese parents, says, “I really identify as a Belgian – truly Belgian. But at the same 
time, I am proud of my origins, meaning proud of my country of origin, my parents’ 
country (Congo).” So while claiming a Belgian identity, these interviewees did not 
dismiss other identities; rather, they embraced them but as subordinate to being 
“Belgian.” They did so despite other, long-term residents not necessarily enforcing a 
specific Belgian identity. (Although long-term residents may not pressure migrants to 
adopt a Belgian identity because for them the primary identity is one based on locality.) 
In sum, few imagined or described a distinct “Belgian” identity in national terms 
or even one coinciding with formal state (or regional) boundaries. Many respondents 
highlighted localities’ importance in the Belgian imaginary. Distinct identities exist 
within the state, shaped perhaps by Belgium’s federal nature. Or it could be that the 
federal nature more closely aligns with popular sentiment: being “Belgian” is local. 
6.5.2 Emotional attachments to place, and attachments through one’s 
passport 
Some interviewees expressed their attachment to Belgium in emotional terms. 
Most did not. The primary attachment to place was through one’s passport—whether or 
not the interviewee had a migrant background (second generation, married to a Belgian). 
For those who expressed an actual attachment to place, meaning Belgium, the attachment 
came when away from the state more so than when inside of it. That is, their identity as 
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“Belgian” and their connection to place coalesced around comparisons to other countries 
and cultures. Françoise exemplifies this point. Born and raised in Wallonia, Françoise 
spent one year of high school as a foreign-exchange student in rural Kentucky (U.S.A.). 
She began to see herself as distinctly Belgian rather than any other identity while abroad 
and says that she maintained that sentiment after returning. Françoise did not qualify her 
statements to Wallonia or even her hometown. Instead, she identified with Belgium as a 
whole. To help others better appreciate Belgium as a place and a Belgian identity, 
Françoise joined a local association that promotes Belgian identity and culture, including 
aspects perhaps more associated with Flemish and/or German areas within the state. The 
association’s intended audience is everyone who wants to better appreciate Belgium—
native Belgians and recent migrants. Asked what she considered to be the Belgian 
identity that she missed while in Kentucky and that she consequently promotes in 
Belgium, Françoise pointed to a conception of one’s self. Belgians, she believes, do not 
take themselves too seriously. She added that they enjoy sports, particularly soccer and 
cycling, and take pride in their cuisine. “Belgian food is French quality with German 
quantity,” she says, before laughing and adding, “Luckily it’s not German quality and 
French quantity!”  
Françoise’s sentiments are not lost on other locals who increasingly express 
attachments to Belgium and identify themselves as Belgian when outside of the state. 
Karena is one example. Married to a Belgian and in the country for more than 10 years 
dating to her early 20s, Karena increasingly feels attached to Belgium. “Each time I go to 
Romania,” she says, “I want to return to Belgium. I feel that Belgium is my home.” 
Asked if she considers herself Belgian, Karena says, “Personally, I feel Belgian, but not 
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100%. … I identify myself as Belgian with a Romanian origin.” Constança, the university 
student born in Brussels to migrant parents, says, “When I am abroad, I say I’m Belgian, 
but with a French and Portuguese origin.” She makes this statement despite not having 
Belgian citizenship herself or any other claim to the country beyond being raised in 
Brussels. And even then Constança limits her view of the Belgian identity to Brussels, as 
explained above. These identities and attachments when abroad correspond with Michael 
Skey’s (2011) findings among native English persons. 
Finally, several locals expressed their attachment to Belgium based on their 
passport. That is, their emotional attachment was based on the right to come and go to 
that place. In the context of belonging, this relates to what Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) 
considers critical to “enter a state or any other territory of a political community and, 
once inside,” stay there (p. 208). Passports make that entrance to a place possible. Yet the 
ability to come and go, and the connection to that ability rather than to the place itself, 
fits with a critique many nationalists make, and one that often appears in integration 
discourses, that migrants acquiring their host society’s citizenship are attached to the 
country only on paper (their passport) but without deeper emotional connections to the 
country, thereby being “paper French” (cf. Brubaker 1992), or in this case “paper 
Belgians.” 
In Belgium the paper citizen critique is not simply made by right-wing 
nationalists espousing an exclusionary mindset. Jean-Luc is one example. Born in 
Belgium to Congolese immigrants but a naturalized Belgian citizen since his youth, Jean-
Luc served in parliament as a member of a center-left political party. He says: 
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What I’ve noticed is that there are a lot of people like me, those who are 
native Congolese but who are Belgian, who are still too attached to Congo. 
They consider Belgium, how to say it? [Thinking.] They consider Belgium 
as not really being their country, you know? I call these persons “paper 
Belgians.” They are effectively Belgians with their passports, their id 
cards, but they are going to criticize Belgium; [changing his tone of voice 
to a critical tone as he mimics these persons stating] “Belgium is like this,” 
or “Belgians are like that.” They are always going to criticize like it’s not 
their country. 
Jean-Luc made this statement while discussing his belief that immigrants should actively 
foster connections to the country, just as his mother had done and taught him. One 
example he gave was his learning Dutch so that he could better understand the country as 
a whole (rather than just the francophone community). Yet despite Jean-Luc’s passionate 
advocacy for Belgium and his professed Belgian identity, Jean-Luc revealed that he too 
lacked emotional connection to the Belgian state. “If I had the opportunity tomorrow to 
go work in Canada, for example, I would go,” he said, then adding, “I am a Belgian, but 
not particularly attached to the country.” 
 Locals with ancestral ties to Belgium similarly claimed to lack emotional 
connections to the country other than their passports. And they were not afraid to say so. 
Bernadette opined that being a Belgian “is just a nationality, because after that … 
[pausing and thinking]. It’s just a nationality. That’s all.” Asked to expound, Bernadette 
stated, “Yes, you could say that there is a culture, and Theo Francken [a far-right, 
Flemish nationalist then serving as the Belgian federal government’s top official over 
migration] would say that there are values, but I don’t have the same values as him. So, 
you know, it’s too bad for him.” She would rather that her passport state her identity as 
“citizen of the world” than Belgian as Bernadette did not see a coherent host society in 
Belgium at any sort of national scale but sought instead connections to humanity broadly. 
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Bernadette attributed at least some of her non-affinity for a Belgian identity to her parents 
and annual trips abroad they took as a family during her youth. Her father was a 
professor, and the family spent at least three months per year outside of Belgium. Claude, 
who spent two years in England working with a multinational team, said, “I am Belgian 
when I watch the national team in the World Cup. That is perhaps the only time I am 
Belgian.” Yet even those who did not spend time abroad like Bernadette discounted a 
desire to belong to a specific “Belgian” identity. Sarah, a university student, says, “I don’t 
think of myself as Belgian. It’s my country, but it’s not how I define myself.” Her 
roommate and fellow native Belgian Geraldine says, “Belonging to a specific Belgian 
nationality isn’t really important to me.” 
 Another local with Belgian ancestry, a white male named Paul, expressed his lack 
of emotional connection to the country by explaining his personal situation. He married a 
woman raised in Belgium but whose parents are Moroccan. Paul and his wife then gave 
their children Moroccan names so that they could have dual citizenship with Morocco. 
Ironically, Paul is a government worker tasked with overseeing migrants living in his 
Walloon city. All migrants with any legal status in the country (e.g., those with five-year 
work permits, asylees, etc.) must register with their local commune. In effect, he is the 
chief local officer for ensuring migrants’ compliance with legal obligations. Despite his 
legally defined role, Paul summarized his sentiments towards the Belgian identity by 
bluntly stating, “I’m not particularly attached to Belgium.” This expression was almost 
identical to Jean-Luc’s despite his and Paul’s radically different backgrounds. 
 The reasons for this lack of emotional attachment vary. Claude considered it to be 
geographical based: 
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Belgians, I think because of their history and their geographic situation, 
the fact that they are in between the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
England, and so forth, the Belgians never had a nationalist feeling like 
other nations. The French are truly French. The Dutch have their distinct 
colors and manner of dress. A German is German. An English is English. 
By nature Belgians adapt to everything and everyone. That is part of our 
DNA. We live like this. A Belgian is never going to confront, he is going 
to go around. So you see, in all, Belgians are not really a nationalistic 
people. 
Essentially, Belgium’s history eliminates any sort of nationhood. He might be right. As 
explained in section 3 and demonstrated above, the country is extremely place-based, 
with localities trumping state-based boundaries for belonging. Belgium is very localized 
in attachment. 
 In the end, this localized focus carries over into Wallonia’s approach to 
immigrants. The Walloon government does not promulgate strong assimilation directives. 
While it maintains a mandatory “integration course” for newly arrived migrants, that 
course does not dictate conformance to a particular Belgian or Walloon ideal (e.g., 27 
Mars 2014 Décret; 28 avril 2016 Décret; Structure thématiques de la formation n.d.). So 
there is no overt pressure by a government (much less one filled by nationalists) to 
conform. The emphasis on localities ultimately may create confusion for migrants 
seeking to identify a host society to which they may belong. But it also provides 
opportunities for migrants to adopt a broader “Belgian” identity that others in Belgium 
may also share and that is readily available to them. 
 Locals maintain two primary criteria for newcomers to assume a Belgian identity, 
as explained above. These are either (1) to live in Belgium and desire to remain there, or 
(2) to hold a Belgian passport. Locals themselves, as putative host society members, 
maintain these criteria even for themselves due to their otherwise locality-based 
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identities. And for migrants and locals alike, there are instances when they will not be 
part of a community depending on that community’s locality within Belgium.  
6.6 Conclusions 
Wallonia’s everyday realities demonstrate why integration scholars cannot 
conceptually categorize a “host society” as homogenous. Locals often have divergent 
ideas as to what their society’s identity is—or even if there is one. Identities and 
emotional attachments to place (personal belonging) are critical to understanding 
integration discourses because they demonstrate that host societies are not monolithic. 
Persons may have attachments to or beliefs about identities and places that can readily 
vary from one locality to the next. This phenomenon is not limited to Belgium. John 
Agnew (2002), for example, considered place-based political attachments in Italy. He 
argued that local attachments shape politics, and that those politics play out through 
nationalist parties that ultimately derive from local places (Agnew 2002). In Belgium, the 
political divides based on locality show that migrants may still find a place within a state 
even if nationalist, anti-migrant rhetoric seems commonplace there. Nationalists have 
significant power in Belgium, but as shown here, Walloons are not as nationalist in 
nature.  
 Next, the Walloon experience reveals how scholars should heed Antonsich’s 
(2018) call to engage the nation in research and not simply treat is as a site of exclusion 
and discrimination. Indeed, treating it in such a fashion falls prey to methodological 
nationalism/the territorial trap. Just as geographers critically considered place to avoid the 
territorial trap (Murphy 2010), integration researchers should engage place and critically 
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consider the local population living in that place. This is particularly salient in an era of 
increased nationalism and integration demands. Too often researchers dismiss the nation 
outright to focus instead on migrants. Yet host societies are not monolithic entities and 
nationalist ideologies do not necessarily shape immigration, integration, and citizenship 
policies in any singular way; there is a process that significantly varies across national 
space. This variance results from ordinary persons’ competing imaginaries and emotional 
attachments to place that may be more local in nature. Each person has his or her own 
notion of who they are, who is part of their fellow community—and they act accordingly. 
So while certain ideas/societal conceptions may appear one way, the everyday 
imaginations among so-called host society members may be different.  
This analysis assumes greater relevance in areas that do not have stated regional 
divisions like Belgium does but that nevertheless have divergent ideas about place and 
identity across geographical space. It could be readily applied in the United States, for 
instance, where what is viewed to be true “Americana” varies by locality, with one in 
“flyover country” seeing things differently from a coastal urbanite (see Kendzior 2018). 
To be welcome within, and feel part of, these varying communities requires some 
conformance to localized ideals and politics (see Cresswell 1996). Locals in conservative 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, (USA) made clear that Muslims were not welcome in their 
overwhelmingly Christian community by filing suit to block a mosque from being 
constructed (Farmer 2010). Similarly, locals in progressive Philadelphia pressured 
conservative foster care agencies to close due to the agencies’ opposing child placement 
with same-sex couples. 
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More broadly, this study demonstrates the methodological advantages of engaging 
everyday nationhood and personal belonging to more critically address integration 
discourses in contemporary nationalistic environments. Researchers examining 
integration would be wise to prioritize ordinary persons’ perceptions in their studies to 
better understand integration’s localized nature, especially considering how one’s 
individual sense of belonging may ultimately shape broader integration politics. This is 
particularly true as governments increasingly legislate integration laws and define the 





















Ancestrally Belgian 44 
Born in Belgium 
(2nd generation)
17 
Migrant but married 
to a Belgian
6 
Table 6.1. Interviewees’ backgrounds
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CHAPTER 7 
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This research addressed immigrant integration in Belgium using qualitative 
methods. Belgium is a microcosm for Europe’s contemporary integration debates. The 
politically and culturally fractured country gives power over integration to regional 
governments rather than the national parliament. Nationalists dominate in Flanders and 
enact assimilative integration laws there while Wallonia, far from being nationalist, also 
adopts integration laws for its territory. Flanders’ integration laws receive frequent 
attention (e.g., Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015), but Wallonia’s do not. This internal 
division, though unique to Belgium, reflects the general unevenness across Europe as the 
continent is not homogeneous in integration politics. Negotiating membership may still 
occur. Accordingly, this study explored the interplay between Wallonia’s integration laws 
and immigrants and non-immigrants localized, co-existent experiences and relationships. 
It did so by considering three key populations with differing connections to integration 
laws: (1) workers tasked with implementing Wallonia’s integration laws, (2) migrants 
affected by these laws, and (3) locals comprising the “host society” into which migrants 
are to integrate according to the laws.  
7.1 Workers’ Implementing Wallonia’s Integration Laws  
 The workers involved in this study who were implementing Wallonia’s 
integration laws were key informants at all eight state-sponsored regional integration 
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centers (centres régionaux d’integration (CRI)), including the centers’ directors. These 
workers show how integration cannot conceptually be categorized as an either/or 
proposition set forth by the state along a multicultural versus assimilationist ideological 
spectrum. At a local level, CRI workers simultaneously incorporate elements from 
normative assimilationist and multicultural models. CRI workers call this mingled 
approach “interculturalism,” a term used in Wallonia’s integration laws but left undefined 
within them (30 Avril 2009 Décret; 27 mars 2014 Décret).   
Regardless of terminology, CRI workers shape societal boundaries for inclusion 
and exclusion in their localized spaces. The local host society they interact with, along 
with the immigrants living there, will create a new culture together that will vary from 
one locale to the next depending on those comprising it, much as a cake might depend on 
the ingredients used in making it. CRI with more sub-Saharan African immigrants 
promote different cultures than those with more Maghrebian immigrants, for instance, as 
shown by the African Night Festival.  
CRI workers reveal as well how scholars and policymakers alike might rethink 
integration. Integration is broader than a uniform state or subnational policy; it is a 
political process that varies across national space. This variance can be both regional, as 
Flanders and Wallonia adopt differing ‘integration’ laws in their respective regions, and 
local as actors implementing integration laws within Wallonia do so differently—at a 
localized level—based on divergent ideas of belonging and community. CRI workers 
have their own notions of how things should be, or how they are on the ground, and act 
accordingly. So while laws may dictate one thing, workers may do another. CRI Director 
2’s comments that workers “work against the regulations” and Director 7’s emphasis that 
205 
workers “maneuver” within the decrees are just two statements exemplifying this reality. 
No two workers will maneuver within and work against integration laws in the same way 
regardless of any uniform integration law. 
7.2 Migrants Affected by Wallonia’s Integration Laws  
 Migrants are perhaps the most talked-about group in integration discourses. Yet 
many studies do not talk to migrants. This study directly talked to migrants directly 
affected by Wallonia’s integration laws, employing a “bottom-up” approach increasingly 
emphasized in literature but underutilized in practice (see, e.g., Harpaz & Mateos 2019). 
The migrants in this study are those attending government-sponsored citizenship classes 
known as “Citizen Integration Training” (Formation à l’Intégration Citoyenne, or FIC) 
(27 Mars 2014 Décret) that migrants attend either as a condition of formal citizenship or 
as a condition of their residence permits (Article 12bis; 27 Mars 2014 Décret). These 
immigrants have emotional attachments to Belgium’s political culture, not its national 
culture. Love of the nation (culturally) is critical for most nationalists (Ho 2009) and 
seemingly an objective for citizenship course proponents (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015), 
yet it is not a primary motivator for those migrants in Wallonia’s FIC courses (at least 
those interviewed here).  
Migrants focused their emotional attachments on Belgium’s political culture, 
meaning its legal system and rights related to formal citizenship that they previously 
lacked like safety and personal liberty. While seemingly suggesting that migrants see 
citizenship in purely instrumental terms, the overall picture is more complex than an 
attachment to the new country and its culture as nationalists may advocate. Indeed, some 
migrants see formal citizenship as a means of securing an identity. They believe that legal 
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citizenship will provide social acceptance—belonging—in Belgian society (e.g., Eliassi 
2016). These findings may be at odds with what nationalists expect, but consistent with 
Wallonia’s seemingly relaxed attitude towards migrants (Pulinx & Van Avermaet 2015; 
Adam 2011; Martiniello 1995). In short, migrants make emotional attachments to the 
state as a place, but their feelings differ from nationalists’ desired emotions. This 
complicates current understandings of citizenship as state-centered and with migrants 
making citizenship decisions devoid of attachments to the host country, thereby 
highlighting that national citizenship is not an either/or proposition. 
Next, the Walloon experience reveals how scholars and policymakers alike should 
rethink citizenship and migrant expectations in nationalist environments. Migrants 
develop emotional attachments to the state, just different attachments from what native-
born nationalists might have themselves. The migrants’ attachments do not imply any 
less devotion to the state. And even then, each migrant has his or her own notions of what 
citizenship means. Riza and Esther, for instance, sees citizenship as religious liberty. For 
Seif, it is an identity. Fatoumata sees citizenship as safety within Belgium. Each has their 
own emotional attachments tied to Belgium as a place. 
7.3 Locals Comprising the “Host Society” into Which Migrants Are to Integrate 
According to Wallonia’s Integration Laws  
Locals comprising the “host society” into which migrants are to integrate 
according to the laws complicate notions of a “national” or monolithic host society. 
(“Locals” in this study consisted of persons living in Wallonia who claim to feel “at 
home” there.) These locals, as fellow community members, have competing imaginaries 
and emotional attachments to place that might be more local in nature. Each person acts 
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according to his or her own notions of who they are and who members of their fellow 
community are. So while certain ideas/societal conceptions may appear one way, 
everyday imaginations may be different. This suggests that that scholars should rethink 
their assumptions about host societies and that nationalist ideologies do not necessarily 
shape immigration, integration, and citizenship policies in any singular way; there is a 
process that significantly varies across national space. 
A key feature of considering locals’ perspectives is that it engages the nation in 
this research rather than seeing the nation as a site of exclusion and discrimination. This 
is particularly salient in an era of increased nationalism and integration demands. 
Researchers often dismiss the nation outright to focus instead on migrants. This article 
thus adds to a limited—but growing—literature focused on host society perceptions (e.g., 
Clarke 2020; Strømsø 2019; Antonsich 2012; Miller-Idriss 2006).  
7.4 Implications 
 This dissertation actively contributes to policy and academic understandings in 
several significant ways. First, this dissertation fulfills a need in Wallonia for qualitative 
research regarding immigrant experiences and integration. Multiple CRI directors 
commented on the lack of qualitative data they were able to provide to lawmakers. The 
desperately desired to share qualitative information to shape future integration laws and 
policies in a way that fosters inclusion in an era of rising nationalist sentiment across 
Europe. But due to government directives to prepare an increasing number of quantitative 
reports, there is a lack of time and resources to produce qualitative material. Relating 
these findings back to CRI directors, as I intend to do (and as some requested), should 
thus facilitate Walloon lawmakers receiving more robust information to guide their 
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legislative efforts. And this information should help lawmakers better understand 
migrants’ motivations in being in Belgium, including their perspectives and emotional 
attachments to their new country of residence, perspectives that may significantly differ 
from those that lawmakers previously (or even presently) might suppose. 
Second, this dissertation provides theoretical and empirical support for a more 
critical perspective on integration. This perspective considers migrants’ and non-
migrants’ viewpoints and is sensitive to emotion and place. Theoretically, this research 
reveals the methodological strength “belonging” contributes to integration literature due 
to its conceptual emphasis on migrants and non-migrants together determining the 
differences that do/do not matter on a local scale. Belonging incorporates local actors’ 
ideals of community and prioritizes them over regional or national policymakers’ 
perspectives. How local actors, including workers implementing integration legislation, 
shape inclusion/exclusion boundaries may be uneven and not always according to stated 
laws. This also connects theoretically with the idea of locality in integration research. 
Focusing on localities incorporates migrants’ and non-migrants’ identities and 
attachments, including their imagined communities, and prioritizes them over an assumed 
homogenous host society (or a presumed discriminatory and exclusionary nation). This 
helps escape the tendency to view the host society as a conceptual hegemon. And it 
moves beyond methodological nationalism in integration studies. Researchers examining 
integration would thus be wise to incorporate belonging and locality in their study to 
better understand integration’s localized nature, especially considering one’s individual 
sense of belonging may ultimately shape broader integration politics. 
209 
Empirically, by combining migrant and non-migrant perspectives in a single 
study, this dissertation richly supports Nagel’s (2009) argument that migrants and host 
society members together influence the meaning of integration. Integration studies 
typically do not simultaneously consider migrant and non-migrant viewpoints. They 
instead focus separately on either state (Antonsich 2019), migrant (Ehrkamp 2005), or 
local population (Strømsø 2019) perspectives. Segmenting studies in such a way makes it 
difficult to understand law’s influence on integration overall rather than a component 
part. But as shown in the holistic approach considering migrant and non-migrant 
perspectives applied here, laws may influence integration discourses among immigrants 
and locals without necessarily dictating those discourses. This is particularly salient when 
discussing integration laws as such laws’ purpose is presumably to shape integration.  
Further empirical support for a critical perspective on integration applied here 
concerns emotion and place. As shown in Chapter Five, migrants maintain emotional 
attachments to Belgium. Many seek an identity to the state through formal citizenship (a 
desire to be “Belgian”). Conversely, as shown in Chapter Six, many non-migrants in 
Belgium seek connections to their local commune rather than the state. These competing 
emotional attachments make it difficult for immigrants and non-migrants to connect with 
each other (and in some instances for non-migrants from different communes as shown 
by Louise’s and Claude’s experiences). 
 Third, this dissertation adds to an emerging scholarship centered on migrants’ 
perspectives and to broader discourses regarding identity creation and formation. 
Considering migrants’ attitudes and the values they ascribe to legal citizenship, 
belonging, and identity in their new state enhances understandings of nationalism’s 
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presence/absence in localized contexts as individuals (including migrants) locally 
produce national identities. In terms of identity creation, nationalists who see citizenship 
courses as key to preserving/maintaining a coherent national identity may need to 
reconsider course implementation and connections that immigrants may or may not make 
in them with the broader society. 
Fourth, this study contributes to growing literature on ordinary persons’ 
perspectives in addressing the nation as this study centers on ordinary persons, meaning 
those who are not considered the ruling elite. As noted earlier, Christian Joppke (2007b) 
considers ordinary persons’ perspectives as “one of the biggest lacunae in the literature” 
(p. 44). Researchers examining integration would be wise to prioritize ordinary persons’ 
perceptions in their studies to better understand integration’s localized nature, especially 
considering how one’s individual sense of belonging may ultimately shape broader 
integration politics. This is particularly true as governments increasingly legislate 
integration laws and define the host society that immigrants are supposed to integrate 
into. As shown here, engaging everyday nationhood and personal belonging to address 
integration discourses reveals ordinary persons’ perspectives. 
7.5 Practical Suggestions for Policymakers 
 This research pushed me to consider practical takeaways for policymakers. After 
speaking with workers, migrants, and locals, and also after attending FIC courses as a 
student, I thought about key policies lawmakers could pursue to facilitate integration. I 
wanted to identify the simplest policies that would not require efforts solely by migrants. 
Accordingly, I came up with two pragmatic proposals that address workers and migrants 
alike. 
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 My first policy proposal concerns workers interacting with migrants. It would 
require those working with migrants (in FIC courses, at CRIs, etc.) to receive cultural 
education about migrant groups coming into the country. It seemed to me that those who 
had greater cultural competency were more effective in their jobs and in helping migrants 
make connections to Belgium. For example, Pierre, the CRI worker mentioned in Chapter 
Four who understood cultural dynamics with Muslim migrants and so worked relatively 
well with them, had a degree in international studies. That being said, the policy proposed 
here would not mandate certain education levels or degrees; instead the required cultural 
training would come by way of a basic course providing broad overviews of world 
regions and cultures where migrants are coming from so that the workers can understand 
how to relate to these migrants. The course would be a basic workshop lasting a few 
hours.  
The cultural course’s effects could be profound in facilitating migrants’ 
connections in Belgium. An experience I had in one of the FIC courses I attended 
provides an example. Yesrin was a fellow student in the course. She came to Belgium 
from Yemen as a refugee. Wearing a headscarf and jilbab (a long, loose-fitting coat), 
Yesrin introduced herself on the first day by stating—in broken French—that her French 
was not very good so she could not really understand/talk with others. For the first 
several days, I noticed Yesrin sit quietly during the course and occasionally whisper to 
one of her Arabic-speaking classmates to get a brief explanation of what was going on. 
But during breaks, Yesrin actively engaged in conversations with Arabic-speaking 
classmates. One morning while waiting for class to start, I asked Yesrin in slow French 
how long she had been in Belgium. She responded by shaking her head and stating in 
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broken French that she did not really understand. So I repeated the question, this time in 
Arabic. Yesrin’s eyes lit up and a large smile spread across her face as she exclaimed to 
me and others, in Arabic, “You speak Arabic! He speaks Arabic!” I soon exhausted my 
limited knowledge of the language, yet from that point on Yesrin started making efforts 
to speak with me and others in her limited French. Others started reciprocating her 
efforts. Yesrin simply needed encouragement that others had at least a basic 
understanding of her background/culture, that they were not all antagonistic. Absent 
some sort of intervention like I did, however, Yesrin may have not achieved any sort of 
connection beyond other arabophone migrants. Indeed, the instructor Pascale did not ask 
students about their cultures or backgrounds throughout the course. (Sadly, Pascale made 
multiple comments reflecting cultural ignorance that visibly troubled some students.)  
 My second policy proposal is to require migrants to be actively involved in the 
community through some sort of organized hobby or sport that interests them. This could 
range from involvement with a community garden to dance classes to recreational sports 
clubs. This requirement serves two purposes. First, it connects migrants with locals who 
have similar interests. As mentioned in Chapter Five, various immigrants who felt greater 
connections to Belgium/with Belgians did so through other activities/connections. 
Viktoriya from Russia spoke favorably of her dance class and the Belgian friends she 
made there. Ping from China said the same about her badminton club. Second, requiring 
migrants to be in some sort of community activity facilitates language learning. 
Involvement requires migrants to speak with Belgians and so speak in French. Migrants 
would thus be learning French from locals rather than in a classroom setting surrounded 
only by other migrants. Mandatory involvement in these activities would last for a period 
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of time, such as 12 months, to achieve the policy’s purpose of connecting migrants with 
non-migrant Belgians. It would also coincide with participation in FIC, where migrants 
could come back and speak with their instructors and classmates about their experiences 
in Belgium. (The required hours in FIC would be reduced to 15-20 and spread out over a 
number of months.)  
7.6 Areas for Further Research 
Multiple future directions flow from this research. One concerns workers at 
private associations assisting migrants. Private organizations abound in Wallonia and 
Belgium; many provide services such as language instruction that help migrants comply 
with Wallonia’s legal directives concerning integration. These workers could provide a 
comparative point of analysis to, and expansion of, this dissertation research interviewing 
paid immigration workers at government-sponsored organizations.  
Other future directions include comparative projects with other integration 
programs internally in Belgium or with other European countries. Internally, these 
projects could certainly include comparisons between programs present in Wallonia and 
Flanders (the parcours d’integration, FIC, and inburgering) as well as between Wallonia 
and francophone Brussels. This latter scenario is especially relevant due to the split in 
integration laws and programs in the French Community (Adam 2007). Concerning 
comparative research with Flanders, several possibilities abound. A visiting researcher at 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel recently contacted me about my research with FIC courses 
because she is comparing citizenship courses in Flanders and Wallonia and wished to 
build upon my findings (Tuley, personal communication, June 15, 2020). A similar 
experience happened after I presented earlier findings at a conference in Maastricht last 
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fall when a Dutch researcher expressed interest in collaborating on a project comparing 
Wallonia’s civic integration classes I researched with those she was studying in the 
Netherlands. 
FIC, alone, presents at least two additional research directions. The first includes 
the content and pedagogy of FIC classes. I received access to FIC instructor materials and 
pedagogy guides from one of FIC’s two creators. Comparing the actual FIC course 
content with the broad-brushed directives in the legislation would illuminate connections 
between laws and localized educational experiences. A second research direction relates 
to FIC instructors’ perspectives on integration. Is there an expectation that one identify as 
something distinctly Belgian? Do the instructors have a unified Belgian identity? 
Focusing on the instructors themselves still steers clear of a set “state” identity and so in 
many respects maintains a “bottom up” approach to study integration as the instructors 
may also have citizenship ideals at variance with government mandates. Further, the FIC 
instructors are workers implementing the laws, thereby providing a comparative example 
to the CRI workers examined in Chapter Four. 
More broadly, my hope is that this project will pave the way for more 
transformative research regarding integration, research that moves away from state-
centric or migrant-centric approaches to instead seek out more localized, people-focused 
perspectives. This research will seek to understand migrant and non-migrant viewpoints 
as tied to a place. Doing so is critical amid rising nationalism as the two groups together 
determine those differences that do/do not matter (see Nagel 2009) and people remake 
places. Integration varies from one place to the next, even within a state, as Belgium 
demonstrates. The new framework I proposed and used in Chapter Six, which combines 
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elements of everyday nationhood and belonging, provides a concrete step for 
understanding integration in localized places.  
Overall, immigrant integration will remain a key issue in Europe (and across the 
world) in coming years as nationalism increases and migration continues. Integration 
legislation will be a part of the discussion. This dissertation’s showing the connection – 
or lack thereof – between laws and the localized, coexistent experiences between 
immigrants and citizens provides a foundation for future research and policy applications 
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